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**DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: EXPLAINING VARIATIONS
IN THE LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY**

by

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OF DEMOCRACY**

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation identified the determinants of a country's level of democracy. In 1996, President Clinton incorporated democracy promotion as a key element in the U.S. National Security Strategy. Experience since the Cold War demonstrated that the implementation of reforms do not necessarily result in a Western-style democracy. The selection and accountability of a country's leaders resides on a political spectrum from no democracy (i.e., fully autocratic) to full democracy with many variations in between.

Using a multi-method approach including econometric, computational, and case study analysis on Mexico, the Philippines, and Senegal, this study proposed and tested a model of democratic change based upon the interaction between a country's socio-economic conditions, its actors, and its level of democracy. The analysis determined that no one factor could definitively predict a change in democracy. Each factor affected the preferences of key actors whose interaction resulted in changes in democracy. Violence and poverty provided a centripetal effect on polity while economic crisis and the loss of an interstate war had a centrifugal effect that pushed polities towards the extremes of the polity spectrum. Although economic income and development contributed to the potential for democracy, neither factor affected the timing of changes in democracy.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFI	Agencia Federal de Investigación
ANSD	Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Demographie
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
CARP	Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
CNC	National Confederation of Peasants
ConAss	Constituent Assembly
COW	Correlates of War
CPP	Communist Party of the Philippines
CTM	Confederation of Mexican Workers
EDSA	Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, a euphemism for People Power
ERP	Popular Revolutionary Army
ERPI	Insurgent Popular Revolutionary Army
EZLN	<i>Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional</i>
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FEC	Federal Electoral Commission
FFF	Federation of Free Farmers
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GLS	Generalized Least Squares
IFE	Federal Electoral Institute
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INEGI	Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática

ISI	Import-substitute industrialization
MEPV	Major Episodes of Political Violence
MFDC	Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAMFREL	National Movement for Free Elections
NCR	National Capital Region
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPA	New People's Army
ONEL	National Electoral Observatory
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAN	National Action Party
PDS	Parti Democratique Senegalais
PFP	Policía Federal Preventiva
PITF	Political Instability Task Force
PNP	Philippine National Police
PO	People's Organization
PRD	Party of the Democratic Revolution
PRI	Institutional Revolutionary Party
PS	Parti Socialist
Stata	A data analysis and statistical software program
UN	United Nations
UNACOIS	Union Nationale des Commerçants et Industriels du Sénégal

UNTS	National Union of Senegalese Workers
Xtregar	Stata command for fixed or random effects linear regression with first order autoregressive disturbance.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This study is an exploration of the factors that determine a country's level of democracy. Using a multi-method approach, this study proposes and tests a model of democratic change based upon the interaction between a country's socio-economic conditions, its actors, and its level of democracy. Quantitative research, supplemented by case studies on Mexico, Philippines, and Senegal, demonstrated that structural factors affected democracy through their influence on the preferences of key actors including civil society, the military, non-government organizations, political parties, and the ruling regime.

Democracies are not created equal. While anywhere from half to two-thirds of contemporary governments can be classified as democratic, there is significant variation between governments in the practice of democratic processes. Even many autocracies practice limited democratic processes. After the end of the Cold War, the popularity of democracy (and democracy promotion as a foreign policy tool) dramatically increased. In 1996, President William Clinton incorporated democracy promotion as a key element within the U.S. National Security Strategy. Experience since the Cold War demonstrated that regardless of the method of change, the implementation of political reforms in a country do not necessarily result in a western European-style democracy.

There is a variation in the level of democracy between countries, accentuated by the wide divergence in styles of democracies since 1980. Governments reside on a political spectrum from no democracy (i.e., fully autocratic) to full democracy with many variations in between. Although there are several instantiations of democracy, this study analyzes democracy as a measure of the competitiveness, openness, and electoral constraints upon the selection and accountability of a country's leaders. The two ends of the political spectrum are easy to identify. Hereditary, strongman dictatorships such as North Korea and Syria clearly lack any semblance of democracy. On the other end of the spectrum, democracy rating entities such as Polity and Freedom House consistently give top marks to countries such as Canada, Japan, the United States, and most of Europe.

Although these governments are not without their problems, the people, without repression, can vote in regular, competitive elections that actually influence the type of government that forms.

Between the two extreme regime types lay governments with significant variations in their political processes. Venezuela, for example, has a history of democracy dating to 1958. The 1998 election of Hugo Chavez was democratic, but his party's success in the legislature gave Chavez almost unlimited power to change the constitution allowing Chavez to become increasingly autocratic. So far, his manipulation of the constitution has only been limited by the public referendum that rejected his bid to allow indefinite re-elections. Georgia has had a democratically elected government since 1991. However, the government continues to coerce the opposition. During a 2007 political crisis, the government declared a state of emergency in order to use force to disperse protestors and suppress the media.

In other cases, democracy is little more than a façade that provides a legal framework from which a dictator can claim authority. Ethiopia's elections were plagued with violence and voting irregularities. Multi-party competition was a myth. In practice, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) dominated the government since the return to elections in 1995, negating the effectiveness of the checks and balances that the legislature should have upon executive authority. The EPRDF is dominated by the Tigrayan, an ethnic group that comprises only eight percent of the total population. Malaysia and Singapore have similar systems. The two ruling parties (the National Front in Malaysia and the People's Action Party in Singapore) have dominated their respective governments for decades, using government resources to limit the oppositions' competitiveness. These examples suggest that democracy is not a simple yes or no classification. But, if regimes are instead classified as a spectrum of grays, what factors shape these differences? Why did Malaysia adopt less democratic practices than Canada?

While Ethiopia, Venezuela, Malaysia, and Singapore may not be models of democracy, they cannot be easily classified as autocratic regimes. They do not have the closed political systems of Cuba, North Korea, or Syria. But, if they qualify as

democracies, why do they lack so many democratic processes? If a country becomes a democracy, why does it not become fully democratic? What influences countries with low levels of democracy to achieve higher levels? To answer these questions, this dissertation used a holistic approach to identify the determinants of the levels of democracy through the examination of the interaction between a country's socio-economic conditions, its actors, and its level of democracy.

This chapter is organized into five sections. The chapter begins with an exploration of the definition of democracy. Section A explores the theoretical and operational definitions of democracy and explains why this dissertation chose to define democracy as a measure of the competitiveness, openness, and regulation of a state's electoral processes and its post-electoral accountability. Section B analyzes the broad literature in democracy studies, which is dominated by discussions of democratic transition and consolidation. Section C introduces the motivating factors behind the study. This study fills a gap in the democracy studies academic literature while providing policy-relevant recommendations for democratization and democracy promotion efforts. Section D presents a literature-based model of the process of democratic change and hypotheses for quantitative and qualitative study. Section E discusses the quantitative and qualitative methods used for this study. A combination of econometric analysis, computational analysis, and qualitative case studies was used to empirically test the model and hypotheses identified in Section D. The chapter ends with a brief introduction to the other chapters of the dissertation.

A. WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?

Democracy is a common word in the Western vernacular. Yet, the term is often used with little regard for its meaning. To complicate the matter, the academic community has no common taxonomy regarding the field of democracy. There is no universally accepted term for those governments that are not dictatorships but have not yet achieved some key aspect of a democracy. The definition of what constitutes a democracy and the factors that contribute to a successful transition to democracy greatly vary.

The term democracy originated in Athens and passed down through the writings of Aristotle; the Greek words *demos* (the people) and *kratos* (rule) indicated rule by the people. The Athenians used a direct form of democracy in which the majority of male citizens directly participated in the legislature. The limited executive authority was administrative in nature. Without the need to select leaders, democracy was equivalent to the legislative decision-making process. Since then, suffrage has greatly expanded, representation became the norm, and the power of the executive greatly increased. This expansion changed the very nature of democracy. The addition of representation and strong executives brought additional challenges: who and how should rulers be elected? How would they be held accountable so that the people still ruled? The expanding nature of the issues concerning democracy has clouded the issue of what a democracy is and when a government qualifies as a democracy.

1. A Theoretical Definition of Democracy

Part of the confusion about the definition of democracy arises from the different theoretical lenses within the field of democracy studies. There are two theoretical approaches with which to view democracy: democracy as it should be and democracy as it is—ideal versus practical. Democracy as it should be is the realm of democratic theory, or perhaps more accurately described as the philosophy of democracy, which conceptualizes democracy as an ideal type of society. This approach seeks to fine-tune the various aspects of democratic government in an effort to attain the ideal, egalitarian society. From this perspective, the threshold of democracy is so high that no government has yet achieved democracy but instead resides at a sub-type which Robert Dahl calls a polyarchy.¹

Conceptualizing an ideal society, and with it an ideal government, is largely a debate of competing decision-making processes and outcomes. Who gets to decide the public good? What is the process for determining the public good? Is ensuring the equality of man a public good? If so, is it economic or political equality, or both? What

¹ Robert Alan Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 223.

is the threshold for equality? Who should be excluded from equality (e.g., children)? The answers to these questions theoretically identify the appropriate decision-making process or outcome.

However, the term “decision-making process” oversimplifies the complexities in the elements that make up a democracy.² A brief list of some major choices in the type of democracy include: majoritarian versus consensus (i.e., majority rule versus unanimous voting), president versus parliament, majority versus proportional representation, two-party versus multi-party, federal versus unitarian system, bi-cameral versus uni-cameral, the checks and balances that the legislature or judicial has over the executive, the size of cabinets (smaller cabinets concentrate power), the level of independence of the central bank, and the procedures for constitutional change. Attempts to define the ideal government have given rise to concepts such as pluralism (i.e., existence of extensive social groups), deliberative participation (i.e., a mix of direct and representative democracy), and consociationalism (e.g., power sharing with the minority group[s]).

The alternative approach views democracy as an existing type of government: democracy is real. The practical view of democracy recognizes the current existence of democracies while appreciating that these democracies are not flawless. While the minimum thresholds for democracy may change over time, researchers in democracy studies select a threshold that tends to qualify dozens or scores of governments for comparative analysis. Since this study is a comparative research project, this work uses the theoretical lens of real democracy as the approach to identify the likely determinants of the level of democracy.

2. An Operational Definition of Democracy

Democracy is a socially constructed concept that has evolved over time. In its original form in Greece, democracy meant direct representation. In the early days of the American Revolution, democratic ideals were shaped by what was, at the time, referred

² Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

to as Republican values: small government (i.e., libertarian), human rights, anti-aristocracy, constitutionalist and, less directly, individualism.³ The importance of certain elements: small government, individualism, and anti-aristocracy have either waned over time or were not universally accepted as democratic ideals as more countries took the opportunity to craft democracy in their own way. On the other hand, human rights have grown in importance and evolved over time. Certain human rights norms, such as the abolition of slavery, have even extended to non-democratic regimes. Similarly, the concept of suffrage has evolved over time. Initial voting rights were typically limited to male landowners. Over time, universal suffrage came to include all citizens including minorities and women.

While the definition of democracy may continue to change over time, the change occurs slowly enough that polities can be defined as democracies based on the contemporary definition. The level of democracy within a country is typically measured in one of three ways. First, democracy can be viewed as a binary variable; if a country does not meet the minimum qualifications for a democracy, then it is an autocracy. Results using this method greatly vary depending upon the threshold chosen for the minimum qualifications of democracy. If the threshold is high, then weak democracies such as Malaysia and Venezuela are pooled into the same category as North Korea and Syria. If the threshold is low, then the limited democratic procedures in Malaysia are considered equivalent to those in Western Europe.

The second method for measuring democracy involves a multi-tiered structure. This method requires the identification of multiple thresholds so that countries may be classified into three or four different categories. In the middle categories lie regimes that do not adequately fit definitions of either democracy or autocracy. These intermediate regimes go by many names: hybrid regimes, semi-democracies, electoral democracies, electoral autocracies, pseudo-democracies, illiberal democracies, procedural democracies, partial democracies, semi-authoritarian, and anocratic are a sampling of the most

³ Felix Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address; Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961).

prominent.⁴ The third method for measuring democracy uses a spectrum. It provides a scale based on selected attributes of democracy. For instance, Freedom House uses a seven point scale while Polity IV uses a twenty one point scale. Interestingly, though both scales measure democracy across a spectrum, both recommend thresholds for democracy.

This study uses both the second and third methods of measuring democracy. The multi-tiered structured was used for computational analysis while the political spectrum was used for econometric analysis. Following David Epstein, et al., this study used three tiers: autocracy, partial democracy, and full democracy. In order to identify the boundaries of each tier, we next explore the various thresholds of democracy.

Democracy is a socially constructed term that means different things to different people. Even among academics, there is much disparity over the minimum requirements required in order to classify a country as a democracy though many attempts have been made to define a threshold. Schumpeter used a minimalist (inclusive) definition of democracy: a system in which rulers are chosen in free, competitive elections. Schumpeter's choice for his definition is a paradox. Schumpeter's view was partly influenced by his opposition to proportional representation. He argued that it was the will of the people that led to discriminatory practices such as anti-Semitism.⁵ Yet, his definition failed to account for democratically elected governments extending their rule beyond the limits of the constitution. Ironically, Schumpeter's definition technically fails to exclude Nazi Germany, a constitutionally elected government that usurped supreme power.

The use of Schumpeter's definition for research on democracy is counterintuitive. Schumpeter's book was not about democracy; democracy was a side-bar topic on the struggle between capitalism and socialism. His definition of democracy is not even

⁴ Diamond, *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*; Schedler, *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*; Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions "; Schmitter and Karl, "What Democracy Is. . . And Is Not."; Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes."; Monty Marshall and Keith Jagers, "Polity Iv Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2007" (Center for Systemic Peace).

⁵ Joseph Alois Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3d ed. (New York: Harper, 1950), 241–2, 69, 72–3.

presented until two-thirds of the way into the book. His minimalist definition lacked a filter for post-election accountability. Schumpeter's definition was far too inclusive. The much-cited Dahl introduced a more exclusive definition by introducing a second metric: participation. Dahl also argued that the concept of competition implied the accountability that comes from political liberalization.⁶

Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter strengthened Dahl's threshold for liberalization by highlighting the important relationship between the development of civil liberties and democracy. When the two are not implemented together, they are weak. Civil liberties granted by an authoritarian regime can just as easily be taken away. Democracy without civil liberties suppresses participation and dissension, which suggests that citizens are not truly being represented.⁷ O'Donnell and Schmitter also introduced a higher threshold: the application of rules and procedures that protected competition and participation. Participation was necessary, but no longer sufficient; codification of participatory rights and adherence to the law was also necessary. Countries that had free elections and participation, but failed to follow Constitutional procedures were called delegative democracies, essentially meaning that the executive was delegated supreme powers through the democratic process.⁸

The threshold laid out by O'Donnell and Schmitter is captured by Karl's definition of democracy as "a set of institutions that permits the entire adult population to act as citizens by choosing their leading decision makers in competitive, fair, and regularly scheduled elections which are held in the context of the rule of law, guarantees for political freedom, and limited military prerogatives."⁹ Karl not only identified a specific level of participation required for his threshold (universal suffrage), but also added a new dimension: civilian control of the military.

⁶ Robert Alan Dahl, *Polyarchy; Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 3–7.

⁷ Guillermo A. O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 7–18.

⁸ Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 1 (1994): 61.

⁹ Terry Linn Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 1 (1990): 2.

Schmitter and Karl, analyzing the third wave of democracy of 1974-1989, argued that they were witnessing a period that had “produced a convergence towards a common definition of democracy” which they defined as “a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.”¹⁰ While Schmitter and Karl followed Karl’s earlier threshold for participation, they raised the threshold for accountability. They developed a set of procedural norms from which to measure accountability that enforced limits on executive power. For instance, the executive of a democracy should not be able to extend the length of his or her term or abolish term limitations on the executive’s own position.

Schmitter and Karl’s 1991 article was the last serious attempt to raise the threshold of democracy. These successive evolutions of democracy had raised the threshold of democracy so high that a considerable number of countries were left in a no-man’s land. Countries with limited democratic procedures such as Malaysia and Singapore did not qualify as democracies and yet they did not deserve the pejorative connotation of autocracy. Over the next 15 years, a variety of attempts would be made to define that middle ground.

Collier and Levitsky thoroughly defined the middle ground, arguing that the multiple variations that make up a democracy created a widely divergent spectrum in which each possible combination of democratic processes was given its own unique nomenclature.¹¹ While defining democracies based on their various elements (parliamentarian vs. presidential, single vs. bicameral legislature) provided explanatory power for individual countries, it provided no foothold for conducting a comparative study.

Diamond created a more practical solution for the field of comparative politics. Finding the dichotomous solution for politics unsatisfying, Diamond created multiple thresholds permitting politics to be defined in four categories: liberal democracy,

¹⁰ Schmitter and Karl, "What Democracy Is. . . And Is Not," 76.

¹¹ David Collier and Stephen Levitsky, "Democracy with Adjectives," *World Politics* 49, no. 3 (1997).

electoral democracy, pseudo-democracy and non-democracy.¹² Schmitter and Karl's high threshold for democracy became Diamond's threshold for liberal democracy. Although Diamond considered partial democracy to be a sub-field of pseudo-democracy, many contemporary quantitative researchers use the term partial democracy to pool together Diamond's concepts of electoral democracy and pseudo-democracy.¹³

Attempts to create multiple thresholds would later be validated by Gerardo Munck and Jay Verkuilen. They argued that the use of a maximalist definition, by adding additional criteria such as economic freedom or civil liberties to the baseline requirement of the definition of democracy, overburdens the definition and excludes those attributes from potential empirical research.¹⁴ If everything is included in the definition of democracy, then there are few variables left with which to discern the determinants of democracy.

While the debate to establish a threshold for democracy has not yet concluded, three of the basic measures of democracy are widely accepted. For the purposes of this study, *democracy is a measure of political openness and competition in accordance with electoral rules*. Open in the sense of participation (i.e., suffrage, political parties) and competitive in the sense that the population can constitutionally elect their leaders and hold them accountable. The ability of the executive to change the electoral rules should be very limited. A government that lacks all three attributes of democracy is an autocracy. All other governments can be graded on a scale based upon their individual adaptation of the three attributes. Those governments with a high amount of all three attributes are considered full democracies. Partial democracies are those regimes that do not have high amounts of democratic attributes but have a preponderance of democratic

¹² Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, 15–6.

¹³ For example, see Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions"; Håvard Hegre et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992," *The American Political Science Review* 95, no. 1 (2001).

¹⁴ Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices," *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 1 (2002): 9.

procedures relative to autocratic practices.¹⁵ Democratization, then, is the process of increasing one or more of the attributes of democracy; a process that can last from a few days to decades.

It should also be clear that there is no such thing as a perfect democracy. Even full democracies find that they can improve upon the quality of their democracy. The United States did not attain a high level of democracy until 1809 when suffrage was changed from landowners to taxpayers. The secret ballot was not introduced until the 1880s. Participation dramatically increased when women's suffrage was finalized in 1920 and culminated with the National Voting Rights Act of 1965. This evolution illustrates the socially constructed nature of democracy. While the United States has reached the definition of a full democracy, it still has much work to do before attaining any semblance of an ideal society.¹⁶

Democracy today is often defined depending upon the perceived end of democracy. There are three interdependent phases to democracy. First is the process of selection and accountability of political representatives. This approach tends to focus on the election, continuation, and removal of political leaders. Second is the decision-making process used by those political representatives to determine policies and the distribution of resources. An example of this approach would be an analysis of the voting patterns of legislators. Third is the actual process of distribution. This approach tends to focus on the equality (i.e., normal distribution) of the means of production and economic benefits. This research focuses on the first phase of the three variations of democratic process. For this study, then, democracy is a measure of the competitiveness, openness, and regulation of a state's electoral processes and its post-electoral accountability.

¹⁵ For a quantified definition of democracy, refer to Chapter III, Sections A and B.

¹⁶ For a balanced analysis on U.S. shortcomings towards an ideal democratic society, see Larry Jay Diamond, *The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World*, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt and Co., 2008), 345–70.

B. DEMOCRATIC POLITY CHANGE

Democracies do not just happen. They are created. Excluding a few democratic experiments from ancient and medieval history, there were no democratic regimes prior to the 18th century. For the most part, democratic regimes are born out of autocratic regimes (or colonial regimes) through a process known as a democratic transition. Since there is a lack of research on the levels of democracy, we explore the literature on democratic transition and consolidation to inform variable selection. This section concludes with a brief overview of the history of democratization.

The democratization literature evolved from a focus on precondition structural factors as the gatekeepers of democracy. These structural factors range from factors internal to the state such as income, ethnicity and age of the bureaucracy to external factors such as the end of the Cold War. Over time, as more democracies appeared, the precondition theories appeared to have little predictive power. Although a few factors such as economic growth, economic development and internal security continued to receive scholarly and policy attention, they failed to explain all cases. Analysts converted to an action-oriented focus that explained democracy as the result of key actors such as the military, political parties, non-government organizations (NGO), and the ruling regime. Other analysts attempted a process-oriented analysis that examined the methods of transition or the design of the constitution. While each approach had some explanatory power, they individually lacked a holistic explanation for why a state would or would not change its level of democracy. Each approach lacked a consistent, predictive capability. The literature on democratic consolidation has had little more success. The majority of such literature is focused on features that help prevent the collapse of democracy after it is achieved. It does little to explain the factors that deepen the level of democracy besides providing a long list of features necessary to qualify as a consolidated democracy.

A more recent thread within the scholarly literature expresses the diffusion of democratic norms as the determining factor in the growth of democracy. However, norms are not a simple construction independent of the other variables. Economic

growth and development often lead to increased political participation from the masses accompanied by an increased awareness of democratic norms. In short, changes in the economy are expected to increase the preference for democracy among the masses and the elites. Numerous other factors from demographics to colonial legacy and the maturity of the bureaucracy also shape individual and group identity. Additionally, a focus on norms as the determining factor appears to assume that political issues take primacy over security issues. Internal security appears to have a bi-directional relationship with democracy. A transition from autocracy to democracy could encourage violence due to decreased state capacity for repression or an inability for the new regime to meet expectations. On the other hand, violence, which is the “deliberate use of physical force on behalf of collective goals”¹⁷ by a non-state entity, could also affect democracy. A government may be motivated to decrease its level of democracy in an effort to contain an insurgency.

1. Democratic Transitions

Governments do not instantly transform from autocracy to democracy. They go through a process for this transformation. Philippe Schmitter depicts five overlapping phases of transition: persistence of authoritarian rule, demise of authoritarian rule, transition to democracy, consolidation of democracy, and persistence of democracy.¹⁸ The literature analyzes the movement between these phases both towards and away from democratic persistence. There is a dense literature that has attempted to denote the ideal formula for a successful democratic transition. Explanations of these movements have coalesced around three main themes: socio-economic conditions, processes, and actors.

Precondition theories attempted to define the specific social or economic conditions that would make a country ripe for democracy. Seymour Lipset was one of the contemporary trailblazers of precondition theory. He argued that favorable economic

¹⁷ Sidney G. Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965–1975* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 77; Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, 2nd ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 30.

¹⁸ Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies," in *Transitions to Democracy*, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing, 1995), 541.

factors (e.g., per capita income, literacy rates) were the key preconditions for a successful transition. A variety of other preconditions were submitted by the field as broad preconditions: social values, political norms, culture, religion, race, geography, and bureaucracy.¹⁹ Linz and Stepan provided very specific preconditions. They argued that certain civil liberties and the rule of law must either pre-exist or co-develop with democracy. They argued that a transition's success was more likely if the state had the capacity to govern (i.e., collect taxes, provide basic services, and maintain a monopoly on the use of force) and the "institutionalization of a socially and politically regulated market."²⁰

The second democratization theme is that of process. The term process is broad in scope. It includes a variety of processes that lead to democracy. Processes of interest include methods of autocratic demise, methods of transition, sequence of events, and paths to democracy.²¹ In a slightly different interpretation of process, some argued that the success of democratization is based upon the process of democratic institutionalization. This perspective focuses on the process of selecting democracy options into a constitutional design.²²

The third theme in democratization is the primacy of actors. Much of the same literature that explored democratic processes found that actors, especially elites, were an important influence in democratization. In some cases, the demise of an authoritarian regime was caused by a split among the ruling elites.²³ Much of the exploration of the

¹⁹ Larry Jay Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder: L. Rienner, 1988), 6. Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 29. These factors will be discussed in more detail in section IV of this chapter.

²⁰ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, 13.

²¹ Terry Linn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Modes of Transition," in *Transitions to Democracy*, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing, 1995), 164; O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*; Juan J. Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," in *Transitions to Democracy*, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing, 1990). *Ibid.*, 435.

²² See: Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*.

²³ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*, 19.

effect of actor involvement in the success or failure of a democracy was closely intertwined with themes on structural and procedural issues.²⁴ Karl and Schmitter found that the involvement of the elites was more important than the involvement of the masses. Linz and Stepan, and to a lesser extent O'Donnell and Schmitter, explored which actors initiated transitions and which actors controlled the transition. Schmitter discussed the various interactions of groups and their influence in defining the regime type. Key actors that can influence a democratic transition include: military, political parties, police, social groups, and the all-encompassing civil society.

The variety of arguments merely serves to reinforce Schmitter's point that there is no one single form of democracy and no one way to get there.²⁵ Throughout the democracy literature, authors tried to propel their theoretical approach above the other two. Few attempted a holistic, empirical approach to democracy in which preconditions, processes, and actors were examined as an interactive system. The few attempts to provide a holistic view of democracy lacked an empirical approach. Taking a conceptual approach, Huntington lists a variety of democratization influences including historical democratic experience and values, culture, and economic equality.²⁶ Diamond argues that a successful democratic transition is based on "resources, legitimacy, and societal support."²⁷ Of course, these factors are built upon underlying issues such as the presence of a colonial administration, leadership, the international environment, and the stance of the military.

Huntington also weighed in on factors that contribute to the breakdown of democracy based on his analysis of the first and second democratic waves. Some of his

²⁴ See Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups," *American Behavioral Scientist* 35(1992); Karl and Schmitter, "Modes of Transition."; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, 66–72; O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*.

²⁵ Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups," *American Behavioral Scientist* 35(1992).

²⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 2 (1991): 137–48; Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

²⁷ Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries*, 6.

findings most relevant include: rapid reforms cause social and/or political polarization; and violence causes the failure of the rule of law.²⁸ Linz and Stepan found that a prolonged bad economy will lead to regime demise regardless of its level of democracy.²⁹ To a large extent, many of these factors can be summarized in Linz's concept that "breakdown is the result of processes initiated by the government's incapacity to solve problems for which disloyal oppositions offer themselves a solution."³⁰ The government commits to solving a problem, but when it fails to deliver, the government refuses to acknowledge its failure. "This process leads from the unsolvable problem to the loss of power, the power vacuum, and ultimately to the transfer of power...or civil war."³¹

2. Democratic Consolidation

The actors, problems, and processes for democratic consolidation are different than those of transition.³² There is no distinct threshold for the transition from autocracy to democracy. Likewise, there is no distinct level of democracy that is necessary to move from democratic transition to democratic consolidation. The start and end periods of the transition and consolidation phases varies by author. Linz suggests that the line is crossed once the elected government has taken office and the new constitution is complete.³³ Schmitter argues that the transition phase is only ended when there is no "threat to revert to status quo ante."³⁴ The consolidation phase may begin when the first free election occurs, the executive takes office, the legislature has its first session, or some other metric that indicates that the new government has begun.

²⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 2 (1991): 134–5.

²⁹ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, 80.

³⁰ Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 50.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies," 537.

³³ Juan J. Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," in *Transitions to Democracy*, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing, 1990), 121.

³⁴ Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies," 541.

Schedler's concept definition of democratic consolidation finds that experts use the term differently depending upon their theoretical lens of the perceived end.³⁵ Consolidation can mean essentially one of two things. First, consolidation can focus on those factors that prevent movement away from democracy. The majority of researchers of consolidation focus on factors that influence the persistence or survival of democratic regimes or the erosion of democratic processes.³⁶ These studies see democratic consolidation as the phase in which the ad hoc activities of the transition phase are normalized into democratic institutions such as political parties, respect for the rule of law, civil liberties, a culture of compromise, and civilian control of the military.³⁷ Through the lens of consolidation as the persistence of democracy, democracy is consolidated when it is "the only game in town."³⁸ This means that the regime has the support of the majority of the population and can withstand crisis.³⁹

The second concept of consolidation focuses on movement towards democratic deepening, the increasing of the level of democracy. These studies explain the steps necessary to achieve full democracy and methods for full democracies to attain, what Schedler calls, advanced democracy.⁴⁰ These studies look at increasing democratic

³⁵ Andreas Schedler, "What Is Democratic Consolidation?" *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 2 (1998).

³⁶ For example, see Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990*, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Milan Svolik, "Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation," *SSRN Working Paper Series* (2007); Samuel Huntington, "Democracy for the Long Haul," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 2 (1996).

³⁷ See Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, 74–6; Seymour Martin Lipset, "Party Systems and the Representation of Social Groups," *European Journal of Sociology* 1, no. 1 (1960); Geoffrey Pridham, *Transitions to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe*, The International Library of Politics and Comparative Government (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), 598–600; Linz, "Transitions to Democracy," 124–25.

³⁸ See for example: Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, 65; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, 5; Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies," 544.

³⁹ Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies," 551–553; Linz and Stepan, *Problems*, 6; Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 67.

⁴⁰ Larry Jay Diamond, Leonardo Morlino, and American Political Science Association. Meeting, *Assessing the Quality of Democracy*, Journal of Democracy Book (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 181; Andreas Schedler, "What Is Democratic Consolidation?" *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 2 (1998); Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens, "The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions," *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 3 (1997): 323.

quality through the establishment or improvement of democratic institutions such as civil society, party systems, and executive systems.

It is important to note that consolidation, persistence, and deepening do not suggest permanence or irreversibility. Some countries regress partially or fully to authoritarianism. While many countries have established successful democracies, a handful of countries seem to have stagnated partway through the democratization process.

3. The Record of Democratization

Since the rebirth of democracy in the 18th century, the world has experienced an inconsistent, yet positive trend towards democratic governments. Huntington argued that democracy has tended to arrive in cyclical surges that he called waves. He identified three major surges towards democracy: 1820–1920, 1945–1962, and 1974–1990.⁴¹ It is possible that the new millennium brought a fourth wave of democracy. Although Huntington’s methodology was weak, trend data support the general conclusion of the continued rise of democracy. These surges are typically followed by what Huntington calls reverse waves as failed transition attempts revert to autocracy. Since World War II, the number of democracies in the world has been on an uphill trend doubling from 20 in 1946 to 40 in 1980. The total number of democracies would nearly double again to 75 in 1992 after the end of the Cold War. While recent, highly publicized reversals in Russia and Venezuela provide the perception that democracy is failing throughout the globe, the number of democracies actually increased by 25% since 1992.⁴²

While a democracy is certainly not a perfect government, most other government types have been found to be far worse. Larry Diamond argues that democracy owes its success to the fact that “the great competing ideologies of the twentieth century have largely been discredited.”⁴³ Whether a country attempted transition because they were

⁴¹ Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave.”

⁴² Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2008; available at: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm> (accessed 1 May, 2010).

⁴³ Diamond, *Democracy in Developing Countries*, x.

encouraged by the international community, perceived the benefits of democracy, or found that their previous ideology was bankrupt, the logic associated with democracy promotion highlights the perceived benefits of joining the club of democratic governments.

Democratization is openly encouraged by many in the international community. For the last century, the United States has varied in its use of rhetoric, economic aid, and military intervention in support of democracy promotion. The United Kingdom, Netherlands, Taiwan, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Germany have democracy assistance programs. Several international organizations including the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, the World Bank, the Organization for American States, and the G-8 promote democracy. The causal nature between democracy promotion and transitions to democracy is somewhat ambiguous. For example, democratization via military intervention succeeded in less than fifty percent of the cases.⁴⁴ Military occupations in Japan, Germany, Austria and Italy turned out strong, long-lasting democracies. Smaller interventions in Grenada and Panama also succeeded.

C. WHY STUDY THE LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY?

This research had four motivating factors. First, there is little substantial research, much less quantitative work, on the levels of democracy. Second, there is little quantitative work on democratization beyond the realm of economic theories. Specifically, there is a lack of quantitative research on the effects of violence and diffusion upon democracy. Third, there is a lack of a holistic democratization model that combines the various approaches to democracy studies. Finally, understanding the determinants of the levels of democracy has important policy and strategy implications

⁴⁴ James Meernik, "United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy," *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 4 (1996): 393–7; Mark Peceny, *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets* (University Park, Penn: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 194–207; Christopher J. Coyne, *After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Economics and Finance, 2008), 14–8.

for democracy promotion efforts across the globe, including those in conflict-ridden states such as contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq.

Existing democratization studies predominantly focus upon the movement into and out of the transition and consolidation phase of democracy and were not specifically designed to test the levels of democracy. Differentiations between low and high levels of democracy are primarily laundry lists of attributes or institutions required to achieve a high level of democracy. Much academic work has been done to define democracy and its minimum qualifications. Yet, little work has been done to identify the factors that influence the deepening of democracy, which “makes the formal structures of democracy more liberal, accountable, representative, and accessible—in essence, more democratic.”⁴⁵ Literature that explored variations in levels of democracy only emerged at the turn of the millennium.⁴⁶ However, it has not yet explored the factors that influence movement either between levels of democracy or across the threshold from a partial to a full democracy. Even though the definitive threshold for the boundaries between phases remains elusive, there is little discussion on the nuances that differentiate the levels of democracy. While the literature provides a lengthy list of qualifying factors for a country to be considered consolidated, the empirical link between structural variables, actors, and the resulting achievement of consolidation is limited. Further, no testable theories recognized the combined contribution of both structural variables and actors to the democratic outcome.

The democratization literature lacks methodological balance. The collective democratization knowledge is largely based upon rich case studies from Latin America and Eastern Europe. Broad quantitative tests using panel data (large number of cases over time) on these theories are scant and are primarily limited to testing economic

⁴⁵ Larry Jay Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 74.

⁴⁶ Larry Jay Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 15–16; Schedler, *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, passim; Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions "; Håvard Hegre et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992 " *The American Political Science Review* 95, no. 1 (2001); Marc M. Howard and Philip G. Roessler, "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 2 (2006).

variables. The majority of quantitative research in the field focuses on the outcomes of democracy, not the inputs. One study that did attempt a broad look at the multiple variables that affect democracy used a simplistic linear regression (unsuitable for time-series data on countries) and examined factors in piecemeal fashion. Within the quantitative literature, there is only limited exploration of violence and diffusion as influences upon democracy. Although violence is widely regarded as an obstacle to democratization, the majority of quantitative research in the area focuses on the effect that democracy has on interstate conflict. Violence is generally accepted as an inhibitor to democracy. Yet, the quantitative literature uses the violence variable only as an outcome of democracy. Diffusion, on the other hand, is a relatively new concept that has not been adequately tested.

A variety of academic approaches are used within democracy studies. Qualitative studies analyzed democracy from a structure, agency, or process perspective. Few studies combined these approaches into a holistic understanding of democracy. Narrowly focusing upon a single approach greatly simplifies the analytical problem but fails to provide a broader understanding of the process of democratic change.

This study has important policy and strategy implications for democracy promotion efforts across the globe, including those in conflict-ridden states such as contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite U.S. democracy promotion efforts over the past sixty years, there has been little consideration of the variations in the levels of democracy. Hybrid regimes have existed since the American Declaration of Independence and continued to maintain a presence throughout the twentieth century. While the proportion of these hybrid regimes shrank during the waves of decolonization during the 1960s and 1970s, the end of the Cold War introduced a glut of hybrid regimes. By 2006, approximately 30% of governments fell within this middle ground (see partial autocracy and partial democracy in Figure 1).




Figure 1. Proportion of Polity Types Over Time⁴⁷

Despite their pervasiveness, the literature has only just begun exploring the negative outcomes of low levels of democracy. History has shown that conversions to democracy are fraught with complications. Partial democracies are more prone to interstate war, insurgency, political instability, and ethnic violence than their autocratic or fully democratic counterparts.⁴⁸ “Where many citizens are illiterate, per capita income is low, society is ethnically divided, religious sects or other illiberal groups dominate civil society, powerful spoilers fear democracy, nationalist mythmakers control the media, and/or oil revenue makes the state unaccountable to taxpayers, the path of democratization is likely to be neither smooth nor peaceful.”⁴⁹ Partial democracies violate human rights as much as autocracies.⁵⁰ These undesirable secondary effects of

⁴⁷ Table created from Polity IV data; for this chart, polities were categorized as follows: -10 to -7 (full autocracy), -6 to 0 (partial autocracy), 1 to 7 (partial democracy), 8 to 10 (full democracy). The rationale for this categorization is discussed in Chapter III.

⁴⁸ Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992”: 33–49; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, “Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War,” *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (2002): 298; Jack A. Goldstone et al., “A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability,” in *American Political Science Association* (Washington, DC2005).

⁴⁹ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, “Turbulent Transitions,” in *Leashing the Dogs of War*, ed. et al. Chester A. Crocker (DC: US Institute of Peace, 2007), 173.

⁵⁰ Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 6 (1997): passim.

democracy promotion can negatively affect U.S. interests abroad. These issues have repercussions on a regional and global scale. They can adversely affect global trade, regional stability, and collective security efforts (e.g., counter-proliferation, counter-smuggling, counter-terrorism). Internal conflict can also lead to under-governed spaces which can be exploited by transnational criminal or terrorist groups. Since the United States, as stated in U.S. Special Operations Command Concept Plan 7500, desires to minimize the operating areas of insurgents and terrorists, it is in the U.S. interest to mitigate the effects of conflict and under-governed spaces.

Understanding the determinants of the levels of democracy is also important for those policy makers that advocate the democratic peace theory: a theory that democracies are less likely to go to war against each other or at all.⁵¹ Some contemporary policy makers have a “widely-shared belief that democracy, development, and security are inextricably linked even if the correlations have not yet been proven.”⁵² However, recent studies suggest that the theory only applies to fully democratic countries since newly transitioning partial democracies are actually more prone to violence than autocracies.⁵³ In order to protect long-term U.S. interests and achieve U.S. policy objectives, it is important for policy makers and strategists to understand which factors affect the resulting level of democracy during planning for democracy promotion. Democracy is not a panacea; it “will not necessarily bring in its wake economic growth, social peace, administrative efficiency, political harmony, free markets, or ‘the end of ideology.’”⁵⁴

⁵¹ Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: Norton, 2001), 127–55; David Rousseau et al., “Assessing the Dyadic Nature of Democratic Peace, 1918–1988,” *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 3 (1996): 522–6. Counter-arguments to the democratic peace theory can be found in Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 4 (2003); Halvard Buhaug, “Dangerous Dyads Revisited: Democracies May Not Be That Peaceful after All,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22, no. 2 (2005).

⁵² Jim Kolbe, Testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearing: Foreign Assistance Reform in the Next Administration – Challenges and Solutions, April 23, 2008.

⁵³ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, “Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War,” *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (2002): 297–337.

⁵⁴ Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is. . . And Is Not,” *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 3 (1991): 15.

Without full consideration of the variations between the levels of democracy, U.S. democracy promotion efforts could have adverse effects upon U.S. interests.

The initial concept of this research was to use existing theory to test the structural determinants of the levels of democracy. However, the direct application of existing theories is limited by a reliance on the phased approach to studying democracy. Studies focused on the movement into and out of the transition and consolidation phase of democracy and were not specifically designed to test the levels of democracy. Even though the definitive threshold for the boundaries between phases remains elusive, there is little discussion on the nuances that differentiate the level of democracy among those countries within the consolidation phase. While the literature provides a lengthy list of qualifying factors for a country to be considered consolidated, the empirical link between structural variables, actors, and the resulting achievement of consolidation is limited. Further, no testable theories recognized the combined contribution of both structural variables and actors to the democratic outcome. In order to fill these gaps, this study deduced a model of political change from existing theory (see Figure 2).

D. HYPOTHESES

This study views democracy as a measure of the competitiveness, openness, and regulation of a state's electoral processes and its post-electoral accountability. A government that lacks all three attributes of democracy is an autocracy. Democratization is the process of increasing one or more of the attributes of democracy; a process that can last from a few days to decades. Though the transition from autocracy to democracy is rightly celebrated, democracy is not a singular event but a recurring process of selection and accountability. A full discussion on the development of the hypotheses is contained in Chapter II but will be briefly outlined here.

This dissertation seeks to identify the determinants of the levels of democracy through the examination of the interaction between a country's socio-economic conditions, its actors, and its level of democracy. The study converged seemingly disparate hypotheses on democracy into a coherent, holistic framework to understand the variations in the levels of democracy within and across countries. This study deduced six

hypotheses based upon a review of the democracy studies literature. This study aggregated the various theories on the socio-economic causes of democratization into four structural factors: income, economic development, diffusion of democratic norms, and intrastate violence. A hypothesis was constructed around each of the four structural factors. One, increasing economic income leads to democracy through the development of the middle class. The middle class, with a growing disposable income, becomes more active in civic organizations and more likely to purchase the means to acquire increased access to media and other information sources.⁵⁵ Two, increasing economic development leads to democracy through an urbanized, educated, literate work force. This leads to the development of unions and demands for increased political say.⁵⁶ Three, the diffusion of norms leads to democracy through the development of civil society.⁵⁷ It is through interactions with other countries that the population learns the disadvantages of autocracy and the advantages of democracy. Four, while a lack of intrastate violence does not cause democracy, violence can lead to the breakdown of democracy.⁵⁸ This suggests two hypotheses. First, an increase in the level of violence is likely to lead to a decrease in the

⁵⁵ Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* (1959); Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990*, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); David L. Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions," *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 3 (2006); Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

⁵⁶ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958); Simon Smith Kuznets, *Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread*, Studies in Comparative Economics 7 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

⁵⁷ Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "International Linkages and Democratization," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 3 (2005); Kristian Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, "Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization," *International Organization* 60 (2006).

⁵⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*; Larry Jay Diamond, *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*, A Journal of Democracy Book (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 2 (1991); Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Linz and Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

level of democracy. Second, increases in the level of democracy amid high levels of violence unrelated to the political change are unlikely to be sustainable.

While security, economy, and norms are critical factors in influencing the evolution of democracy in a country, they are not in themselves determinative of a country's level of democracy. Instead, each of these structural factors influences the preferences of a country's key political actors: civil society, the military, NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime. This study combines the structural factors of the economy, intrastate violence, and the diffusion of norms with the key actors of civil society, the military, non-government organizations, political parties, and the ruling regime. This research proposes a supply and demand model as the analytical framework for studying the interaction between structural factors, key actors, and the resulting democratic processes (see Figure 2). The effect of a single variable upon the level of democracy is not universal over time or across cases because actors' preferences are affected by all three factors simultaneously. To complicate matters, the structural factors do not occur in isolation of one another. Increases in violence can have a negative effect upon the economy and opportunities for the diffusion of norms. A bad economy can increase the potential for people to turn to violence as a means of survival or protest while inhibiting the diffusion of norms. Further, the diffusion of democratic norms affects citizens' perceptions of security and economic policies. Therefore, this study hypothesized that a change in the polity preferences of key actors leads to a change in the level of democracy.




Figure 2. A Model for the Determinants of the Levels of Democracy

E. THE APPROACH OF THIS STUDY

Using a mixed methods approach, this study integrated literatures from the fields of political science, behavioral science, history, and economics to explore the factors that influence levels of democracy. While the study seeks to identify those factors that inhibit or encourage the development and maturation of democratic institutions, the research recognizes that it is unlikely that any single variable can *cause* democracy since there are many forms of democracy and there are many paths to democracy. The quantitative portion of this study explored the relationship between the level of democracy and structural variables with emphasis on intrastate violence. The quantitative analysis included econometrics, trend data, and computational analysis of major regime transitions. Additional details on these sources and methods are discussed in Chapter III.

The second phase of the study is a qualitative analysis of three country case studies to complement the quantitative research. Qualitative analysis helps to make sense of quantitative findings. The findings from the computational analysis were used to identify cases that met the qualitative case study selection criteria. The qualitative approach was designed to explore those cases that demonstrated an ability to overcome structural obstacles to democratization. The qualitative portion of this study used a combination of rational choice and rational choice institutionalism to explore the effect that structural variables had on actors' preferences for democracy. Within this paradigm, the resulting equilibrium between supply and demand determines the level of democracy typically through the development of the constitution and electoral laws. The purpose of the mixed methods approach in this study was two-fold. First, this method was chosen for the purpose of development; the findings from the quantitative analysis identified appropriate case studies for the three-case qualitative analysis. Second, mixed methods provided complementarity; varied perspectives to the same problem.⁵⁹

Demand for democracy is an analytical opinion of the aggregate change in preferences for the various civil society groups within a country. Supply for democracy encompasses four key groups that can deliver some element of democracy. These groups will supply democracy when the cost-benefit analysis of democracy exceeds that of autocracy. Typically, the military, political parties, NGOs, and the ruling regime benefit from the persistence of autocracy through economic, political and social advantages. The change in costs and benefits can occur in several manners. The benefits of democracy could increase through increased awareness or a change in socio-economic conditions. Or, the increasing costs for maintaining autocracy could overshadow any perceived gains. This model does not ignore the influence of rebellions or foreign invaders. Once they control one of the four key actors within the country, they gain influence over the supply of democracy. For instance, when the United States invaded Iraq and established a new regime, it faced a choice for the new polity type.

⁵⁹ For an introduction to the mixed methods approach, see Jessica T. DeCuir-Gunby, "Mixed Methods Research in the Social Sciences," in Jason W. Osborne, ed., *Best Practices in Quantitative Methods* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2008), 125–136.

1. Case Study Selection Criteria

Three cases were selected in order to explore the three potential combinations of the two primary structural variables: security and industrialization (see Table 1). Cases were selected based on their relevance and representativeness. Relevant cases had either significant levels of internal violence or a low level of industrialization as measured by the proportion of agricultural labor. Additionally, each case study was required to have some aspect of contemporary strategic importance: large economy, large population, proximity to major shipping lanes or have value as a potential forward operating base for U.S., NATO or EU forces for regional counterterrorism, conventional, or disaster assistance operations.⁶⁰ In order to maximize representativeness, the case study countries were selected from different geographic regions in countries with populations larger than five million. Finally, in order to be representative of future transitions to democracy, colonial transfers to full democracy (e.g., Papua New Guinea) were not selected as case studies.

⁶⁰ Following Larry Jay Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *The Global Divergence of Democracies* / Edited by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *A Journal of Democracy Book* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 360–1. A large economy is \$100+ billion; large population is 100+ million people.

	Significant Levels of Internal Violence during Transition	Underdeveloped Agricultural Society during Democratization	Potential Cases (Percent Ag Labor)
Case #1	YES	YES	Indonesia (46%) Philippines (48%)
Case #2	YES	NO	Mexico South Africa
Case #3	NO	YES	Senegal (74%) India (79%) Kenya (75%) Solomon (77%) Papua NG ((85%) Ghana (56%) Botswana (52%) Bolivia (52%)

Table 1. Case Study Selection Criteria

For the first case, Indonesia and Philippines are equally relevant and representative. Both countries transitioned during periods of violence with a high percentage of agricultural labor, large populations, significant economies and strategically important locations. The Philippines was selected because its democracy has been sustained for a longer period and it skipped the partial democracy phase entirely. For the second case, both Mexico and South Africa are equally relevant. However, Mexico's situation is slightly more representative as South Africa faced a combination of rare occurrences: intense international diplomatic pressure, a charismatic opposition, and a government-enforced racial cleavage.

The third case was a far more difficult selection. India and Papua New Guinea lack representativeness since their transition to democracy was via colonial transfer. The Solomon Islands was excluded due to its lack of strategic importance and, as a tiny, remote island nation, is not representative. Botswana and Bolivia are poor examples of underdeveloped countries since both had relatively low agricultural labor (around 50%) and twice the GDP per capita of the other cases. Additionally, both countries have only a limited strategic significance. Kenya's recent regression to partial democracy reduces its

relevance for the study. This process of elimination left Ghana and Senegal. While both countries fit the criteria, Senegal is the preferred choice due to its extremely high proportion of agricultural labor. While Ghana would be an interesting study, Senegal is a more appropriate choice for exploring the effect of underdevelopment on the level of democracy.

2. Qualitative Analysis

As indicated in the hypotheses section above, the qualitative section seeks to test the hypothesis that all else being equal, a change in the polity preferences of key actors may lead to a change in the level of democracy. To test this hypothesis, country-unique literature reviews contributed to a detailed historical narrative for each period of democratization. The literature review was supplemented with personal communications with local subject matter experts including academics, think tanks, NGOs, and embassy personnel. These communications filled data gaps from the literature review and providing a local perspective to the narrative. In total, 54 personal communications were conducted: 19 in Mexico, 17 in the Philippines, and 18 in Senegal.

Following George and Bennett, this study analyzed each case using structured, focused comparison based upon the hypotheses discussed in the previous section.⁶¹ The case studies analyzed how each independent variable affected the democratic preferences for five key actors: civil society, the military, political parties, NGOs, and the ruling regime. Each case was tri-sected into three analytical sections. The first part of each case provides a brief historical background with emphasis on significant political history and socio-economic conditions, particularly those that might serve as obstacles to democratization. The second part examines the changes in the demand for democracy among civil society as affected by security, economy, and norms. The final part analyzes the factors that affected supply of democracy among elite groups (those groups capable of delivering democracy: military, NGOs, political parties, and ruling regime [old or newly installed]). Sections two and three are evaluations of how structural factors and

⁶¹ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Bcsia Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 67–72.

events shaped group preferences. These preferences were analyzed in an aggregate sense using a rational actor model—change in group cost-benefit analyses of regime types over time.

In some cases, public opinion surveys provided insights into the beliefs and perceptions of a country's citizens such as those gathered by Eurobarometer since 1974, Latinobarometer since 1996, Afrobarometer since 1999, Asian Barometer since 2002, and the Arab barometer since 2005. To the extent possible, these surveys were used to inform the work of this study. However, these surveys provide only general information about the preferences of the citizens and not of each key actor group. Furthermore, the surveys are often aggregated, preventing analysis at the sub-state level.

F. THE STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION

The next chapter analyzed literature across several fields to formulate a model of political change. The model draws upon theories from political development, economic development, and political violence. From this literature, the study deduced several hypotheses for testing the proposed model of political change. Chapter III presents the methods, sources, and results for the quantitative analysis; a combination of econometric and computational analysis. The computational analysis was used to augment the econometric analysis in order to present the findings in a more compelling manner for the non-econometrician. This study demonstrated that high levels of economic income, industrialization, security, and diffusion of norms each individually had a positive effect upon the level of democracy. Of these factors, security and diffusion were the most important. Yet, the determinative nature of these factors falls short in two respects. First, several countries with positive structural factors do not have high levels of democracy. Second, several countries with very poor structural factors do have high levels of democracy. The qualitative portion of the study found that the determinative factor was the strategic interaction among actors.

Chapters IV through VI present three different case studies on countries that were able to overcome supposed economic and security obstacles to democracy: Mexico, Philippines, and Senegal. Each case study explores the factors that affect the preferences

of citizens and key political institutions. Chapter VII closes with a conclusion, policy implications, and recommendations for future research. The qualitative analysis indicated that the positive effects of economic income and industrialization upon democracy could be negated through the development of a patron-client system which provided organized workers with a stake in maintaining the existing political structure. However, periods of economic crisis or eruptions of violence led to increased demands for leadership change. Whether this demand for change also resulted in a demand for democracy appeared to rely upon the level of diffusion of democratic norms.

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II. PROPOSING A MODEL OF POLITICAL CHANGE

How does a high level of democracy come about? Does the international system have an influence or are the determinants primarily internal to the state or, perhaps, group actors? Is democracy simply incompatible with some countries? Is there some unchanging element to a country (e.g., location, age) that makes democracy unattainable?

This chapter presents a model of democratic (and undemocratic) change and six testable hypotheses shaped by insights from a review of the existing literature. This study argues that security, economy, and norms shape the preferences of a country's key political actors: civil society, the military, NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime. This research builds upon the literature by combining structure, actors, and process into a testable model that explains the determinants of the level of democracy (see Figure 2). This chapter breaks down empirical arguments in order to analyze the logical cause-effect chain. Combined, four of the hypotheses state that, all else being equal, a change in the level of intrastate violence, industrialization, income, or the diffusion of democratic norms, may lead to a change in the level of democracy. Hypothesis five argues that the presence of intrastate violence during a transition to a higher level of democracy may limit the sustainability of that level of democracy. Finally, the sixth hypothesis connects the structural factors to the actors; it states that a change in the polity preferences of key actors may lead to a change in the level of democracy. Section A analyzes how actors, including civil society, the military, NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime influence the level of democracy. Section B reviews the various structural arguments, which are aggregated into three categories: the economy, internal security, and the diffusion of norms. Section C discusses the process of democratic change as the result of actor interaction.

A. SUPPLY AND DEMAND EXPLANATION OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE

Following Inglehart and Wetzel, Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, a supply and demand model explains the democratic output of the

competing preferences of actors.⁶² Changes in the level of democracy are not simply a matter of elite choice or the capacity of social movements. Group preferences are a rational choice based on institutional interests and changes in the costs and benefits of autocracy versus democracy. Changes in the structural factors affect the cost-benefit analysis of these actors. Further, each group has multiple rational choice actors that, in some cases, have varying preferences.

This study uses the supply and demand model to provide a general logic to the interaction of multiple actors based upon the costs, benefits, and level of democracy. For economic purists, this is the price, utility, and quantity of democracy. However, in this instance the purist terms suggest an overly mathematical and exact nature that is not intended. The model is not intended to identify a specific price point. Such a project would be futile since many of the costs and benefits of democracy are not measured in dollars. Instead, the model is used in a logical fashion to explain changes in costs, benefits, and levels. For this study, supply and demand is simply used as an organizing principle with which to study the rational choices of various actors. After all, rational choice is “an equilibrium analysis in which actors respond to each others’ decisions until each is at a position from which no improvement is possible.”⁶³

The importance of actors during a democratic transition cannot be overstated. Nothing happens without the involvement of group and individual actors. A single individual, such as Nelson Mandela or Lech Walesa, can serve as a rallying figure to motivate democratic change. However, not every transition has such a charismatic figure

⁶² Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 187–91; Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian W. Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 3–14; Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin, "Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies," *British Journal of Political Science* 31, no. 2 (2001): 349; Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton, "Learning About Democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance, and Experience," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 1 (2007): 193–4; Michael Bratton, Robert B. Mattes, and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, *Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 26–30, 272–88; Einar Overbye, "Democracy as Insurance," *Public Choice* 87, no. 3/4 (1996): 323–6.

⁶³ Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 23.

to rally around. The heavy lifting is done by the faceless group called civil society. Civil society is a normative measure of group and individual social and political activism. Social groups, professional organizations, and labor groups act as advocates for group interests. Citizens staff the democratic institutions. They choose to become constructive members of the civil society. They develop political parties, work in the bureaucracy, create, publish and debate political stories, and vote. The military, NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime can have a direct influence on the level of democracy. Although their actual involvement varies from case to case, these actors collectively can reform and respect the constitution, develop branches of government, and ensure free elections.

1. Consumer Demand for Democracy

Demand is a measure of citizens' willingness and ability to commit resources in order to maintain or increase the level of democracy. The benefits include increased input into the selection and accountability of leaders and representatives which make policy and resource decisions. The costs represent the citizens' commitment of resources to maintain, increase, or improve democracy. In the context of the supply and demand model, it should be noted that democracy is far from an efficient market. In many countries, a limited oligopoly of democracy suppliers makes the supply highly inelastic: changes in demand do not immediately result in a change in the level of democracy. This inelasticity is possible because "repressive police authority, a powerful army, and a willingness by rulers to use brute force may maintain a regime's power almost indefinitely."⁶⁴ This tendency towards inelasticity explains why many democratic theorists focus on the actions of elites as the key to democratization.

The citizens' preference for autocracy or democracy is the result of a cost-benefit calculation, which is shaped by normative, economic, and security factors. The citizenry's preference for democracy is a critical element to the level of democracy. If the citizens see democracy as an expendable luxury or see autocracy as a cure for their

⁶⁴ Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address," *American Sociological Review* 59, no. 1 (1994): 9.

socio-economic ills, then democracy will not survive without considerable, sustained effort by those that supply democracy. Similarly, a high level of demand for democracy is not enough to bring it about without some effort on the part of the suppliers of democracy. Even the concept of democracy is not homogenous among the citizens beyond a desire for change from the existing regime.⁶⁵ Of course, supply and demand do not always remain unmixed. It is possible for a segment of consumers to become suppliers (through revolt) and it is possible for suppliers to influence demand (through marketing or coercion).

The core of the citizens' polity preference resides within the civil society. Although some consider all non-government actors to be a part of civil society, other authors narrow their definition to formal or informal non-government groups that promote the collective interest.⁶⁶ In either case, civil society implies an evolution of norms through meetings and discussions; the sharing of ideas, complaints, and successes.⁶⁷ Civil society can be thought of as an aggregation of the citizens' views on cooperation, decision making, justice, and dispute resolution. It can also be a normative measure of individual and group socio-political activism. Civil society affects the development and strength of political parties, the media, and pluralist non-government organizations such as unions and professional societies. It is this sense of civil society that is widely regarded as the bulwark to creating a sustainable democratic government.⁶⁸ However, since the sources of political activism vary across countries, a single

⁶⁵ Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions of Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 2 (1996): 45.

⁶⁶ Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, 221; Philippe C. Schmitter, "Civil Society East and West," in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives*, ed. et al Larry Diamond (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 240; Aleksander Smolar, "From Opposition to Atomization " in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives* ed. Larry Diamond (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 263; Larry Diamond, "Towards Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 3 (1994): 6. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Stephen D. Grant (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 221.

⁶⁷ Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Latin American Program., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 48–53; Robert D. Putnam, Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 163–76.

⁶⁸ Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies," 537–548; Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 218–260; Pridham, "Political Actors, Linkages, and Actions," 598–600; Linz and Stepan, *Problems*, 7–11.

measurement is difficult. Even if available, a single measurement would be misleading since the collective interest of a civil society is an aggregation of individual and group interests which may or may not be inclined towards democracy.

2. The Suppliers of Democracy

The term supply should not be misconstrued to suggest that democracy is a good (or event) that is manufactured, purchased, and delivered. The term supply is merely meant to convey a group's physical or legal ability to enact or prevent political activities which affect the level of democracy in either a positive or negative manner. While suppliers could be categorized into neat categories of supporters and opponents of democracy, this study uses a more nuanced approach arguing that the support for a specific polity type is a far more incremental scale. This study argues that the suppliers of democracy can be aggregated into four categories of rational choice institutions: the military, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), political parties, and the ruling regime. The relative power of these organizations and their ability to deliver or impede democracy varies from case to case.

This study does not see any of these actors as inherently supportive of or opposed to a particular polity type. The supply of democracy in a country hinges upon the decisions of these four entities, which are not necessarily homogenous in themselves nor independent of the actions of the other actors. Each group's preference for autocracy or democracy is the result of a cost-benefit calculation, which is shaped by normative, economic, and security factors.

The military is often in the unique position to use physical force to defend or remove democracy. Therefore, some see civilian control of the military and an apolitical military as critical components to building a democracy.⁶⁹ The military's decision to remain apolitical or to seek or allow civil oversight of the military is influenced by the same security, economic, and normative issues that concern the broader civil society.

⁶⁹ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*, 32–36. Schmitter and Karl, 9; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 3.

Crises of security or economy can be a test of a military's apolitical measure. In many cases, the military is a bastion of conservatism that will naturally prefer the status quo or take action to return to the status quo ante. In some cases, democracy may contain direct costs with budget cuts, manpower reductions, the implementation of human rights commissions, or the expulsion of the military from advantageous government positions or businesses. The norms that affect the military are not necessarily those that affect civil society; democratic norms specifically relate to the military's perception of its role in the constitutional process.

NGOs can be an important contributor to democracy.⁷⁰ This study views NGOs in a broad context that covers all nongovernment organizations including non-profits, charities, grassroots organizations, religious organizations, and unions. NGOs have neither the force of the military to implement democracy nor the authority to adopt changes to the constitution. However, NGOs do have the ability to improve the freedom and competition of elections through election monitoring. NGOs can also improve participation by monitoring government repression and lobbying their group's interests to government officials. While they do not have direct authority over changes to the electoral system, NGOs do provide increased accountability of the other suppliers of democracy. Some domestic NGOs have the additional power of leveraging transnational NGO networks to put international pressure onto the regime to implement reforms.⁷¹ NGOs with transnational links are likely to have a higher density of interaction with western ideals and will therefore generally support the supply of democracy.

Political parties can have an influence over the supply of democracy. However, there is great disparity in the strength of political parties across and within countries. In many cases, political parties have no power, especially in those systems that lack elections. The inclusion of elections, though, creates competing interests for shaping the electoral rules. By its nature, the majority power has more political power than the opposition parties. The influence among the various opposition parties also varies based

⁷⁰ See Julie Fisher, *Nongovernments: Ngos and the Political Development of the Third World*, Kumarian Press Books on International Development (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 1998).

on party resources, organization, and mobilization. In a repressive country that bans opposition parties, the opposition may lack an organization vehicle with which to influence the supply of democracy. Absent the use of force, parties provide the primary process for the competition of political power.⁷² Political Parties reduce uncertainty, act as advocates, and provide legitimacy to the government.⁷³ Political parties are important to democracy for three other reasons. The opposition provides a limited constraining effect upon the ruling regime's policy options. Second, parties provide an alternative outlet (besides violence) for the expression of grievances and policy preferences. Third, political parties act as the pinnacles of group interests. Issues of security, economy, and norms are important drivers for motivating an opposition to form, voice its dissent, and mobilize the citizens to demand change. The factors that influence civil society partially affect a citizen's preference for a particular political party. In that sense, security, economic and normative issues have a direct influence on the relative power between parties. One or more of those political parties, either in or out of the legislature, could have a direct hand in designing or approving electoral changes. In general, political parties will prefer to shape the electoral system in a manner that provides their party an advantage over its competitors.

No ruler acts without constraints. Even in those states that appear to have supreme executive power, the ruler is mindful of how his actions will affect his patron-client supporting coalition.⁷⁴ If the clients find that their personal relationship with the patron is no longer enough to guarantee their privileged status, they seek to solidify their

⁷¹ Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).

⁷² Scott Mainwaring, "Political Parties and Democratization in Brazil and the Southern Cone," *Comparative Politics* 21, no. 1 (1998): 97.

⁷³ Geoffrey Pridham and University of Bristol. Centre For Mediterranean Studies., *Transitions to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives from Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe*, The International Library of Politics and Comparative Government (Aldershot ; Brookfield, USA: Dartmouth, 1995), 598–600; Seymour Martin Lipset, "Party Systems and the Representation of Social Groups," *European Journal of Sociology* 1, no. 1 (1960).

⁷⁴ Douglass Cecil North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 75.

privileged status through the development of institutions and the rule of law.⁷⁵ In other cases, cleavages may exist within ruling regimes between hard-liners and soft-liners, conservatives and reformists.⁷⁶ Within these constraints, the ruling executive can change the level of democracy at will: the freedom and competition of elections, the level of repression, and electoral laws that guarantee free and competitive elections with open participation and a regular changing of the ruling executive. From a rational actor view, the ruling regime will prefer to limit the supply of democracy because it threatens a potential change in executive power. If the costs of maintaining autocracy become too high, the ruling regime may choose to supply democracy by enabling reform, stepping down, or by negotiating a new government with dissidents. For instance, democracy in Chile and the Philippines was possible because the ruling dictator agreed to step down. In some cases, the death of the ruling executive removed a significant obstacle to democracy such as Rafael Trujillo in Dominican Republic, Idi Amin in Uganda, and Francisco Franco in Spain.

In many cases, the ruling regime was removed by military force in the form of a coup, international intervention, or an insurgency. However, democracy is not a natural follow-on to regime change by force. In most cases, the victorious party establishes a new ruling regime, which then begins its own cost analysis of supplying democracy.

B. STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES ON SUPPLY AND DEMAND

In order to build a holistic model of the process of political change, key studies are explored in-depth in order to understand the logical underpinnings that explain how the various determinants affect the level of democracy. This research groups structural variables into three categories: the economy, internal security, and the diffusion of norms. Note in Figure 2 that these variables are not independent of each other. Internal security affects economic income and, over time, economic development. Conversely, a healthy economy is expected to reduce the probability of intrastate violence. It is possible that

⁷⁵ North, Wallace and Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders*, 191.

⁷⁶ O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*, 15–17.

democratic norms affect economic norms and violence norms. Economic development affects the diffusion of norms as it relates to the ability for democratic ideals to spread from foreign influences via technology. The spread of democratic norms could provide an alternative to violence as a means to achieve political objectives. The overall effect of structural factors upon democracy can be viewed in Figure 2. Actor preferences for democracy are affected by structural factors that can be aggregated into economic, security, and norms. This section analyzes the causal chain of each structural factor to identify hypotheses that will further exploration of the determinants of levels of democracy.

1. An Economic Theoretical Model

Some of the most advanced quantitative democracy studies come from the field of economics. From this research, econometricians developed a mathematical representation between democracy and key economic variables. Following Acemoglu and Robinson, as well as Haber and Menaldo, the Cobb-Douglass production function can be used as a starting point to estimate a mathematical model of the relationships between the dependent and independent variables.⁷⁷ For use in this study, the equation is recalculated to solve for changes in the level of democracy. The Cobb-Douglass production function is expressed as:

$$Y_t = A_t K_t^\alpha H_t^\beta G_t^\gamma L_t^\delta \quad (1)$$

where $\alpha > 0, \beta > 0, \gamma > 0, \delta > 0$ and $\alpha + \beta + \gamma + \delta \geq 1$

Where Y is economic growth, K is private capital, G is public capital, H is human capital, and L is labor force participation and A can be defined as;

$$A_t = T_t Gov_t \quad (2)$$

Where T is technological progress and Gov is governance defined as:

⁷⁷ Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse," (2009).

$$Gov_t = g(D_t N_t S_t X_t) \quad (3)$$

Where D is the level of democracy, N is the level of democratic norms, S is the level of security, and X represents undetermined exogenous variables. Substituting for Gov_t and simplifying capital and labor into production variable P_t ,

$$Y_t = T_t^\alpha D_t^\beta S_t^\gamma P_t^\varepsilon N_t^\delta$$

In order to solve for the steady state levels of capital and labor, i_k , i_h , and i_g are defined as the fractions of income invested in private, human, and public capital, respectively, and the stocks of capital per unit of labor defined as:

$$h = \frac{H(t)}{L(t)}, g = \frac{G(t)}{L(t)}, k = \frac{K(t)}{L(t)}, y = \frac{Y(t)}{L(t)}$$

Then:

$$\begin{aligned} k(t) &= i_k y(t) - (n + g + d) k(t) & k(t) &= i_k k(t)^\alpha h(t)^\beta g(t)^\psi - (n + g + \zeta) k(t) \\ h(t) &= i_h y(t) - (n + g + d) h(t) & \rightarrow & h(t) = i_h k(t)^\alpha h(t)^\beta g(t)^\psi - (n + g + \zeta) h(t) \\ g(t) &= i_g y(t) - (n + g + d) g(t) & g(t) &= i_g k(t)^\alpha h(t)^\beta g(t)^\psi - (n + g + \zeta) g(t) \end{aligned}$$

At steady state, change in the rate of accumulation is zero or $kt = ht = gt = 0$.

$$i_k K^\varphi(t)^\alpha h^\phi(t)^\beta g^\gamma(t)^\psi = (n + g + \zeta) K^\varphi(t) \quad (4)$$

and since:

$$h^\phi(t) = i_h y^\phi(t) = \frac{i_h}{i_k} k^\varphi(t) \quad \text{AND} \quad g^\gamma(t) = i_g y^\phi(t) = \frac{i_g}{i_k} k^\varphi(t)$$

then:

$$i_k k^\varphi(t)^\alpha \left[\frac{i_h}{i_k} k^\varphi(t) \right]^\beta \left[\frac{i_g}{i_k} k^\varphi(t) \right]^\psi = (n + g + \zeta) k^\varphi(t)$$

$$\frac{i_k}{i_k^\beta + i_k^\psi} \left[k^\varphi(t)^\alpha k^\varphi(t)^\beta k^\varphi(t)^\psi i_h^\beta i_g^\gamma \right] = (n + g + \zeta) k^\varphi(t)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
k^\phi(t) &= \left[\frac{i_k^{1-\beta-\psi} i_h^\beta i_g^\gamma}{(n+g+\zeta)} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} \\
h^\varphi(t) &= \left[\frac{i_h^{1-\alpha-\psi} i_k^\alpha i_g^\psi}{(n+g+\zeta)} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} \\
g^\gamma(t) &= \left[\frac{i_g^{1-\alpha-\beta} i_k^\alpha i_h^\psi}{(n+g+\zeta)} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}}
\end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

Substituting the steady states of capital from equation (5) back into the production function $y(t) = A(t)k^\phi(t)^\alpha h^\varphi(t)^\beta g^\gamma(t)^\psi$ results in:

$$y^\nu(t) = A(t) \left[\frac{i_k^{1-\beta-\psi} i_h^\beta i_g^\psi}{(n+g+\zeta)} \right]^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} \left[\frac{i_h^{1-\alpha-\psi} i_k^\alpha i_g^\psi}{(n+g+\zeta)} \right]^{\frac{\beta}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} \left[\frac{i_g^{1-\alpha-\beta} i_k^\alpha i_h^\psi}{(n+g+\zeta)} \right]^{\frac{\psi}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} \tag{6}$$

Pulling $(n+g+\zeta)$ out,

$$y^\nu(t) = A(t) \left[\frac{1}{(n+g+\zeta)} \right]^{\frac{\alpha+\beta+\psi}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} \left[i_k^{1-\beta-\psi} i_h^\beta i_g^\psi \right]^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} \left[i_h^{1-\alpha-\psi} i_k^\alpha i_g^\psi \right]^{\frac{\beta}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} \left[i_g^{1-\alpha-\beta} i_k^\alpha i_h^\psi \right]^{\frac{\psi}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} \tag{7}$$

Simplifying by substituting $Z = \frac{1}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}$:

$$\begin{aligned}
y^\nu(t) &= A(t) \left[\frac{1}{(n+g+\zeta)} \right] \left[i_k^{\alpha-\alpha\beta-\alpha\psi} i_h^{\alpha\beta} i_g^{\alpha\psi} \right]^Z \left[i_h^{\beta-\alpha\beta-\psi\beta} i_k^{\alpha\beta} i_g^{\psi\beta} \right]^Z \left[i_g^{\psi-\alpha\psi-\beta\psi} i_k^{\alpha\psi} i_h^{\beta\psi} \right]^Z \\
y^\nu(t) &= A(t) \left[\frac{1}{(n+g+\zeta)} \right]^{\frac{\alpha+\beta+\psi}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} i_k^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} i_h^{\frac{\beta}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} i_g^{\frac{\psi}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}}
\end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

Expanding A(t) to its full form yields:

$$y^\nu(t) = T(t)Gov(t) \left[\frac{1}{(n+g+\zeta)} \right]^{\frac{\alpha+\beta+\psi}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} i_k^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} i_h^{\frac{\beta}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} i_g^{\frac{\psi}{1-\alpha-\beta-\psi}} \tag{9}$$

If order to solve for change over time, the speed of convergence to steady state per capita income is calculated by taking the derivative of equation (9):

$$\frac{\partial \ln y(t)}{\partial t} = \lambda (\ln y^\nu(t) - \ln y(t)) \quad (10)$$

$$\lambda = (n + g + \zeta)(1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi)$$

Let $y(0)$ be initial per capita income, so

$\ln y^\nabla(t2) = (1 - e^{-\lambda T}) \ln y^\nu + e^{-\lambda T} \ln y^\nabla(t1)$ where $y^\nabla(t1)$ is income per effective worker at some point in time and $T = t2 - t1$.

$$\begin{aligned} \ln y^\nabla(t2) &= \ln y^\nu - e^{-\lambda T} \ln y^\nu + e^{-\lambda T} \ln y^\nabla(t1) \\ \ln y^\nu - e^{-\lambda T} \ln y^\nu &= \ln y^\nabla(t2) - e^{-\lambda T} \ln y^\nabla(t1) \\ \ln y^\nu (1 - e^{-\lambda T}) &= \ln y^\nabla(t2) - e^{-\lambda T} \ln y^\nabla(t1) \\ \ln y^\nabla(t2) &= \ln y^\nu (1 - e^{-\lambda T}) + e^{-\lambda T} \ln y^\nabla(t1) \\ \ln y^\nabla(t2) - \ln y^\nabla(t1) &= \ln y^\nu (1 - e^{-\lambda T}) + e^{-\lambda T} \ln y^\nabla(t1) - \ln y^\nabla(t1) \\ \ln y^\nabla(t2) - \ln y^\nabla(t1) &= (1 - e^{-\lambda T})(\ln y^\nu - \ln y^\nabla(t1)) \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

Substituting for y^ν , we get:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln y^\nabla(t2) - \ln y^\nabla(t1) &= (1 - e^{-\lambda T}) \left[\ln \left[T(t) Gov(t) \left[\frac{1}{(n + g + \zeta)} \right]^{\frac{\alpha + \beta + \psi}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi}} i_k^{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi}} i_h^{\frac{\beta}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi}} i_g^{\frac{\psi}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi}} \right] - \ln y^\nabla(t1) \right] \\ \ln y^\nabla(t2) - \ln y^\nabla(t1) &= (1 - e^{-\lambda T}) * \\ &\left[\left[\ln T(t) + \ln Gov(t) - \left[\frac{\alpha + \beta + \psi}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \right] \ln(n + g + \zeta) + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \ln i_k + \frac{\beta}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \ln i_h + \frac{\psi}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \ln i_g \right] - \ln y^\nabla(t1) \right] \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

In order to solve for output per capita:

$$\begin{aligned} y^\nabla(t) &= \frac{y(t)}{A(t)L(t)} \\ \ln y^\nabla(t) &= \ln\left(\frac{y(t)}{L(t)}\right) - \ln(A(t)) \\ \ln y^\nabla(t) &= \ln y(t) - \ln A(t) \end{aligned}$$

Substituting, we get:

$$Q = \left[\left[\ln T(t) + \ln Gov(t) - \left[\frac{\alpha + \beta + \psi}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \right] \ln(n + g + \zeta) + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \ln i_k \frac{\beta}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \ln i_h \frac{\psi}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \ln i_g - \ln y^\vee(t1) \right] \right] (13)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \ln y(t2) - \ln A(t2) - (\ln y(t1) - \ln A(t1)) &= (1 - e^{-\lambda T})Q - (1 - e^{-\lambda T})(\ln y(t1) - \ln A(t1)) \\ \ln y(t2) - \ln y(t1) &= (1 - e^{-\lambda T})Q - (1 - e^{-\lambda T})(\ln y(t1) - (1 - e^{-\lambda T})(\ln A(t1) + \ln A(t2) - \ln A(t1))) \\ \ln y(t2) - \ln y(t1) &= (1 - e^{-\lambda T})Q - (1 - e^{-\lambda T})(\ln y(t1) + \ln A(t2) - e^{-\lambda T} \ln A(t1)) \end{aligned}$$

Noting that $A(t) = T(t)Gov(t)$ where $Gov(t) = f(S(t), D(t), N(t), X(t))$ and $T(t) = T(0)e^{gt}$ and the conditions at time $t1$ are not observed,

$$\ln y(t2) - \ln y(t1) = (1 - e^{-\lambda T}) \left[\ln A(t2) + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \ln i_k \frac{\beta}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \ln i_h \frac{\psi}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} - \frac{\alpha + \beta + \psi}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \ln(n + g + \zeta) - \ln y(t1) - e^{-\lambda T} \ln A(t1) \right]$$

Let $P = (1 - e^{-\lambda t})$ and let

$$\begin{aligned} R &= \frac{1}{(1 - e^{-\lambda T})} \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \ln i_k + \frac{1}{(1 - e^{-\lambda T})} \frac{\beta}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \ln i_h + \frac{1}{(1 - e^{-\lambda T})} \frac{\psi}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} - \frac{1}{(1 - e^{-\lambda T})} \frac{\alpha + \beta + \psi}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \ln(n + g + \zeta) - e^{-\lambda T} \ln y(t1) \\ \ln y(t2) - \ln y(t1) &= (1 - e^{-\lambda T}) \left[\ln A(t2) - (1 - e^{-\lambda T}) \right] e^{-\lambda T} \ln A(t1) + R \\ (1 - e^{-\lambda T}) \ln A(t2) - (1 - e^{-\lambda T}) e^{-\lambda T} \ln A(t1) &= \ln y(t2) - e^{-\lambda T} \ln y(t1) - (1 - e^{-\lambda T}) R \\ (1 - e^{-\lambda T}) \ln A(t2) - e^{-\lambda T} \ln A(t1) &= \ln y(t2) - e^{-\lambda T} \ln y(t1) - R \\ \ln A(t2) - e^{-\lambda T} \ln A(t1) &= \frac{1}{(1 - e^{-\lambda T})} (\ln y(t2) - e^{-\lambda T} \ln y(t1)) - R - \ln A(t1) + e^{-\lambda T} \ln A(t1) \\ \ln T(t2) + \ln Gov(t2) - \ln T(t1) - \ln Gov(t1) &= \frac{1}{(1 - e^{-\lambda T})} (\ln y(t2) - e^{-\lambda T} \ln y(t1)) - R - \ln A(t1) + e^{-\lambda T} \ln A(t1) \\ \ln Gov(t2) - \ln Gov(t1) &= \frac{1}{(1 - e^{-\lambda T})} (\ln y(t2) - e^{-\lambda T} \ln y(t1)) - R - (1 + e^{-\lambda T}) \ln A(t1) - \ln T(t2) - \ln T(t1) \\ \ln Gov(t2) - \ln Gov(t1) &= \frac{1}{(1 - e^{-\lambda T})} (\ln y(t2) - \ln T(t2) + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \ln i_k \frac{\beta}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \ln i_h \frac{\psi}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} \ln i_g \\ &\quad - \frac{e^{-\lambda T}}{1 - e^{-\lambda T}} \ln y(t1) - (1 + e^{-\lambda T}) \ln A(t1) - \ln T(t1) - \frac{\alpha + \beta + \psi}{1 - \alpha - \beta - \psi} (n + g + \zeta)) \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

Equation (14) demonstrates that the change in the level of governance ($\ln Gov(t2) - \ln Gov(t1)$) is determined by GDP per capita [$y(t2)$], private capital to GDP (i_k), human capital to GDP (i_h), public capital to GDP (i_g), technological progress (T) as well as other unknown factors. Therefore, these factors also have a determinative influence upon the subcomponents of $Gov(t)$ including democracy, security, and diffusion. In order to understand these relationships in a more contextual manner, the study reviewed existing

theory to further shape hypotheses development. The most prominent economic variables explored in democracy studies are economic growth, economic crisis, the resource curse, and economic development.

a. Income

The terms economic growth and economic development are often used interchangeably. While the practice is acceptable in some cases, for this research it is important to identify the nuanced differences so that a full exploration of the causal interaction with democracy can be investigated. Income is the most common metric of economic growth. As a determinant of democracy, there are two variations of income used. One variation is the exploration of an income threshold. Once a country's income moves above or below this threshold, the probability of democracy is influenced. The second variation involves exploration of the effects of precipitous drops in income creating an economic crisis. Again, this approach requires the development of a threshold to identify when an economic crisis has occurred.

The claim that only wealthy countries can become democracies is an old argument dating back to Aristotle's analysis of Athenian democracy. The relationships between economic growth and democracy as well as economic development and democracy are still highly debated today. Seymour Lipset set the stage for both of these debates, arguing that economic prosperity was a prerequisite for a successful democratic transition.⁷⁸ Comparing "less democratic" and "more democratic" governments, Lipset found that the more democratic countries had a considerable advantage in income as well as several economic development factors. We will address economic development shortly, but will first explore the arguments on economic growth.

Lipset's findings were based on cross-sectional data: a single snapshot in time that included only Latin America and Europe. The cross-sectional approach provides useful information on differences between countries, but does not explain changes within countries. Lipset's findings showed that the economically advanced

⁷⁸ Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy."

countries were democratic. However, his empirical analysis provides no insight into the direction of causation or advance a theory for why or when an individual country would democratize. Surprisingly, Lipset's theory does not address the reason that the Axis powers became democracies in the post-war environment rather than prior to the war. But, the political landscape of the late 1940s and 1950s provided overwhelming evidence in support of Lipset's theory. The Axis powers had recently transitioned to democracy. Almost every stable democracy was a developed country. Poor democracies were dropping like flies: Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sudan, and Syria. Burma and India were democratic, but on the verge of civil war. Colombia and Peru were politically unstable. Malaysia and Venezuela had only entered the democracy scene and had not yet proved themselves. The only country at the time to achieve a high level of democracy that appeared sustainable was wealthy Uruguay (though even Uruguay's democracy would not last). The political environment changed drastically in fifty years. Reality seemed to have disproved Lipset's theory. Moderate-income countries like Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines and even poor Mongolia were able to create sustainable, highly democratic regimes. Meanwhile, wealthy countries like Belarus, Malaysia and Singapore had only limited democracy.

A slew of researchers have debated Lipset's theory for decades. Przeworski, et al., seemingly put the final nail in the coffin of Lipset's theory with their finding that income level was not a factor in determining democratic transition, but only a factor in democratic sustainability.⁷⁹ While critics agreed that wealth does not *cause* democracy, the political landscape seemed to suggest that poor countries had a tough time with democracy. David Epstein, et al., argued that Przeworski's results were skewed because he chose a dichotomous variable for polity type. Epstein retested using a three-tier regime type (autocracy, partial democracy, and democracy) and found that income is, after all, a significant factor in democratic transitions: wealthy countries are both more likely to transition to and to sustain full democracy.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Przeworski, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990*, 103.

⁸⁰ Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions": 560–6.

Though they may disagree on the outcome, the above arguments all agree that economic growth is an input to democracy. Yet, there are many that argue that this causal direction is backward: economic growth is the *output* of democracy.⁸¹ However, this debate is equally contentious. A recent survey of the literature found that less than half of 14 studies show that democracy has a positive affect on economic growth.⁸² Attempts to change the economic system in order to boost economic growth can create short term losers. An autocracy can repress the dissent of the losers. Citizens in a democracy are likely to complain (and vote accordingly) about the pain associated with economic reforms.⁸³ It is possible that this debate affected the preferences for democratic change among ruling regimes and intellectuals. While the proper sequencing of political and economic reforms may be debated, it is clear that the simultaneous transition of politics and economics runs some risks. Simultaneous, or near simultaneous, economic and political transitions provides an opportunity for the losers from political reform to ally with the losers of economic reform. The experience of Eastern Europe during the 1990s demonstrated that these risks are not insurmountable.⁸⁴

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the income-democracy debate is not the causal direction between the two factors, but how the relationship has changed over time. Gasiorowski and Poptani found that the effect of democracy on economic growth is dependent upon the time period.⁸⁵ Their findings, based on a study of Latin America, show that it is the economic policy choices of a democracy that matter. Populist policies of the 1960s were a drag on the economy while free market policies of the 1980s

⁸¹ See Abbas Pourgerami, "The Political Economy of Development: A Cross-National Causality Test of Development-Democracy-Growth Hypothesis," *Public Choice* 58, no. 2 (1988): 123. For discussion that democracy leads to long term, but not short term, economic growth, see John Gerring et al., "Democracy and Economic Growth: A Historical Perspective," *World Politics* 57, no. 3 (2005): 325.

⁸² Five studies reported a positive correlation, four, a negative correlation; four, no impact; and one was inconclusive. See Lane and Ersson, 53.

⁸³ Francesco Giavazzi and Guido Tabellini, "Economic and Political Liberalizations," *Journal of Monetary Economics* (2005): 1297–330.

⁸⁴ Arend Lijphart and Carlos H. Waisman, *Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Latin America in Global Perspective (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 235–7.

⁸⁵ Mark J. Gasiorowski and Zaheer Poptani, "The Macroeconomic Consequences of Democratic Transition: Learning Processes in the Third and Fourth Wave of Democratization," *Studies in Comparative International Development* (2006): 54.

produced long-term economic growth. This effect likely varies from region to region and even country to country. If the correlation between economic growth and democracy varies over time, then it is possible that the causal direction between economic growth and democracy also varies over time.

Two explanations for the rationale that income drives democracy stand out. Both are built upon the assumption that economic growth leads to increases in the individual incomes of at least a portion of the population, creating what could be called a middle class. This change in income creates disposable income, provides independence from the patronage of the state, and changes the spending priorities of those achieving middle class status.

The first rationale for the connection between economic growth and democracy focuses on disposable income. More income means increased opportunities for purchasing technological goods (i.e., television, radio, internet, and cell phone) that provide access to formal and informal sources of international news and sources for learning about the advantages and disadvantages of democracy relative to autocracy. As citizens in autocracies get greater access to information, they will gain an increased ability to monitor the decisions, actions, and performance of their government relative to its peers. An increase in income leads to an increase in demand for democracy and an improved ability to monitor and evaluate government legitimacy.

An increase in income also changes the needs priorities of individuals. The poor are focused on meeting their basic needs of food, water, shelter and safety. The middle class, having secured enough income to satisfy their basic needs, has the ability to address what Maslow called social and self-esteem needs. These needs drive individuals to seek social interaction, develop mutual respect with their peers, and take on social responsibilities. The development of these values coincides with the development of the democratic norms of tolerance, trust, and the expression of choice.⁸⁶ Social and professional organizations are formed. Social and political problems and solutions are debated. The widespread adoption of these democratic norms is often referred to as civil

⁸⁶ Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*, 54–8, 150–3.

society, a potential determinant of democracy, which will be explored in more detail later. Both of these rationales suggest that income is not the immediate determinant of democracy. Income affects some intervening variable, which produces, or at least increases the probability of, a democratic outcome. One explanation is that income is part of a cost-benefit analysis.⁸⁷ For example, Singapore's consistent economic growth and ability to successfully provide basic and advanced services, the people perceive the government of Singapore as legitimate and have no reason to rebel or demand change.

The income-democracy correlation (via intervening variables) shows promise, but the relationship likely fluctuates over time. Although the direct connection is tenuous, some foreign policy makers have adopted economic assistance programs to encourage democracy. The Kennedy administration created the Alliance for Progress while the Reagan administration implemented the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

Economic crisis as a variable is simply a subset of economic growth. If a country sustains economic growth, then it should not suffer an economic crisis. But, the business cycle is not so forgiving. All countries suffer the occasional economic crisis regardless of their growth pattern. Countries with poorly designed policies may suffer more than their peers. If economic growth encourages democracy, then the logical extension of the argument is that economic loss should discourage democracy. An economic crisis threatens individuals' incomes. Priorities revert to meeting basic needs while maintaining a civil society becomes a secondary priority. In some cases, an economic crisis shatters the perceived legitimacy of the government. This would be especially true if the autocratic government began under the premise of fixing the failed economic policies of the past. However, evidence suggests that economic crisis is not necessarily bad for democracy; economic crisis is a catalyst for regime change but has no preference for autocracy over democracy.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, 1.

⁸⁸ Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 321–32.

The theory that rising incomes leads to a middle class is not universal. Countries with high-priced, high-demand natural resources like diamonds, oil, and gold can suffer from the resource curse, originally called Dutch Disease (the term originally referred to the Dutch experience with natural gas). Countries with the resource curse fail to, or choose not to, develop industry beyond that required for resource exploitation. Other industries become unappealing and unaffordable. The high profitability of natural resources decreases the relative benefit of developing, operating, or investing in alternative industries. Meanwhile, the rising prosperity that comes with a boon in natural resources drives up local prices, driving low margin businesses into the red. When industrial capacity is limited, the middle class remains small, decreasing the demand for democracy and the number of participants in civil society.

There are a plethora of both quantitative and qualitative studies that conclude that oil is an inhibitor of democratization.⁸⁹ Almost all of the high oil rent states are autocracies. This is one possible explanation for the lack of democracy in the Middle East. However, recent events suggest that the resource curse may be only a secondary factor. Latin American oil producers were able to become democracies in the 1980s. Since the end of the Cold War, oil producers across Africa, Asia, and Europe have democratized, albeit with mixed success. Previous large-N studies focused on variances between countries but failed to examine changes within countries over time.⁹⁰ In contrast, Haber and Menaldo examined seventeen resource dependent countries from 1972–1999. Botswana, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Papua New Guinea remained democratic throughout the period. Malaysia substantially decreased its level of democracy, but long before the country was receiving large oil rents. Ecuador, Chile, Peru, Venezuela,

⁸⁹ For case study research, see: Lisa Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa," *Comparative Politics* 20 no. 1 (1987). Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, *The Rentier State*, Nation, State, and Integration in the Arab World V. 2 (London ; New York: Croom Helm, 1987). Jill Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar*, Cambridge Middle East Library 24 (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, *The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East*, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). Jay Ulfelder, "Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy," *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 8 (2007); Michael Ross, "Oil and Democracy Revisited," (UCLA, 2009), 232–46.

⁹⁰ Haber and Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse."

Nigeria and Mexico were autocratic prior to oil and managed to become democracies in spite of their resource dependence. Chad, Iran, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, and Angola were also autocratic prior to oil, but have made considerable political reforms since. The remaining states, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Equatorial Guinea, were autocratic both before and after oil. However, these states are in a region that has a poor overall democracy rate. Egypt and Syria have only small oil programs and Jordan has no oil, yet their movements towards democracy have been limited. Most of the Middle East was autocratic long before they had considerable amounts of oil, limiting the explanatory value of the resource curse. There are only a handful of cases in which the resource curse directly correlated to a change in democracy. In Indonesia, Syria, and Gabon, democracy turned autocratic when oil rents jumped.⁹¹ Taiwan and Mexico turned towards democracy during a period of declining oil rents per capita.

The most convincing aspect of the economic growth-democracy causal chain rests on changes in income. While economic crisis and oil rents appear to have some influence, they do not appear to be determinative in nature. Based on this discussion and the results from equation (14), this study hypothesized that all else being equal, a change in the level of per capita income ($Y_t - Y_{t-1}$) $\neq 0$ may lead to a change in the level of democracy ($D_t - D_{t-1}$) $\neq 0$. However, economic crisis and oil rents will be considered as alternative explanations.

b. Economic Development

The relationship between economic development and democracy is extremely difficult to measure largely due to the amorphous nature of the concept of development. Theorists do not agree on either the basic components or where it resides in the causal chain. The literature is divided on whether economic development is an input or output to economic growth. Others argue that the causal chain is bi-directional. The input crowd looks at the societal factors that influence economic growth. These

⁹¹ Haber and Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse." 19–22.

factors include technology, education, and infrastructure as well as more abstract factors such as industrialization and economic liberalization. The output crowd, including the United Nations Development Program, sees economic growth as a means to achieve the end of economic development. In this case, economic development is perceived as an increased quality of life such as health, nutrition, and employment.

In either case, the term “development” suggests some type of advancement. Some refer to this advancement as modernization. Modernization, in its broadest form, is an aggregation of the social and technological changes that have occurred since the 16th century. The actual time frame or the specific social and technological changes that are relevant to modernization vary from author to author. The congruence of spreading democracy and societal advancements led to the creation of modernization theory. Daniel Lerner, arguably the founder of modernization theory, emphasized the social aspects of development such as urbanization, literacy, mass media, and education. This social development led to increased knowledge of and demand for democratic processes while providing increased opportunities to organize, share information, and discuss politics. Simon Kuznets, on the other hand, emphasized technological advances of modernization such as those in agriculture, food processing, transportation, and distribution. Advances in technology led to increased productivity and an abundance in depth and breadth of goods. Over time, this abundance disrupted the relative position of economic groups and bred social and normative changes towards a spirit of inquiry and critical examination of evidence that were in favor of democracy. Despite their differences in the makeup of development, Lerner and Kuznets agreed that economic development contributed to democracy.⁹²

Both theories have weakness in the definitions. Does the adoption of modern equipment and transportation methods qualify as industrialized or must a country have a certain amount of manufacturing capacity as well? Does it have to be industrial or

⁹² Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), 60–3; Simon Smith Kuznets, "International Differences in Income Levels: Reflections on Their Causes," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 2, no. 1 (1953): 20–1; Kuznets, *Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread*, Studies in Comparative Economics 7 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 8–12.

can a transition to a service-based economy serve the same purpose? Does a high rate of technology make a country modern or does the society have to embrace contemporary international norms on issues such as gender equality and human rights? Is it simply a measure of per capita income or is there some combination of quality of life metrics that must be met? We will not fully explore the details of modernization theory here, but will merely provide a brief summary of the arguments that demonstrate linkages between economic development and democracy.

Regardless of the weaknesses in the definition, the majority of Lerner's contribution is still part of the debate. Yet, Lerner's theory had one major flaw. Lerner posited that modernization was a phased evolution that would end up at democracy. Urbanization would lead to increased skills and resources as workers adapted to industrial jobs. The need for increased skills required increased training and, therefore, increased literacy. Literacy and the media would grow concomitantly, in a manner spreading the good news on democracy. The growth of literacy and media would eventually lead to a desire to participate in politics and a migration to democracy. Lerner's evolutionary theory was modified and championed by Walt Rostow in his book *The Stages of Economic Growth*. Rostow would later become an influential foreign policy advisor in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The Kennedy implementation of the Alliance for Progress, a foreign assistance program for Latin America, suggests that this academic theory was applied to foreign policy.

Over time, the theory of sequential phases of modernization was dealt several mortal blows. Countries like India were achieving democracy out of sequence prior to achieving high levels of either social or technological advancement. Some critics argued that the developing world's economic dependency on the developed world prevented the evolution argued by modernization. Others argued that in some cases, the social changes involved in modernization appeared to be directly responsible for devolution into political instability or internal violence instead of democracy.⁹³ The

⁹³ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 47.

combination of these attacks has largely killed the sequential portion of Lerner's theory. However, the linkage between economic development and democracy has largely survived.

Lipset tested the economic development aspects of modernization theory. Lipset confined his study to seeking correlations between the various elements of modernization theory as laid out by Lerner and Kuznets. Lipset tested education levels, percentage of agricultural labor (as a metric for level of industrialization), urbanization rates, the mass media, and the availability of cars and doctors. Lipset found correlations between all of the various metrics of economic development and democracy. However, his study was a single snapshot in time, a comparison between existing autocracies and democracies. It was *not* a study in the change from autocracy to democracy.

More recent studies have attempted to address this change factor, but have slightly modified their approach to the problem. Following Kuznets, Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson and Charles Boix suggest that industrialization involves a change in the domestic balance of power and the dispersion of resources. Industrialization contributes to civil society through the development of labor groups and professional organizations. Civil society becomes more educated. Education breeds tolerance and proliferates the benefits of democracy and highlights the evils inherent in autocracy. The dispersion of resources causes changes in the distribution of income resulting in the rise of a middle class.

Democracy brings the prospect of resource distribution. If a society with a high amount of income inequality transitioned to democracy, the poor (the majority) have an economic incentive to redistribute the resources of the rich (the minority) in order to ease their situation in life. Because of this prospect, many of the rich and politically powerful will oppose giving more say to the poor. The development of a middle class creates a more normal (linear) distribution of income. As the middle class grows, the rich feel less threatened by the prospect of democracy due to the reduced threat of aggressive redistribution.⁹⁴

⁹⁴ Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, 285.

Prevention of redistribution is not the only interest of the rich. Landowners in an agricultural society have an interest in maintaining cheap labor. Democracy encourages organization which could lead to labor unions and, consequently, rising labor prices. Even in cases where cheap labor was plentiful, landlords worked to prevent the establishment of small landholders that would eat into their profits. All other things being equal, land-owners in agricultural societies are likely to oppose democracy.⁹⁵ Costa Rica's early democratic success has been partially attributed to its small farms and lack of large landholders. Guatemala and El Salvador both had oligarchies based on the landed class and were late adopters of democracy compared to their more industrialized Latin American peers.⁹⁶ Politics in the Philippines and arguably in the early days of the southern United States were also dominated by a landholder oligarchy.

Capitalists enjoy democratic institutions such as the rule of law, but tend not to be interested in sharing power with the lower classes. Landowners in agricultural societies hold the keys to the means of production and control resources, activities and positions within the production process. That ownership enables landowners to dominate politics and regulate access of the workers.⁹⁷ This dominant relationship comes to be accepted as a norm.⁹⁸ Only if the norm changes can the balance of power be shifted. The rich tend to desire an internal balance of power between workers and the rich such that "the dominant classes accommodated to democracy only as long as the [political] party system effectively protected their interests."⁹⁹ As the country develops, landowners become less dominant. Industrialization not only creates a middle class while reducing

⁹⁵ Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 271–3.

⁹⁶ Evelyne Huber and Frank Safford, eds., *Agrarian Structure & Political Power* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), 9–17, 190.

⁹⁷ David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power, Issues in Political Theory* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1991), 56.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 106.

⁹⁹ Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, 287.

the number of peasants but entices some land-owners to become industrialists.¹⁰⁰ The rise of industrialists and the importance of industry as a contributor to the economy and the government's tax revenues lessens the regime's reliance upon the landed class. Industrialized workers are far more densely populated than farm workers. This density enabled the organization of labor unions. This organization extended into the political arena providing a driving force for democratization. In days past, peasants in rural areas had little ability to organize. For contemporary peasants, modern communications and transportation enable organization and the sharing of ideas of disparate peoples.

Industry Barons desire political stability. Coups lead to work stoppage and trade stoppage, which hurts profitability. Agriculture is a seasonal business that is unaffected by trade stoppages during the off-season. Rural labor is likely far from the coup and can continue daily operations. Industrialists have less to fear from democracy since industry is mainly about the application of skilled labor. Land is relatively easy to tax and redistribute due to its immobile nature. Industry can be both more difficult to find, and thus tax, and more difficult to redistribute since industrial capital is a flight risk. If government policies increase the costs of business too much, industry can often move to a more suitable location.

In sum, economic development, more specifically, industrialization leads to increased organization and education. These lead to increased democratic norms and lobbying power. As the economy moves from a land-based economy, the wealthy become more interested in market and political stability and less concerned about the threat that democracy has on the redistribution of land. Since industrialization represents changes in both knowledge and the means of production, this study hypothesized that, all else being equal, a change in the level of industrialization, represented in equation (14) as $(H_t - H_{t-1}) \neq 0$, $(K_t - K_{t-1}) \neq 0$, and $(G_t - G_{t-1}) \neq 0$, may lead to a change in the level of democracy $(D_t - D_{t-1}) \neq 0$.

¹⁰⁰ Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 39, 430.

2. Internal Security

Recent research indicates that the relationship between intrastate violence and democracy is in the shape of an inverted U-curve.¹⁰¹ The lack of violence in full autocracies can be attributed to two factors. First, autocratic states can rule by fear and repression, deterring citizens from using violence. Second, states can form “a dominant coalition that limits access to valuable resources—land, labor, and capital—or access to and control of valuable activities—such as trade, worship, and education—to elite groups” forming various patron-client networks.¹⁰² These networks give important groups and individuals a stake in maintaining the autocratic system.

Although Hegre’s work did not specify the direction of causation, it is accepted as common knowledge within the field that internal violence is both an inhibitor to democracy and a detractor to democratic sustainability.¹⁰³ However, there is little empirical work to back up these claims. Security is a key aspect of government performance. Internal violence is a black mark on regime performance because it threatens the state’s monopoly on the use of force. This decrease in government performance threatens the perceived legitimacy of the government. The regime may autocratize in order to regain its monopoly on the use of force and boost its perceived performance and legitimacy. The existing theory, then, clearly suggests that a significant increase in internal violence should lead to autocratization. Similarly, the theory also indicates that the existence of violence during democratization will prevent democratic consolidation. The majority of empirical research in democracy studies is dedicated to the outcomes of democracy: how and why democracy contributes to interstate or intrastate violence. Before adopting intrastate violence as an independent variable, this study will first explore the causal directions between polity type and violence.

¹⁰¹ Hegre et al., “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992”: passim.

¹⁰² North, Wallis, and Weingast, *Violence and Social Orders*.

¹⁰³ Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” 134–5; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, 6; Diamond, *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*, 16; Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, 89–90.

Within the context of this study, violence is the “deliberate use of physical force on behalf of collective goals” by a non-state entity.¹⁰⁴ Political violence has political ends (e.g., autonomy, regime change). Criminal violence is a means to, or byproduct of, attaining illegal profit.¹⁰⁵ However, in some instances, organized criminal groups blur the line between political violence and criminal violence. For instance, criminal groups may use violence against other groups or the state as a means to gain territorial control or autonomy. Within these instances, organized crime challenges the state’s monopoly on the use of force. At the local level, this threat to security is little different from the threat from local insurgents.

Arguments on the causes of intrastate violence can be aggregated into two factors: capability and intent. A group’s capability to conduct violence is based on its ability to organize and the state’s ability to repress. However, early researchers in the violence field initially focused on intent in order to determine why individuals and groups would resort to violence. The theories on intent primarily fell into two shaping factors: emotion-driven and rational choice.

a. Intent: Emotion-Driven Violence

The emotion-driven argument views violence as the result of anger. This does not mean to suggest that violence is perpetrated by individuals that are in a barbaric rage. It merely suggests that some grievances can drive people towards violence. Ted Gurr pioneered the emotion-driven argument with his theory of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is the difference between people’s perception of what they deserve and what they have.¹⁰⁶ This perception can be influenced by loss of something they had or failure to gain something that they anticipated. Wilkinson summarized the concept as articulated by psychologist John Dollard’s: “severe frustration leads to anger and anger to

¹⁰⁴ Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965–1975*, 77; Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, 30.

¹⁰⁵ John Bailey and Roy Godson, eds., *Organized Crime & Democratic Governability* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 6–7.

¹⁰⁶ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 24.

acts of aggressive violence.”¹⁰⁷ The sources of relative deprivation can be tied to any part of Maslow’s Needs Hierarchy, especially physical needs (i.e., food, water, shelter) and safety needs (i.e., security, public health, job security).¹⁰⁸ Imagine these relative deprivation scenarios: troops burn down your house; land reform was promised but did not happen; your land was seized and given to someone else; government policies ruined your employment opportunities; the state education system promised you a good job upon graduation, but failed to deliver; improved literacy and access to media highlights how poor and unhealthy your situation is relative to others. The higher tiers of Maslow’s hierarchy are also relevant. Love (the government kills your family) and self-esteem (the raid on your home dishonored you) can also contribute to relative deprivation.¹⁰⁹

While relative deprivation can come in many forms, much of the literature focuses on the economic causes of violence.¹¹⁰ Economics can result in relative deprivation in one of two ways. During economic crisis, it can degrade an individual’s ability to meet basic physical needs. During economic growth, individuals may perceive that they are missing the benefits of growth. It is important to note that the emphasis is on the change in relative deprivation, not absolute deprivation (though an absolute change could result in a relative change). For instance, if a poor person has always been poor and anticipates being poor in the future, then that person is unlikely to resort to violence, based solely on economic deprivation.

The theory of relative deprivation is often misunderstood due to a similar sounding political economy concept called relative gains. The adoption of the concept of relative gains indicates that an individual desires to gain more than his competitor. Relative deprivation, on the other hand, is rarely competitor based. For instance, if you

¹⁰⁷ Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, 34.

¹⁰⁸ A. H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review* (1943): 370–96.

¹⁰⁹ Gurr mentions Maslow’s Needs Hierarchy in passing as a potential way to measure relative deprivation. The examples given here are merely examples to help illustrate the concept of relative deprivation.

¹¹⁰ See ; Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 57; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, 4; Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965–1975*, 21; Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, 37; Ekkart Zimmerman, *Political Violence, Crises, and Revolution* (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing, 1983), 284.

were a middle-income earner living in California during the “dot com” 1990s, your neighbors involved in technology were gaining far more than you. Unless you had some expectation that you should have gained from the dot com boom, then you suffered a relative loss compared to neighbors (although you may have had an absolute gain in your income), but did not necessarily suffer relative deprivation. On the other hand, if you had lost your life savings in a dot com bust while all of your neighbors had dot com booms, the potential for relative deprivation exists.

The problem with Gurr’s theory is not that it has been discredited as some claim, but that the theory, like many sociology theories, is not falsifiable. There is no threshold that indicates how much a person needs to be relatively deprived before they decide to rebel. Without a threshold, the theory is a tautology: if a group does not rebel, it is because they were not been relatively deprived *enough*. Because of this fault, his theory fails to explain why some relatively deprived people do not rebel. While he successfully made the relative deprivation—violence connection, Gurr did not explore alternative outcomes of relative deprivation (e.g., suicide, drug addiction, crime).

However, Gurr’s theory has additional explanatory power when it is combined with James Davies’s theory of rising expectations. Davies argues that revolution occurs when needs satisfaction is in the shape of an inverted J-curve. Using examples from the United States, Russia, and Egypt, Davies shows that rebellion occurred when “rising expectations [were] followed by their effective frustration.”¹¹¹ Similar to Gurr, though, Davies fails to explore alternative outcomes to frustrated expectations. Davies’ primary measure of needs satisfaction is GDP growth. However, not all periods of recession or depression are accompanied by rebellion.

The theories of Davies and Gurr provide some theoretical backing to the notion that a democratic transition can increase the near-term probability of intrastate violence. As countries democratize, there is likely an expectation or hope that the new regime will achieve a high level of democracy. Often, there is an assumption that a transition to democracy will also bring about some other socio-economic benefit. If the

¹¹¹ James C. Davies, “Towards a Theory of Revolution,” *American Sociological Review* 27, no. 1 (1962): 14.

country instead becomes mired in a low level of partial democracy or fails to achieve the expected socio-economic benefits, this frustrates citizens' rising expectations, a type of relative deprivation. However, the focus on expectations fails to consider each country's tactical situation. The prominence of the tactical situation is the realm of the rational choice approach to violence.

b. Intent: Rational Violence

Much of the literature on violence shows a sharp divide between the two camps that explore intent. This is exemplified in the greed versus grievance arguments. The grievance argument believes that emotions drive an individual to violence. The individual is angry about some way that he was wronged and seeks vengeance. The greed camp, and other rational choice theorists, argues that there is a type of cost-benefit analysis for participation in political violence.¹¹² The benefit of righting the wrong is worth the cost of rebellion. Even experts not committed to rational choice theory find that there are some rational aspects to choosing violence.¹¹³ Within this context, people are driven to the cost-benefit analysis of violence when they find that they are unable to address their grievances through the existing political process.

The rational argument indicates that individuals must perceive that they will gain some benefit from political violence. Violence must be perceived as a useful method for achieving some ends. This perception can be influenced by the success of other groups either domestically or internationally. For instance, a variety of Latin Americans were inspired to rebel by the Cuban Revolution. The perception can also be reinforced by domestic history. "The greater the extent of historical violence, the more likely it is that some groups have found it effective."¹¹⁴ Even failed rebellions tend to

¹¹² See James DeNardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); Harvey Waterman, "Reasons and Reason: Collective Political Activity in Comparative and Historical Perspective," *World Politics* 33, no. 4 (1981): 554–89.

¹¹³ See Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965–1975*; Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*; Linz and Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*; Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 13, no. 4 (1981): 385, 96.

¹¹⁴ Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 327.

result in some positive changes (from the rebels perspective). The benefits of violence vary upon the situation, but often include power, profit, or civil liberties.

Benefits, of course, are only part of the equation. Costs must also be taken into account. However, cost is not solely considered in numbers of lives or resources in this case. It is primarily a risk management decision. Internal assessments are based on the available group resources, group leadership, group support from the masses and/or elites, the perceived legitimacy of the state, and the state's capacity for repression. It seems unlikely, though, that violence is purely based on cold calculations. This would not do well to explain rebellions in countries that have a massive capacity for repression (e.g., Egypt) or the lack of rebellion in militarily weak countries (e.g., Iceland). Perhaps violence results when the emotional argument and the rational argument intersect to create the perfect storm.

c. Intent: Synthesis

The rational thought versus emotion appears to be a false dichotomy. Intent requires a combination of emotion and rational thought. The theories of Gurr and Davies suggest that some partial democracies might rebel because they are not getting the expected benefits of democracy and are frustrated by their inability to influence the political system. The theories of rational thought suggest that citizens of partial democracies may perceive their government as less legitimate and have limited alternatives for addressing grievances due to their low level of democracy. These factors reduce the perceived costs of rebellion.

Another perspective on the interaction between emotion and rational thought is found in Jack Snyder's *From Voting to Violence*. Snyder argues that nationalism is led by elites who want to maintain their hold on power. During democratic transitions, elites use nationalism to win over the support of the masses.¹¹⁵ The elites exploit new freedoms to promote their nationalist cause. Elites may own the mass media or at least have the resources to exert influence over an immature media. The immature

¹¹⁵ Jack L. Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 2000), 32.

government may have difficulty refuting elite arguments. Nationalism tends to exaggerate the threat from an enemy (typically based on ethnicity, religion, or state) and therefore usually results in violence against that enemy which would seem to explain Mansfield and Snyder's findings that new democracies are more likely to go to war. The choice of nationalism by the elites is a rational choice while nationalism itself is an emotional appeal to the masses.

Intent is a key factor in understanding why some partial democracies experience rebellion. Initial studies in the field focused on intent and provided only a cursory examination of capability. For example, Gurr recognized that group resources were important. Wilkinson and Wickham-Crowley both discussed the importance of group leadership. However, it was not until the development of social movement theory that the full aspects of capability were studied in detail.

d. Capability

Contemporary social movement theory, as refined by the likes of Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, incorporates aspects of both intent and capability for the production of rebellion. These studies highlight two aspects of capability. One, highlighted by Charles Tilly, is the ability and resources to organize a group. Organizing a violent group requires facilities, funds, weapons, and management skills. Without these skills and resources, the group will not function. This concept convinced some social movement theorists that Ted Gurr's theory on relative deprivation was discredited. Since people in poverty do not have the resources to organize; some assumed that deprivation could not be a cause of rebellion. However, this assumption is clearly a perversion of Gurr's theory, which is not about poverty itself, but an individual's frustration created by a radical life change (or failure of expected change). The second aspect to capability involves the ability to mobilize.

Regardless of the ability to organize, the group will die if it cannot get people to show up and participate. Effective mobilizations rely upon social and professional networks.¹¹⁶

While some theories have argued that intent was irrelevant, contemporary experts acknowledge that rebellion is the result of both intent and capability. While the phraseology may be different, the end result is the same. Changes in the cost-benefit analysis equation are sometimes called “opportunities” based on the possibility of success. Intent is summarized as “collective interests.” Collective interests are formed by a collective identity, which tends to be a cultural or ideological response to outsider attempts to impose adjustments on society (e.g., adjustments such as economic or political reforms, modernization [cultural reforms]).¹¹⁷

Structural or System Change




Figure 3. Factors that Influence Intrastate Violence

¹¹⁶ Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2; Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1978), 7.

¹¹⁷ Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd ed., Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 201.

Violence is the result of a process involving both intent and capability (see Figure 3). While social movement theory is a reasonable explanation to explain why individuals join protests and riots, it does not convincingly explain why individuals join groups that routinely use political violence. For instance, the concept of collective interests formed by a collective identity does not fully explain why some individuals would associate their personal interests with the collective interests while others would not. By itself, this concept fails to explain why individuals would provide resource support to a rebellion, but not participate in the group itself. The major problem of solely focusing on capability without viewing intent is the failure to explain *which* group an individual would join: the revolutionaries versus the counter-revolutionaries.

This process is not purely linear. Often times, the planned benefit of a rebellion is to counteract the negative repercussions associated with a system change. The rebellion and the government's response cause more system changes, some intended, some not. As a country democratizes, it should experience less political violence. Free, competitive elections increase the legitimacy and accountability of the elected government, increasing the democratic alternatives to conflict resolution. Similarly, as insurgencies come to a close, the international community, the provider of reconstruction aid, often encourages democracy and elections as a method for the prevention of future conflict.

e. Intent, Capability, and Democracy

From the discussion above, the idea that changes in democracy can cause an eruption in violence seems well established. A regime change from autocracy to partial democracy creates conditions conducive to the increase in both intent and capability for intrastate violence. Citizens may feel that they have been cheated of full democracy. A change in regime to a partial democracy suggests that those previously in power will suffer a reduction in power. Contemporary partial democracies are predominantly developing countries and face increased economic risk and tend to lag in economic development and quality of life. Many partial democracies were former colonies turned oligarchies and have little distribution of power due to a lack of land

reform or industrialization. Some partial democracies practice repressive tactics and discrimination, causing further relative deprivation. The administrative disturbance inherent in a regime change can involve a temporary disruption in the provision of basic services, decreasing the perceived legitimacy of the new government.

Movement from autocracy to a partial democracy increases the potential capability of political violence. As a country democratizes, it allows various freedoms in order to increase electoral participation, competition, and accountability. Some of these newfound freedoms can be exploited by groups that seek to use political violence. It may give them the capability to recruit via free speech and freedom of the press. It may grant them freedom of religion which could allow the spread of extremist millenarianism. And, it could grant the freedom to organize, making it simpler for illicit actors to move, assemble, and plan violent activities.

A transition from a dictatorship to a democracy often involves a decrease in internal security efforts as the state intelligence apparatus is dismantled, groups are given new freedoms, the state reduces repression of opposition forces, and certain aspects of the law may be suspended while a new constitution is developed. This does not suggest that a transition is the sole cause of group formation. Existing revolutionary groups that initiated the transition may refuse to disband, take advantage of the reduced security, and challenge the state's monopoly on the use of force. Furthermore, the success of violent opposition during the transition establishes a perception that violence can be a useful tool for achieving objectives.

There is a surprising lack of causal chain theory that explains how violence affects the level of democracy. The literature suggests three potential explanations of the relationship between violence and democracy. First, the government may believe that high levels of democracy will enable or reward insurgents. In this case, the government will seek to minimize or reduce the level of democracy. Second, actors may disengage from the political process due to increased security concerns. Their lack of participation degrades the level of democracy. Third, the government may believe that its inability to provide security jeopardizes the ability to be reelected in a fully democratic government. In this case, democracy will be kept at low levels in order to ensure regime

continuation. In order to more fully explore the violence-democracy relationship, this study hypothesized that all else being equal, a change in the level of violence or intrastate security ($S_t - S_{t-1}$) $\neq 0$ may lead to a change in the level of democracy ($D_t - D_{t-1}$) $\neq 0$ (see equation 3).

3. Diffusion of Norms

The norms of a society are a social construction with numerous influencing factors. Though norms are a heterogeneous mish-mash across society, norms can be evaluated in a general way over time and between countries. The norms of democracy are diffused in many ways as democratic ideals are shared through demographic factors, the colonial legacy, the evolution of the bureaucracy, and a variety of domestic and foreign interactions. This section will first address the concept of legitimacy and then examine the applicability of the determinants of demographics, colonial ruler, the age of the state, access to information technology, and peer country influence upon the level of democracy.

a. Legitimacy

The preferences of consumers and suppliers of democracy is the product of the concept of legitimacy. It is widely argued that regime legitimacy is a key determinant of regime change and persistence.¹¹⁸ A common reference for legitimacy in democracy studies is Linz and Stepan who argued that legitimacy was the result of government effectiveness and efficacy that resulted in “the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be established, and that they therefore can demand obedience.”¹¹⁹ But, legitimacy is not directly a determinant of democracy. It is a subjective belief of an individual or group. This subjective belief is arguably formed by three interdependent normative

¹¹⁸ Linz and Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, 19; Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies," 547–8; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, 80; Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, 65.

¹¹⁹ Linz and Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, 16.

perceptions of the regime: legality (e.g., conformance with electoral rules or local customs), government performance (e.g., effectiveness and efficacy), and consent (e.g., compliance motivated by fear or charisma).¹²⁰ There does not appear to be a standard adopted within the literature. Linz and Stepan adopted government performance. Weber argued charisma. Eckstein and Gurr favored the legal aspect of legitimacy as the “perceptions that authority patterns are rightly constituted and therefore worthy of...actions that tend to keep the patterns in existence and functioning effectively.”¹²¹ This study argues that these three normative perceptions should be used cooperatively as a theoretical lens in order to analyze the effects that structural factors have upon actors’ preferences for democracy.

b. Demographics

A variety of demographics are proffered as catalysts or obstacles to the spread of democratic norms. Most demographic theories are based on the premise that homogeneity is better for democracy. These theories largely evolved from Aristotle’s argument that democracies must be small. Beside the geographical or logistical difficulties of the personal interaction of a large population there is more potential for political conflict due to differing regional, religious, ethnic, and linguistic interests.¹²² Although population would seem to be a poor determinant of democracy today at the country level, the correlation to the theory highlights lack of homogeneity as a serious obstacle.

This lack of homogeneity primarily comes in four forms: regional, religious, ethnic, and linguistic differences. Ethnicity and religion, specifically, are

¹²⁰ David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, Issues in Political Theory (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1991); Bruce Gilley, "The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries," *European Journal of Political Research* 45(2006): 502–3; Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, *Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry*, Comparative Studies in Behavioral Science (New York: Wiley, 1975), 53–77; Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *Essential Readings in Comparative Politics* ed. Patrick O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: Norton, 2006), 23; Linz and Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, 19.

¹²¹ Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, *Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry*, Comparative Studies in Behavioral Science (New York: Wiley, 1975), 198.

¹²² Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, 18–9.

widely noted as obstacles to democracy due to cleavages that complicate the process of democratization and its sustainment.¹²³ Social cleavages can complicate democratization when political fragmentation occurs as newly developing political parties coalesce along ethno-religious cleavages, preventing progress towards the greater good. The existence of a cleavage provides an opportunity to take advantage of the minority by passing laws that provide preferential treatment to the majority. Empirical results suggest that this exploitation primarily occurs in medium size minorities (five to twenty percent of the population).¹²⁴ Large minorities are more difficult to marginalize due to their sheer size and their breadth throughout the community. The benefits of exploiting small minorities is likely not worth the effort.

However, social cleavages are surmountable obstacles. An empirical evaluation of the social cleavage argument indicates that the theory is weak.¹²⁵ Botswana and Mauritius both had ethnic cleavages and yet were able to achieve democracy. Arend Lijphart and Benjamin Reilly identified consociational and electoral solutions to lessen the negative impact that social cleavages have on democratization.¹²⁶ Perhaps the availability (and implementation) of their recommendations explains why empirical evidence shows that there is very little correlation between social fragmentation

¹²³ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 2 ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 291–3; Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 1–21; Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: a Theory of Democratic Instability*, Merrill Political Science Series (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1972), passim; Ben Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*, Theories of Institutional Design (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 4; Wilkinson, *Terrorism and the Liberal State*, 37; Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, 20; Mansfield and Snyder, "Turbulent Transitions," 173; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries*, 6; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, 29.

¹²⁴ Tanja Ellingsen, "Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew? Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and after the Cold War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (2000): 239.

¹²⁵ Jan-Erik Lane and Svante O. Ersson, *Democracy: A Comparative Approach* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2003), 104–5; Ellingsen, "Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew? Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and after the Cold War."

¹²⁶ Ben Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*, Theories of Institutional Design (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), passim; Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 2 (2004): 96–109.

and democratization.¹²⁷ Ironically, it is possible that social cleavages, as long as they are nonviolent, support democratic stability. The difficulty of creating a coalition in multi-cleavage societies, so-called pluralist democracies, prevents the implementation of excessive redistribution efforts, making the elites comfortable with sustaining democracy.¹²⁸

Even without cleavages, some argue that specific religions and ethnicities are simply incompatible with democracy. It has been postulated that Protestantism and Buddhism are compatible with democracy while Catholicism and Islam are unsuited for democracy. Catholicism was considered unsuited due to its adherence to a rigid hierarchy and lack of the Protestant work ethic. Islam was considered unsuited due to fundamental Islam viewing democracy as a corruption, putting man's law above God's law.¹²⁹ Similar arguments have been made suggesting that the value systems in Arab, Asian, and Latin societies made them unsuitable for democracy.¹³⁰

The success of democracy in Latin America and Asia indicates that the very theoretical basis for culture as an inhibitor were unfounded. The argument that religion (i.e., Protestant) was a key factor in determining democracy was dealt a severe blow when Catholic Southern Europe (i.e., Greece, Spain, and Portugal) democratized in the mid 1970s and Catholic Latin America democratized in the 1980s. Further, recent studies provided evidence that Islam is not the determining factor in polity type.¹³¹ While certainly much of the Islamic world continues to be ruled by autocracies, there are

¹²⁷ Lane and Ersson, *Democracy: A Comparative Approach*, 103–5; Ellingsen, "Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches' Brew? Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict During and after the Cold War," passim.

¹²⁸ Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, 43.

¹²⁹ Manus Midlarsky, "Democracy and Islam: Implications for Civilizational Conflict and the Democratic Process," *International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 3 (1998): passim; Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 73–82.

¹³⁰ For the arguments and counter-arguments regarding religion and culture, see Joshua Muravchik, *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny*, Aei Studies 513 (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1991).

¹³¹ Ali Reza Abotalebi, *Islam and Democracy: State–Society Relations in Developing Countries, 1980–1994* (New York: Routledge, 2000), passim; John L. Esposito and John Obert Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), passim; Mark Tessler, "Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries," *Comparative Politics* 34, no. 3 (2002): passim; Lane and Ersson, *Democracy: A Comparative Approach*, 118.

several examples of Islamic democracies including high levels of democracy in Albania, Indonesia, and Senegal and moderate levels of democracy in Krygyzstan, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, and Turkey. Bangladesh, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone have also been working towards democracy, but remain politically unstable. Even autocracies in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, and Tunisia are moving away from autocracy. While it is too soon to say that the naysayers are wrong, the core of the culture argument lacks a logical causal chain.

c. Colonial Legacy and Bureaucratic Maturity

While demographics change over time, some aspects of society are immutable. A country cannot change the legacy of its colonialism any more than it can change the region of the world that it is located in or the date of its independence from colonialism. Colonial legacy is often claimed to be an impact on the success of democracy.¹³² It is common knowledge within the field that the British colonial experience was more conducive to democracy than any other colonial rule. A cursory look at the world in the 1970s provided ample evidence. British colonies all over the globe became democracies: the United States, the anglo-phone Caribbean countries, India, and the various members of the British Commonwealth. Developing democracies across the globe seemed to have had an advantage from being a colony of Britain: Fiji, Gambia, Sri Lanka, and Mauritius. By comparison, democracy appeared to be a lost cause in Latin America, Belgian Congo, French West Africa, French Southeast Asia, and the Dutch East Indies. Portuguese and Spanish former colonies suffered political instability. Former French colonies were dominated by dictatorships. Supposedly, the strength of the civil service and the culture of the rule of law established by the British created a state conducive to democracy. But, the third wave of democracy largely negated the colonial legacy theory as Spanish and French colonies adopted democracy in droves.

¹³² Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries*, 6; Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 29; Przeworski, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990*, 126.

State age as a determinant of democracy is a branch concept of modernization theory. This concept believes that states go through a maturation process. For its first two centuries, democracy was primarily constrained to the region that was responsible for the formation of the modern state: Europe. It took centuries for modern states to develop into democracies. This observation suggests that a threshold of state institutions or bureaucratic maturity must be developed prior to democratization.¹³³ But, the argument seems to have little weight. Throughout the later half of the twentieth century, newly decolonized countries had widely divergent polity types. For example, the Baltic States, long under the Soviet umbrella, had a largely successful democratic transition. While a strong bureaucracy may actually have been a factor in the transition, a simple measurement of age would appear to provide little useful insight into the state's potential for democracy. Although colonial legacy, region, and state age do not appear to have a determinative effect, all three were incorporated as control variables into the study.

d. External Influences

Regardless of the effects of demographics, colonial legacy, and bureaucratic age on a society's willingness to adopt democracy, none of these factors address variations in how democratic ideals spread. The concept of diffusion indicates that ideas about democracy spread from those that have them to those that do not. Increased diffusion can occur either through advances in technology or increased personal interaction.

As technology increases, the ability to receive exterior media information enhances citizens' ability to monitor the government's performance and enable comparisons with other country's governments. Of course, this technological advancement presupposes that a significant proportion of the population can afford it, making the technology metric difficult to separate from economic income and economic

¹³³ See Stein Rokkan et al., *State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan: Based on His Collected Works*, Comparative European Politics (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 85; Charles Tilly, *Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 53–4.

development. Furthermore, in strong autocracies, the media is controlled by the government. Therefore, changes in communications technology do not appear to be a good predictor of diffusion.

Regardless of the level of internal control that a government has, no country is immune from external influences. As peer countries successfully transition to democracy, citizens may raise their threshold of expectations for their own government. As states develop political, military, and economic relationships, their personnel interact and, intentionally or not, spread information about democracy. The norms of democracy can also be spread socially through foreign travel, migration, and student exchanges. One study has found that these linkages are largely based on geographic proximity and similar studies have found that democracies appear to occur in regional clusters as can be seen in Europe and the Western Hemisphere.¹³⁴ Therefore, this study hypothesized that all else being equal, a change in regional democratic norms ($N_t - N_{t-1} \neq 0$) may lead to a change in the level of democracy ($D_t - D_{t-1} \neq 0$) (see equation 3).

C. THE INTERSECTION OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND: THE POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

As depicted in Figure 2, the intersection of civil society's demand for democracy and political institutions' supply of democracy determines the process of democratization largely through constitutional design or redesign. It is the design of and the adherence to the constitutional rules that make up the democratic processes within a country. Democratic constitutional design is a buffet. There are many options available singularly, in combinations, or in hybrids. Each option can be selected independent of the others. Major choices include the type of executive (president versus parliament), the method of representation (proportional or majority), the legislative process (uni-cameral

¹³⁴ Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "International Linkages and Democratization," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 3 (2005): 22–3; Kristian Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, "Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization," *International Organization* 60(2006): 932–5; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, *All International Politics Is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 21–3; Harvey Starr and Christina Lindborg, "Democratic Dominoes Revisited: The Hazards of Governmental Transitions, 1974–1996," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 4 (2003): 510–5; Michael Colaresi and William Thompson, "The Economic Development-Democratization Relationship: Does the Outside World Matter?," *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no. 4 (2003): 394–7.

or bi-cameral), the type of sovereignty (unitary or federal), the question of royalty (constitutional monarchy or a republic), and the type of checks and balances (e.g., independent judiciary, Ombudsman, civilian oversight of the military and the national intelligence apparatus). Theory suggests that the optimum democratic design includes a parliamentarian, federal, bicameral, republican, and proportional representation system due to increased accountability and reduction of political polarization.¹³⁵

However, the implementation of constitutional design is not so simple. Most design choices involve a great number of subordinate choices. Advocates of federalism argue that unitary systems favor the distribution of resources near the center of government at the expense of outlying regions. However, as Mexico can attest, federalism is not a guarantee for improved distribution of resources or prevention of ethnic conflict. The introduction of a second legislative house in Senegal in 2005 actually reduced the level of democracy as the majority of the seats in the newly created senate were appointed by the president. A parliamentary system in early 1980s Philippines enabled Ferdinand Marcos to retain his position as head of the government without facing a general re-election. This study does not attempt to find the ideal process blueprint that will lead to high levels of democracy. It is likely that a blueprint for one country would not work for the next. It is the tailoring of the constitutional design to meet the specific requirements of each country that results in a high level of democracy.

¹³⁵ Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, *The Failure of Presidential Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 18–20; Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), passim; Alfred C. Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism Versus Presidentialism," *World Politics* 46, no. 1 (1993): 22; Arend Lijphart and Don Aitkin, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945–1990*, Comparative European Politics (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 139–40; Lane and Ersson, *Democracy: A Comparative Approach*, 125–39; George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money, *Bicameralism*, Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), passim.

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III. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: TESTING STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRACY

This chapter explores the effect of structural factors upon the level of democracy. While the interaction of key actors (e.g., civil society, the military, and the ruling executive) may be the final arbiters in determining a country's level of democracy, the political preferences of those actors are influenced by structural factors. From the literature, the structural factors with the most explanatory power upon both democracy and actor preferences include security, economic development, and the diffusion of norms.

Although democracy is sometimes viewed as a decision-making process or a measure of egalitarian policies, this study views democracy as a measurement of the competitiveness, openness, and electoral constraints upon the selection and accountability of political leaders. Many contemporary democracy theories were derived from the classical works of Aristotle and Tocqueville. Both argued that a wealthy society was an important attribute of a functioning democracy since it provided a large number of citizens who "possess enough wealth to want order."¹³⁶ Tocqueville also argued the importance of democratic norms largely built through associations.¹³⁷ Twentieth century works argued that these norms and associations were built through industrialization, urbanization, and modernization.¹³⁸ More recently, analysts argued that the diffusion of democratic norms came not through changes to the economic system but through

¹³⁶ Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 287.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 128, 213.

¹³⁸ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958); Simon Smith Kuznets, *Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread*, Studies in Comparative Economics 7 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* (1959); Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber, and John D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

increased travel, migration, and trade.¹³⁹ Security is often assumed to be a prerequisite that allows the development of norms, associations, wealth, and industry. Without security, democratic norms and processes take a back seat to survival.¹⁴⁰

This chapter seeks to build upon previous research by identifying the relative relationship between four key structural factors and the spectrum of polity types from fully autocratic to fully democratic. While there is a wealth of econometric analysis on the economy-democracy link, there is a lack of econometric analysis using other structural factors such as security or the diffusion of norms.¹⁴¹ Those studies that do broaden the scope to other structural factors tend to focus on democracy as a dichotomous relationship. The view of democracy through a dichotomous lens typically resulted in a nominal analytic approach in order to identify thresholds for transition and consolidation. Because of the need to broach a defined threshold, these studies missed the ordinal effect of variables upon incremental changes in democracy.

To explore the relationship between the four structural factors and the level of democracy, this chapter presents econometric and computational analysis using a large-N panel data design.¹⁴² The panel included annual data on 171 countries over 61 years for

¹³⁹ Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "International Linkages and Democratization," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 3 (2005): 22–3; Kristian Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, "Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization," *International Organization* 60(2006): 932–5; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, *All International Politics Is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 21–3; Harvey Starr and Christina Lindborg, "Democratic Dominoes Revisited: The Hazards of Governmental Transitions, 1974–1996," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 4 (2003): 510–5; Michael Colaresi and William Thompson, "The Economic Development-Democratization Relationship: Does the Outside World Matter?," *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no. 4 (2003): 394–7.

¹⁴⁰ Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," 134–5; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, 6; Diamond, *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*, 16; Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, 89–90.

¹⁴¹ For econometric works on the economy–democracy link, see Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990*, Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Abbas Pourgerami, "The Political Economy of Development: A Cross-National Causality Test of Development-Democracy-Growth Hypothesis," *Public Choice* 58, no. 2 (1988); David L. Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions " *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 3 (2006).

¹⁴² Panel data is a combination of time-series (in this case annual observations over a period of decades) and cross sectional (multiple observations per case in a single year) data. Time series data provides insight into changes within countries while cross sectional data provides insight on differences between countries.

the period 1946–2006 ($n = 171$, $t = 61$). The post World War II timeframe was used for analysis because it encompasses the majority of movement towards democracy in what many refer to as the second, third, and fourth waves of democracy.¹⁴³ The panel dataset was used to test four hypotheses. Combined, the four hypotheses state that, all else being equal, a change in the level of intrastate violence, industrialization, income, or regional democratic norms, may lead to a change in the level of democracy. For a more detailed analysis on the development of each hypothesis, see Chapter II, Section D.

This chapter is organized into four sections. Section A is a description of the variables (dependent, independent, and control) and data sources for both econometric and computational analysis. Section B describes the quantitative methodology used for this study. The section begins with an explanation of the process used in selecting the estimable model for econometric analysis. In order to compensate for serial correlation, heteroskedascity, and an unbalanced panel, random effects linear regression with first order autoregressive disturbance was used as the estimable model. Next, the section reviews the computational approach that augmented the econometric analysis with historical trend data and insight into the value of independent variables during transition between regime types. Section C presents the results of the quantitative analysis. The quantitative results support the hypotheses that intrastate violence, industrialization, income, and diffusion had an effect on the level of democracy. Of the four factors, violence and diffusion returned the most significant results. The explanatory power of development waned over time to the point of obsolescence. The timing suggests that the decreasing costs of transportation and information sharing provided an alternative mechanism for the development of associations and democratic norms though diffusion making industrialization less of a requirement.

¹⁴³ Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy* 2, no. 2 (1991); Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World," *World Politics* 54, no. 2 (2002).

A. DATA AND VARIABLES

The definition and data source of each of the eleven variables used in the quantitative analysis is covered in detail in this section. The dependent variable, or the outcome, was the level of democracy. There were four causal, or independent, variables: internal security, economic income, industrialization, and diffusion of norms. In addition, six control variables were used: economic crisis, oil rents, colonial legacy, region, bureaucratic maturity, and the loss of an interstate war.

1. The Level of Democracy: the Dependent Variable

Democracy has always been somewhat difficult to quantify. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, analysts used Schumpeter's and Dahl's definitions of democracy to create a dichotomous dependent variable.¹⁴⁴ Attempts to define an adequate threshold with which to bifurcate polities into neat groups of democracies and autocracies contained an intrinsic catch 22. The difficulty resided in the decision of what to do with hybrid regimes such as Malaysia and Singapore; countries with limited democratic processes. Classifying them as democracies would tarnish the image of other countries with stronger democratic practices. Classifying them as autocracies equated their government systems to the likes of North Korea. The binary classification of regime type is an inadequate approach that provides misleading results.

A broader sense of democracy came in the mid 1970s as efforts to quantify democracy began to blossom, resulting in the creation of four major empirical databases: Freedom House, Gasiorowski, Polity, and Vanhanen. While both Freedom House and Polity provide data across significant time frames, Polity is the preferred metric for quantitative researchers such as Mansfield & Snyder, Hegre et al., and Epstein, et al.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ In this case, the term autocracy is used collectively as some authors used alternative terms such as authoritarian, totalitarian, or dictatorships. Likewise, some authors used the term polyarchy instead of democracy.

¹⁴⁵ Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War," *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (2002); Håvard Hegre et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992" *The American Political Science Review* 95, no. 1 (2001); David L. Epstein et al., "Democratic Transitions" *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 3 (2006).

The only major author that uses Freedom House is Diamond. However, Diamond used the data for trend, not statistical, analysis. Although there is no perfect database, Polity has a slight edge on Freedom House with regards to conceptual logic, internal reliability, measurement, and aggregation.¹⁴⁶

Although the Polity score is an imperfect aggregation, it is the best alternative available. The composite Polity score is computed from three measurements: the fairness and freeness of elections; the openness of political participation to all groups regardless of differences such as ethnicity, religion, region, or income class; and the sanctity of the electoral process, which prevents the executive from manipulating the constitution in order to perpetuate tenure. Each of the three components is a key component to the study's definition of democracy. Therefore, this study used Polity as the proxy for the level of democracy for each country at year t . Polity uses a 21-point scale (-10 to 10) polity score for countries with a population greater than 500,000 from 1800 to 2008. The polity2 metric is a modified version of the polity score made suitable for time-series analysis by modifying the polity score for regimes in transition, a period of interregnum (i.e., anarchy), or a period of interruption (e.g., by invasion). Following Plumper and Neumayer, scores for interregnum periods and related transition periods were modified using interpolation.¹⁴⁷ The specific conversions for interregnums can be found in Appendix 1. For ease of interpreting the econometric results, the polity score was converted to a zero-to-twenty scale by adding ten to each polity2 score.

2. Independent Variables

The independent variables, derived from the democracy studies literature in Chapter II, are hypothesized to have an influence on the level of democracy. This study included four independent variables: internal security, economic income, industrialization, and diffusion of norms. Additionally, six control variables were

¹⁴⁶ Munck and Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices."

¹⁴⁷ Thomas Plumper and Eric Neumayer, "The Level of Democracy During Interregnum and Affected Transition Periods: Recoding the Polity2 Score."

included to account for alternative explanations of polity change. A summary of all of the variables and data sources can be found in Table 2 at the end of the Section A.

a. Internal Security

This study used an inverse proxy measure for internal security: intrastate violence data from the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Database and the Center for Systemic Peace's Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset.¹⁴⁸ The PITF and MEPV datasets used slightly different coding criteria and therefore have slightly different event data. Both datasets include fatalities as only one of a number of factors that affects a society at war. The primary MEPV metric for the magnitude of total civil violence in a country, CIVTOT, is built on a zero to ten scale based on an assessment of the conflict's effect upon human resources (e.g., deaths), population dislocation, social networks, environmental quality, infrastructure damage, and quality of life. On the other hand, PITF is a combination of three different datasets coded by type of violence: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, and genocides / politicides. The datasets for revolutionary and ethnic wars both use the AVEMAG variable, which is the average magnitude based on three composite scores: the number of insurgents, the number of casualties, and the portion of the country affected. Both of the components are measured on a zero to four-point scale.¹⁴⁹ For genocides and politicides, PITF's DEATHMAG is a measure of the magnitude of the number of deaths on a zero to five-point scale.

Unfortunately, there is no single ideal dataset for intrastate violence. MEPV is more inclusive while PITF more accurately captures nuanced changes in the level of violence. For instance, the MEPV dataset captures the student revolts and general strike in 1968 France while PITF does not. On the other hand, MEPV uses only a single magnitude for the duration of a conflict while PITF captures annual variations in

¹⁴⁸ Monty Marshall, Ted Gurr, and Barbara Harff, "Political Instability Task Force State Failure Problem Set, 1955–2006," (Center of Systemic Peace); Monty Marshall, "Major Episodes of Political Violence (Mpev), 1946–2004," (Center for Systemic Peace); Meredith Sarkees, "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997," (Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2000). The Correlates of War dataset was used to confirm the timeframes of event data in the PITF and MEPV datasets.

¹⁴⁹ In addition, two missing numbers for Pakistan (1997–98) were extrapolated from existing data in the PITF Ethnic Wars dataset.

the intensity of a conflict. In order to capture the best of both datasets, a combined variable (Intrastate Violence) was generated. The Intrastate Violence variable was the sum of PITF's AVEMAG for revolution, PITF's AVEMAG for ethnic war, PITF's DEATHMAG, and MEPV's CIVTOT; creating a scale of zero to 23.

b. *Economic Income, Industrialization, and the Diffusion of Norms*

Economic development is a broad term that incorporates changes in workforce knowledge as well as changes in the means of production. Following Lipset,¹⁵⁰ this study simplified the level of industrialization into a single proxy using agricultural labor as a percentage of the total labor force as measured by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). To make the econometric results easier to interpret, the study used a zero to 100 scale instead of 0% to 100%. For economic income, the research used Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita from the Penn World Tables.¹⁵¹ Following a standard practice in the field, this study used the log base ten of GDP per capita in order to reduce the effect of skewness and extreme outliers upon the results.¹⁵²

As a proxy for diffusion of norms, the study used peer countries' levels of democracy; the sum of polity scores for all other countries in the region for that year. Although norms are diffused in a variety of different methods, peer region was selected as the proxy due to studies linking democratic diffusion to geographic proximity regardless of the method of diffusion.¹⁵³ Several alternative variables for diffusion were

¹⁵⁰ Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy."

¹⁵¹ Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, "Penn World Table Version 6.2," (Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 2006).

¹⁵² Jason W. Osborne, "Best Practices in Data Transformation: The Overlooked Effect of Minimum Values," in *Best Practices in Quantitative Methods*, ed. Jason W. Osborne (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2008), 197–204; Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis," *The American Political Science Review* 89, no. 4 (1995): 886.

¹⁵³ Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "International Linkages and Democratization," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 3 (2005): 22–3; Kristian Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, "Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization," *International Organization* 60(2006): 932–5; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, *All International Politics Is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 21–3; Harvey Starr and Christina Lindborg, "Democratic Dominoes Revisited: The Hazards of Governmental Transitions, 1974–1996," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 4 (2003): 510–5; Michael Colaresi and William Thompson, "The Economic Development-Democratization Relationship: Does the Outside World Matter?," *Comparative Political Studies* 36, no. 4 (2003): 394–7.

considered interesting but unsuitable including number of memberships in international organizations, number of social interactions, and number of economic interactions. Membership in international organizations does not equate to more frequent or significant interactions. Unstable Afghanistan is involved in 42 organizations, the same number as highly democratic Botswana. Democratic Albania has only 47 memberships while Algeria has 59. In a more extreme case, the special status of Taiwan limits it to 9 international memberships.

Although social, economic and military interactions are also considered important, data for interactions based upon foreign travel, military exchanges, and NGO activities is limited. Although data for access to information technology is readily available for certain timeframes, technology has the least theoretical backing as a method of diffusion. Technology increases the opportunity to interact with citizens of a democracy, but in many cases this potential interaction is limited. States can control the information distributed through print, television, and radio media. While cell phones and the internet are less easily controlled by the government, both inventions are relatively new, especially in developing countries. While data for trade, migration, and remittances are more plentiful, they are not currently designed for panel data analysis but should be considered for future analysis.

3. Control Variables

Correlation does not, by itself, suggest causation. The fact that two variables move in tandem does not explain which variable causes the other to change or whether the change is not more accurately described by some third variable or a combination of other variables. Correlation via regression suggests causation if the model is realistic and includes additional variables to account for alternative viable hypotheses. This study accounted for several alternative hypotheses through the use of six control variables. Each of these variables had been claimed to be a significant influence upon democracy. In most cases, the causal explanation of these variables is dated and has either been disproven or lacks a consistent, logical cause-effect chain. In other cases, these factors

act as catalysts for polity change without influencing the subsequent type of polity. In order to not entirely discount their explanatory value, these variables are included within the analysis as control variables.

Research suggests that economic crisis motivates regime change, but has no preference over the resulting regime type.¹⁵⁴ Following Gasiorowski, the study used a combination of GDP loss and inflation as a measure of economic crisis.¹⁵⁵ GDP growth data was obtained from the Penn World Tables while inflation rate data was gathered from the IMF. The data was used to create a dummy variable for economic crisis. A score of one was given for those country-years that had a greater than eight percent loss in annual GDP growth, had a cumulative loss of twenty percent in GDP growth over five years, had inflation rates greater than 100%, or suffered a major currency crisis. A score of zero was given to those country-years in which no economic crisis occurred. For major currency crises, 1994 Mexico, 1998 Russia, and 1999 Argentina were coded as economic crises. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis did not required additional coding since countries most affected already had significant GDP loss. In all, 717 economic crises were coded (out of 7,843 country-years).

Oil dependence is often cast as an obstacle to democracy since it provides a ready source of easily exploitable revenue that an autocratic regime can use to create and maintain a patronage network.¹⁵⁶ As the major provider of resources, key actors have a stake in maintaining the autocratic system. This is one potential explanation for why the countries with the highest oil rents are staunch autocracies. However, the high oil rent

¹⁵⁴ Haggard and Kaufman, *The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State*; Gasiorowski, "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis."

¹⁵⁵ Gasiorowski, "Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis."

¹⁵⁶ Lisa Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa," *Comparative Politics* 20 no. 1 (1987); Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, *The Rentier State, Nation, State, and Integration in the Arab World V. 2* (London ; New York: Croom Helm, 1987); Jill Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar*, Cambridge Middle East Library 24 (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, *The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East*, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Jay Ulfelder, "Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy," *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 8 (2007); Michael Ross, "Oil and Democracy Revisited," (UCLA, 2009); Benjamin Smith, "Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999," *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 2 (2004).

states are also located in regions with few democracies. Despite their high income, they lack the industrialization and diffusion of norms that might otherwise encourage democracy in their country. Recent studies shed some doubt on the causal connection between oil and lack of democracy. Many resource-dependent countries in the Western Hemisphere and, to a lesser extent, in Africa and Asia, increased their level of democracy in the last twenty years.¹⁵⁷ Data for oil rents per capita was used to test and control for oil.¹⁵⁸

The outcome of interstate wars affects regime change.¹⁵⁹ Severe physical or economic costs during war decrease the perception of the state's ability to maintain security and economic development and lead to a change in government. However, this factor does not necessarily affect the type of new regime created. In order to control for the effect of interstate wars upon regime change, a dummy variable for war loss was created based upon data from the Correlates of War.¹⁶⁰ Five sets of loss of interstate wars were added: Armenia to Azerbaijan (1991–4), Egypt to Britain (1951–2), USSR to Afghanistan (1980–88), and Yugoslavia to NATO (1995 and 1999). Including these additions, the dataset contains 88 instances of war loss.

Three enduring structural variables were controlled for: colonial legacy, state age, and state region. Each country was given a code for its colonial legacy or lack thereof based on the colonial power that had occupied the country. In those cases in which a country was affected by more than one colonial power for a substantial period, the country was given a colonial legacy code of "mixed." State age was calculated based on the year of independence from the Correlates of War Dataset. To minimize skew caused by centuries-old countries, state age was right-censored at 100 years. Regions were drawn from the MEPV dataset. In cases where countries bordered two regions, a single

¹⁵⁷ See Haber and Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse."

¹⁵⁸ Michael Ross, "Oil, Gas, and Minerals Stata Dataset" (2009).

¹⁵⁹ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," *The American Political Science Review* 89, no. 4 (1995): 850–1.

¹⁶⁰ Sarkees, "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997."

region was chosen based upon analytical judgment. For example, the MEPV region code for South America is eight while the region code for Central America is nine. Since Panama connects the two regions, MEPV coded Panama as 89. For the study, Panama was recoded as a nine for Central America (see Appendix 1).

Variables	Metric	Type*	Metric Source	Years Available
Level of Democracy	Polity2	DV	Polity IV ¹⁶¹	1800–2007
Economic Income	GDP per capita	IV	Penn World Tables (PWT) ¹⁶²	1950–2006
Development	Percent of Labor in Agriculture	IV	UN FAO ¹⁶³	1961–2005
Internal Security	Calculated	IV	PITF. ¹⁶⁴ MEPV. ¹⁶⁵	1948–2006 1946–2004
Peer Pressure	Democracy in Region	IV	Calculated from Polity IV	1946–2006
Economic Crisis	Dummy	CV	PWT, IMF Database ¹⁶⁶	1980–2002
Resource Curse	Oil Rents	CV	Ross, Oil dataset ¹⁶⁷	1950–2006
Colonial Legacy	Ruling Country	CV	Fieldhouse, <i>Colonial Empires</i> ¹⁶⁸ COW Colonial Data ¹⁶⁹	1700–1947 1816–2002
External Influence	Region	CV	MEPV	1946–2006
Bureaucratic Maturity	Years since Independence	CV	Fieldhouse COW Colonial Data	1700–1947 1816–2002
Lost interstate war	Dummy	CV	Correlates of War ¹⁷⁰	1946–1991

*DV=Dependent Variable; IV=Independent Variable; CV=Control Variable

Table 2. Summary of Data Sources

¹⁶¹ Monty Marshall and Keith Jagers, "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2007" (Center for Systemic Peace).

¹⁶² Heston, Summers, and Aten, "Penn World Table Version 6.2."

¹⁶³ "Resources Popstat Annual Time Series" (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2006).

¹⁶⁴ Marshall, Gurr, and Harff, "Political Instability Task Force State Failure Problem Set, 1955–2006." The dataset includes all internal conflicts that terminated after 1955 and therefore includes conflict data as early as 1948 but should not be considered inclusive for 1948–1954.

¹⁶⁵ Marshall, "Major Episodes of Political Violence (Mpev), 1946–2004."

¹⁶⁶ International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007 Edition.

¹⁶⁷ Ross, "Oil, Gas, and Minerals Stata Dataset."

¹⁶⁸ D. K. Fieldhouse, *The Colonial Empires; a Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson Universal History, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966). See also Matthew Lange, James Mahoney, and Matthias vom Hau, "Colonialism and Development: A Comparative Analysis of Spanish and British Colonies," *American Journal of Sociology* 111, no. 5 (2006): 1417–8.

¹⁶⁹ "Correlates of War 2 Project. Colonial / Dependency Contiguity Data, 1816–2002."

¹⁷⁰ Sarkees, "The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997."

The descriptive statistics in Table 3 provide the minimum, maximum and mean values, standard deviation, and number of observations of each variable. Descriptive statistics are included for each variable as described in its original format as well as the first differenced variable in its modified form.

Variable	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Count
Polity (original scale)	-10	10	0.06	7.55	7743
Polity modified (0 to 20 scale)	0	20	9.97	7.56	7743
Change in the level of polity modified	-18	16	.064	1.70	7561
Intrastate Violence	0	20	1.04	2.71	7843
Change in the level of intrastate violence	-14	14.5	0.004	1.08	7669
Agricultural Labor	0	0.95	0.45	0.29	6144
Change in Agricultural Labor	-3	1	-0.54	0.59	5976
GDP per capita	171	84408	6653	7675	6163
Change in log base ten of GDP per capita	-1.87	0.4	0.007	0.04	5998
Change in regional polity	-27	133	2.89	12.12	7561
Oil Rents	0	63089	832	3665	3705
Change in oil rents	-18242	38125	11.6	1110	7369
Maturity	0	100	56.50	37.50	7840

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics by Variable

B. METHODOLOGY

Part 1 in the methodology section is a brief portrayal of a mathematical representation of the hypothetical effect that the independent variables have upon the dependent variable. From this model, data analysis identified the optimal regression model in Part 2. This section ends with a summary of the computational approach.

1. Mathematical Model

Based upon the literature reviewed in Chapter II, four hypotheses were identified. Using the proxy variables described in the previous section, the polity of country i at time t is expressed in four separate mathematical models, one for each hypothesis:

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_{it} &= \beta (\text{Intrastate Violence}_{it}) + U_{it} (\text{Error}) \\
 P_{it} &= \beta (\text{Ag Labor}_{it}) + U_{it} (\text{Error}) \\
 P_{it} &= \beta \text{LN}(\text{GDP}_{it}) + U_{it} (\text{Error}) \\
 P_{it} &= \beta (\text{Diffusion}_{it}) + U_{it} (\text{Error})
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{15}$$

However, this study does not assume that the independent variables act in isolation of one another. On the contrary, there are a variety of interconnections. Therefore, this chapter expresses the level of democracy, D , as:

$$D = f(Y, S, N, P, X)$$

Where D is the level of democracy, Y is the level of economic income, S is the level of security, N is the level of democratic norms, P is the level of industrialization, and X represents a vector of control variables defined as:

$$X = g(C, O, L, R, M, W)$$

The culmination of the control variables is made up of six factors where C equals economic crisis, O equals oil rents, L equals colonial legacy, R equals the region, M equals bureaucratic maturity, and W equals loss of an interstate war. Combining the four hypotheses and substituting the proxy variables as described in Section A of this chapter, the mathematical model can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} P_{it} = & \beta (\text{Intrastate Violence}_{it}) + \beta (\text{Ag Labor}_{it}) + \beta (\text{Diffusion}_{it}) + \beta \text{LN}(\text{GDP}_{it}) \\ & + \beta (\text{econ_crisis}_{it}) + \beta (\text{oil}_{it}) + \beta (\text{legacy}_{it}) + \beta (\text{region}_{it}) + \beta (\text{maturity}_{it}) \\ & + \beta (\text{war loss}_{it}) + U_{it}(\text{Error}) \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

Note that the Greek character β , beta, represents the standard coefficient for each variable. Since the value of the dependent and independent variables are provided from the dataset, the regression analysis solves for the error and the coefficient for each independent variable. It is the comparison of these standardized coefficients that explains the significance of each independent variable relative to the others as an explanatory cause of the dependent variable. However, prior to calculating the coefficients, it is important to first conduct some routine tests upon the dataset in order to select the optimum regression model to maximize the accuracy of the results.

2. Identifying the Optimal Regression Model

There are five standard tests that assist in the identification of an optimum regression model or models: unit root, serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, endogeneity, and fixed versus random effects. Conducting regression analysis without these tests runs the risk of choosing the wrong method of regression or underestimating the error in the results. These tests work to minimize spurious correlations so that the results indicate a causal relationship to the extent possible.

When analyzing data over time, some variables have a natural trend (positive or negative) over time. For instance, country rates of access to cell phones over the past twenty years are on a growth trajectory as technology evolved and prices dropped. Although the growth rate changes from year to year, the growth rates are nearly all positive. These long-term trends, called trend stationary variables, must be accounted for in order to reduce bias in the results. In order to check for trend stationarity, each variable of interest was tested using the Fisher augmented Dickey Fuller Test (xtfisher in Stata); a test compatible with unbalanced panels. The test indicated trend stationary results for polity, GDP per capita, and peer region polity.¹⁷¹ In order to account for the positive trend in these three variables over time, the study used the first differenced variables (i.e., annual change). Using the Fisher Test upon the first differenced variables, the test indicated no trend stationarity.¹⁷²

When analyzing data over time, there is also a possibility that the observations of some variables behave in a repeated pattern. This condition, known as serial correlation, if present, adversely affects the parameter estimates and must be corrected. This study used the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data models (xtserial in Stata) to test for serial correlation. Using the first differenced data, the test indicated that serial correlation was present.¹⁷³ Due to this finding, the study could not use Ordinary Least Squares based estimators because they would underestimate the standard errors.

¹⁷¹ The study was unable to reject the null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationarity).

¹⁷² The study was able to reject the null hypothesis of unit root.

¹⁷³ The study was able to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.

With an unbalanced panel over 60 years, heteroskedasticity (significant differences in variance over time and space) was likely to be present. This was expected because not all 162 countries are represented for the entire timeframe largely due to the dramatic increase in the number of countries during post World War II decolonization. Only 72 countries were part of the dataset for 1946. This number climbs to 112 by 1961 and 158 by 1991. In some cases, there is country attrition such as when West Germany and East Germany merged into a single Germany. Due to these variations in the size of observations, the study expected to find variance in the error term over time. This study used the Modified Wald Test for Group-wise Heteroskedasticity (xtreg followed by xttest3 in Stata). The test indicated that heteroskedasticity was present.¹⁷⁴ Fortunately, the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimator corrects both for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.

Endogeneity is present if an independent variable is correlated with the error term. The literature suggests that causality between intrastate violence and level of democracy are bi-directional or co-determined and are therefore endogenous. That is, changes in violence may lead to changes in democracy and changes in democracy may lead to changes in the level of violence. The literature also suggests that GDP-violence, GDP-industrialization, diffusion-democracy, and GDP-democracy also have bi-directional relationships. Using the Hausman Test for Endogeneity upon the first differenced variables, endogeneity was not found.¹⁷⁵ Therefore, no correction for endogeneity was necessary.

The final pre-test that was conducted compared the fixed effects versus random effects generator. Fixed effects tend to be more consistent while random effects are more efficient. The Hausman Test (xtreg with fe, then xtreg with re, then hausman fe re in Stata) determines if the difference in the coefficients between fixed and random effects is not systematic. The test returned a P-value of 1.83 with Prob>chi2 of 0.7665, indicating that random effects should be used.

¹⁷⁴ The study was able to reject the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity.

¹⁷⁵ The study was unable to reject the null hypothesis that the regressor is exogenous.

Unfortunately, the existing literature provides little insight into the selection of an appropriate regression model.¹⁷⁶ However, the requirements for GLS, in order to correct for serial correlation and heteroskedascity, as well as the recommendation for random effects, led to an optimum model selection of the random-effects linear model with first-order autoregressive disturbance (xtregar in Stata). The xtregar model is suitable for unbalanced panels and provides the option of a GLS estimator with random effects.

This study tested two model variations. Model One included all polities. Since the study expected that violence has a non-linear relationship with democracy and cannot rule out similar relationships with other independent variables, the polity database was bifurcated in order to more accurately understand the causal nature. Therefore, Model Two included those polities that never achieved a polity2 score greater than zero. This model specifically focuses on the lower half of the polity scale in order to differentiate the effect of variables across the polity spectrum without the natural bias of the more numerous democratic polities. Both models were tested for the time period 1946–2006. In order to test for changes in variable sensitivity over time, Model One was tested for five time period subsets: 1961–69, 1970–79, 1980–89, 1990–99, and 2000–06. Although the time period subsets substantially reduced the number of observations, the purpose of the test was intended to identify changes in variable significance over time.

3. Computational Approach

Computational analysis augmented the econometric analysis. While the econometric analysis identified relationships over time, the computational analysis focused exclusively on the year of change between polity types. Although the econometric approach is more accurate, the computational approach provides more easily interpretable results. For the computational portion, the study used a modified three-tier dependent variable of democracy based upon resulting regime type. Following Epstein, et al., this study coded a polity score of eight or greater as a full democracy, from one to

¹⁷⁶ The major econometric studies of the determinants or outcomes of democracy focus almost exclusively upon dichotomous variables, a method antithetical to the exploration of democracy as a spectrum of levels. For example, Przeworski, et al., Michael Ross, Goldstone, et al., Hegre, et al., Mansfield and Snyder, and Russett and Oneal used dichotomous dependent variables.

seven as a partial democracy, and zero and less as an autocracy.¹⁷⁷ The score of eight is significant because it requires a maximum score in at least one of the three elements that make up polity. The score of zero was a natural breakpoint for autocracies since it indicates a tendency towards autocracy over democracy. Differentiation between the variations in autocracy was beyond the scope of this phase of the research. Additionally, any country that gained its independence during the time period studied was coded as a colony for its first transition. The computational method analyzed 277 cases; 190 of the cases involved an increase in the level of democracy while 87 were a decrease in democracy (see Table 4).

Transition from:	Transition to:	Number of Cases
Partial Democracy	Full Democracy	35
Colony	Full Democracy	18
Autocracy	Full Democracy	30
Total increase to Full Democracy		83
Colony	Partial Democracy	27
Autocracy	Partial Democracy	80
Total increase to Partial Democracy		107
Total increase in democracy		190
Full Democracy	Partial Democracy	19
Full Democracy	Autocracy	14
Total decrease from Full Democracy		33
Partial Democracy	Autocracy	54
Total decrease in democracy		87

Table 4. Transition Cases by Regime Type

The independent variables analyzed were largely the same as those used for the econometric analysis: GDP per capita, economic crisis, bureaucratic maturity, agricultural labor, oil rents per capita, war loss, geographic region, and colonial ruler. In addition, four dummy variables were also created to test for constitutional design:

¹⁷⁷ Epstein et al., “Democratic Transitions.”

parliament, proportional representation, bicameral, and federal. Each category was given a score of zero or one. Hybrid designs were given a score of one-half. Instead of using the level of intrastate violence, dummy variables were used to represent the current status of violence within the country: increasing violence preceding transition, existence of violence during transition, and reduced violence preceding transition.

Results were calculated for each variable by transition type. For instance, the mean level of agricultural labor was calculated for all transitions from partial democracy to full democracy and compared with the seven other types of transition. Additionally, the averages (totals for dummy variables) were aggregated into and compared across three categories: transitions to full democracy, transitions away from full democracy, and transitions to autocracy. Note that transitions from colonial rule to autocracy are not considered because this study considers colonies to be a type of autocracy. Finally, each variable was compared as to the proportion of increases in democracy compared to the proportion of decreases in democracy. For example, war loss corresponded to nine increases in democracy (5% of upward transitions) and four decreases in democracy (5% of downward transitions). Although the absolute number suggests that war loss favors transitions to democracy, the lack of difference in proportion indicates that while war loss may be a catalyst for political change it favors neither democracy nor autocracy. Finally, one additional hypothesis was tested using the intrastate violence dummy variables; all else being equal, the presence of intrastate violence during a transition to a higher level of democracy may limit the sustainability of that level of democracy. This hypothesis was analyzed using a simple comparison of success rates; the proportion of long-term successes of transitions towards increased democracy during periods of violence compared to those same transitions during periods of no reported violence.

C. QUANTITATIVE RESULTS

The results for the quantitative analysis are organized into three sections. The first part reports on the results of the effect of intrastate violence upon democracy. The Part 2 offers the findings of the various economic-related variables including industrialization, income, and the control variables of economic crisis and oil rents. The

final part reviews the results of the diffusion of norms including the change in peer country democracy and the control variables of bureaucratic maturity, colonial legacy, region, and the loss of an interstate war.

1. Intrastate Violence

The study's first hypothesis posited that a change in the level of intrastate violence may lead to a change in the level of democracy. This section reports the results of intrastate violence in three segments; the effect of rising intrastate violence on the level of democracy; the effect of decreasing violence; and the long-term effect of the presence of violence during large increases in democracy.

The regression results support the hypothesis that a change in violence leads to a change in democracy. Model One in Table 5 indicates that there is an inverse relationship between intrastate violence and level of democracy. It is interesting to note that the significance and magnitude are considerably less for the smaller sample of observations in Model Two. This suggests that autocracies are less influenced by changes in intrastate violence perhaps due to fewer normative and legal limitations on the repression of dissenters.

	Model 1 (All Polities)	Model 2 (Autocracies Only)
Δ Intrastate Violence	-0.080***	-.020
	0.022	0.019
Δ Industrialization	0.022	0.018
	0.043	0.035
Δ Income	1.024	-1.457**
	.788	0.546
Δ Peer Democracy	0.005**	0.005*
	0.002	0.003
Number of Observations	5174	897

Note: Table shows coefficient with standard error in parentheses and p-value indicated by asterisk:
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

Table 5. Linear Regression Results

a. Rising Violence and Change in Democracy

A change in the level of intrastate violence was a factor in 30% of significant regime changes. As suggested by the quantitative results in Table 5, the computational results confirmed that violence has a non-linear effect upon the level of democracy. A rise in the level of violence could claim responsibility for 20% (17 of 87) of substantial decreases in democracy in the post-war era. Of 39 cases of rising violence in democracies, 44% resulted in a significant decrease in the level of democracy. On the other end of the political spectrum, of 65 cases of rising violence in autocracies, 31% resulted in a significant *increase* in the level of democracy.

Because there are multiple factors at work, the effect of violence was not a constant. In a small number of cases, the opposite effect occurred; 5% of democracies with violence increased in democracy while 15% of autocracies with violence decreased in democracy. For instance, civil disturbances in 1968 were partially responsible for France's return to full democracy. At the end of the Cold War, after violent clashes between protestors and the army, the Romanian military ousted President Ceaușescu, the communist dictator. But, these cases were rare. In the majority of cases, governments showed a surprising resilience to rising violence. Of 104 cases, 55% had no significant change in democracy. Full democracies and full autocracies survived periods of violence unexpectedly well. In cases of increasing violence, 65% (11 of 17) of full democracies and 70% (26 of 37 cases) of full autocracies tolerated a period of violence without a significant change in democracy. Prominent examples include India and the United Kingdom, where democracy was maintained despite prolonged periods of high-magnitude violence. Of full democracies, the only two cases that resulted in a transition from full democracy to autocracy, Turkey and Thailand, had previous histories of political instability. In comparison, only 30% of partial autocracies and 50% of partial democracies endured a period of increased violence without a change (either positive or negative) in the level of democracy.

b. Decreasing Violence

During data analysis, an interesting pattern appeared in which several countries became democracies immediately upon the cessation of internal violence. The results in Table 5 support the premise that a decrease in violence could lead to an increase in democracy. In 68 cases of countries that demonstrated a decreasing trend in the level of violence, 53% resulted in an increase of democracy. The end of violence was arguably a key to democratization in 1969 Venezuela, 1996 Guatemala, and 2004 Algeria. Yet, it is not a green flag for all states. Decreasing violence appeared to have no immediate effect on 1996 Croatia or 1994 Indonesia, two states that were poised for democratic transitions. Surprisingly, 13% of the cases responded to a reduction in violence by *decreasing* their level of democracy. Greece, for example, transitioned to autocracy in 1949 *after* the Greek Civil War came to an end.

Trend analysis lends additional evidence to the non-linear effect of violence. Based upon the average level of intrastate violence by polity type, full democracies are by far the least violent regime type (see Figure 4). Prior to 1980, the majority of violence was within the partially autocratic regimes. High levels of violence in partial democracies are limited to the 1980s. By the 1990s, fully autocratic regimes had actually become more violent than the partial democracies. This suggests that Hegre's findings of an inverted U-curve relationship between violence and democracy are largely based on the 1980s.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁸ Hegre et al., "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992."




Figure 4. Violence Trends across Regime Types

Of course, there are cases of intrastate violence within even full democracies. Among countries with high levels of democracy, states with intrastate violence consistently had lower democracy scores on average than states without any violence (see Figure 5). Examples of full democracies with periods of intrastate violence include Columbia, Israel, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Countries that were autocratic during periods of violence such as Bangladesh, Guatemala, Honduras, and Indonesia actually averaged higher levels of democracy than autocracies without violence (see Figure 6). Therefore, the effect of reduced levels of intrastate violence depends upon the initial regime type. There is a contradiction between the regression results and the trend chart. Regression indicated that violence had a negative effect on the level of democracy while the trend charts clearly show that autocracies with violence generally tend to have higher democracy scores. This disparity suggests that intrastate violence tends to pull regimes towards the center of the polity spectrum.




Figure 5. Effect of Violence on Polity Scores in Democracies




Figure 6. Effect of Violence on Polity Scores in Autocracies

Because intrastate violence pulls governments towards the center of the polity spectrum, countries that substantially increase democracy during a period of violence have a low probability of maintaining a high-level democracy. Of 35 cases, 65% of regimes that transitioned during a period of intrastate violence failed while an additional 10% suffered a significant decrease in democracy. Azerbaijan, Burma, Guatemala, and Sierra Leone are each examples of failed attempts to democratize during periods of insurgency. Those states that did survive tended to have low levels of violence and did not achieve high levels of democracy until the violence was reduced to insignificant levels. Violent transitions in 1957 Columbia, 1986 Guatemala, and 1993 Peru led to partial democracies. Full democracy was achieved, but only after the violence

dissipated. There are three notable exceptions: Philippines, Indonesia, and South Africa. All three of these countries transitioned during periods of significant violence and obtained high levels of democracy. In the cases of Indonesia and South Africa, a small reduction in, but not elimination of, violence preceded the development of full democracy. The peculiarity of the Philippines is explored in Chapter V.

2. The Economy

Analysis on the economic effects upon democracy is discussed in three sections: industrialization, income, and economic control variables. Two economic control variables are included: economic crisis and oil rents.

a. Industrialization

Hypothesis Two stated that changes in the level of industrialization may lead to changes in the level of democracy. The regression results in Table 5 indicate that the relationship between changes in industrialization and level of democracy are not statistically significant. Industrialized countries such as Argentina, Jordan, Syria, Portugal, North Korea, and Eastern Europe had extensive periods of autocracy. However, this does not mean that the factor is irrelevant. A cursory look at the data suggests a linear relationship between industrialization and changes in democracy. Transitions to full democracy averaged 12 points less in agricultural labor than transitions to partial democracies (Figure 7). The point spread expands to 18 when colonial transitions are excluded.




Figure 7. Agricultural Labor and Regime Change

Countries with higher levels of agriculture are more likely to breakdown. Further, their reductions in democracy are likely to be more severe. The average case of a full democracy transitioning to a partial democracy had an agricultural labor rate of 47%. Full democracies that transition to autocracy had an average agricultural labor rate of 63%. Surprisingly, there was a rash of low industrialization countries advancing in democracy in the 2000s, including Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Senegal, Burundi, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, and Nepal. Because all nine are new democracies, it is too soon to conclude that industrialization is no longer a prerequisite for democracy.

The distribution of agricultural labor in polities is in the shape of an inverted U-curve (see Figure 8). The comparison between the two figures suggests that the shape of the curve has become more pronounced over time. Instead of being fully autocratic, non-industrialized countries dominate the center of the polity spectrum as hybrid regimes. The change shown in Figure 8 suggests that the positive relationship between levels of agricultural labor and democracy since 2000 is likely caused by full autocracies moving towards the center of the polity spectrum.




Figure 8. Agricultural Labor and Regime Type over time¹⁷⁹

Although industrialization does not cause increased democracy, the data indicate that a high level of industrialization is conducive to achieving and maintaining a high level of democracy. Throughout much of the twentieth century, industrialization was a necessary, but not sufficient, factor for an increase in democracy. However, the recent trend in low-industrialized countries becoming increasingly democratic suggests that industrialization may no longer be a necessary cause of democracy. This concept will be further explored in Chapter VI with the case study on Senegal.

b. Income

Hypothesis Three asserts that a change in the level of income may lead to a change in the level of democracy. When the control variables were taken into account, income was shown to have a positive effect on the level of democracy (see Table 6). However, the results for Model Two suggest that income is not a determining variable in level of democracy across the entire polity spectrum as GDP per capita has a negative effect on the level of democracy within partially autocratic systems. Instead of pushing countries towards democracy, GDP appears to push countries towards the polity extremes.

Part of the reason that the regression returned such unimpressive results for the impact of income on democracy is the changing nature of the relationship over

¹⁷⁹ Left chart shows average from 1961–2004; right chart shows 2004.

time. Table 7 suggests that income had a varying effect over time and across polity type. Throughout the post-war period, countries transitioning to full democracy had twice the average GDP per capita of those countries that transitioned to autocracy. However, this gap narrowed during the 1970s as relatively wealthy countries such as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay moved towards autocracy. The income gap almost entirely disappeared in the 2000s, as moderately wealthy countries such as Iran, Fiji, and Thailand drastically reduced their levels of democracy.

	Model 1 All Polities	Model 2 Autocracies
Δ Intrastate Violence	-0.080***	-0.017
	(0.023)	(0.019)
Δ Industrialization	0.043	0.022
	(0.045)	(0.040)
Δ Income	1.600*	-1.531**
	(0.910)	(0.679)
Δ Peer Democracy	0.005**	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.003)
Economic Crisis	0.102 (0.095)	-0.021 (0.081)
Δ Oil Rent	-.000004 (.00002)	-.000004 (.000008)
Bureaucratic Maturity	0.003**(0.001)	0.004**(0.002)
Interstate War Loss	0.132 (0.267)	-0.248 (0.372)
West Africa	0.179 (0.132)	0.273 (0.183)
North Africa	0.164 (0.181)	0.174 (0.190)
East Africa	0.094 (0.157)	0.288 (0.202)
South Africa	0.144 (0.147)	0.022 (0.254)
Mid East	0.078 (0.116)	0.276 (0.207)
South Asia	0.064 (0.132)	0.055 (0.212)
East Asia	0.053 (0.123)	0.083 (0.222)
South America	0.075 (0.166)	NA
Central America	0.145 (0.163)	NA
Isolated Islands	0.060 (0.156)	NA
Belgian Colony	0.301 (0.356)	NA
Dutch Colony	0.266 (0.297)	NA
French Colony	0.049 (0.132)	0.205 (0.180)
Ottoman Colony	0.105 (0.165)	-0.061 (0.207)
Portuguese Colony	0.046 (0.194)	-0.172 (0.206)
Russian Colony	0.047 (0.173)	0.370 (0.232)
Spanish Colony	-0.052 (0.160)	NA
British Colony	-0.058 (0.110)	0.090 (0.163)
Mixed Colony	0.032 (0.145)	0.104 (0.192)
Japanese Colony	0.204 (0.250)	0.215 (0.195)
Number of Observations	5174	897

Note: Table shows coefficient with standard error in parentheses and p-value indicated by: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.001

Table 6. Regression Results with Control Variables

	Average GDP Per Capita (in thousands)						
	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Transition to Full Democracy	3.5	2.2	3.9	4.6	5.3	6.8	3.7
Transition to Partial Democracy	1.7	3.0	1.5	2.7	4.1	3.5	2.1
Regression from Full Democracy	NM	NM	1.3	2.2	4.3	3.2	NM
Transition to Autocracy	1.8	1.3	2.3	3.1	1.9	2.6	3.4

NM – due to low occurrences during this period, the average is not meaningful

Table 7. The GDP-democracy relationship over time

Clearly, income is a discriminator between transitions to full democracy versus partial democracy. Income also was a discriminator in determining regression from full democracy. With the exception of the 1950s, full democratizers averaged higher GDPs than any other type of regime transition while partial democratizers had the lowest average GDP per capita. Countries that regressed from full democracy consistently had lower GDPs than those achieving full democracy. Surprisingly, transitions to autocracy often had a higher average GDP per capita than transitions to partial democracy. In general then, the relationship between income and level of democracy can be depicted as a U-curve (see Figure 9).




Figure 9. Income Level and Regime Type

Table 7 suggests that a linear relationship between income change and level of democracy is limited to the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, GDP per capita in cases transitioning to full democracy was almost three times that of transitions to autocracy. Even the partial democracies demonstrated a clear economic advantage over the autocracies. With the exception of Argentina, all autocratizers in the 1980s were relatively poor countries. In the 1990s, as countries became independent from the Soviet Union, new countries that became full democracies had almost 80% more GDP per capita than those that became partial democracies.

Of course, it is not unheard of for a poor country to attain a high level of democracy. During the period of study, there were 26 cases of a country with less than \$2,000 GDP per capita attaining full democracy. However, only three of those cases managed to survive over the long term: India, Mongolia, and the Solomon Islands. Four more recent cases (Ghana, Liberia, Moldova, and Senegal) achieved a high level of democracy but have not yet withstood the test of time.

Like industrialization, income does not cause an increase in democracy though a high level of income is conducive to achieving and maintaining a high level of democracy. The recent trend of low-income countries becoming increasingly democratic suggests that income's relevance to the level of democracy may be on the wane. This concept will be further explored in Chapter VI on the case study of Senegal.

c. Economic Control Variables

The regression results in Table 6 showed that the two economic control variables, economic crisis and oil rents, had no statistically significant effect on the level of democracy. Economic crisis as a primary catalyst for regime change is a recent development. Since World War II, the first correlation between economic crisis and regime change was Nigeria's fragile democracy in 1966. In the 1970s, a handful of countries increased democracy, though only temporarily, after an economic crisis. The collapse of cocoa prices, Ghana's primary trade commodity, led to the downfall of the autocratic regime and the birth of Ghana's first short-lived, partially democratic regime. Bangladesh and Nigeria went through similar experiences. It was not until the 1980s that

regional economic crises in Latin America sparked widespread democratization. Three of these transitions, Brazil, Bolivia and Uruguay, achieved long-lasting, high levels of democracy. But, economic crisis was responsible for its share of autocratizations as well. Triple digit inflation correlated with democratic breakdowns in Ghana, Turkey, and Uganda. Overall, economic crisis as a catalyst for regime change slightly favored increases in democracy. In cases where polity change was associated with an economic crisis, 73% of the cases resulted in a significant increase in the level of democracy. However, the importance of economic crisis as a catalyst for polity change is largely constrained to the 1980s and 1990s, which accounted for 80% of the cases.

The explanatory power of oil as an obstacle to democracy appears to have lost its luster during the early 1990s. Although no country has ever transitioned to democracy while it received more than \$1,000 in annual oil rents per capita, the majority of oil-rich autocracies are in regions rife with oil-poor autocracies. Outside of the Middle East and developed countries, countries with significant amounts of oil (oil rents greater than 150 per capita) lagged in levels of democracy for significant periods only prior to the 1990s (see Figure 10).




Figure 10. Effect of Oil on Level of Democracy in Developing Countries

Oil is certainly more prominent in full autocracies than any other regime type (see Figure 11). While full autocracies such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE dominate oil production business, the oil production in other autocracies is not

substantially greater than in the democracies. Only in a few cases can a decrease in the level of democracy be attributed to a rise in oil rents: Indonesia, Syria, and Gabon.¹⁸⁰ A decrease in oil rents contributed to a delayed increase in Mexico's democracy. On the other hand, an increase in oil rents during 1979–1980 corresponded to large increases in democracy in Ecuador, Nigeria, and Peru. Finally, Algeria, Nigeria, and Venezuela had increases in the level of democracy despite persistent high levels of oil rents.




Figure 11. Oil Rents and Regime Type

Oil does not appear to be a determinative factor in the level of democracy. However, oil can be used to extend a patronage system, which encourages the sustainment of autocratic processes. Therefore, it is not the presence of oil that is detrimental to democracy, but the capabilities and preferences of key actors in the decision to establish a patronage system using the readily exploitable oil rents.

3. Diffusion of Norms

The fourth hypothesis contends that a change in the level of the diffusion of norms may lead to a change in the level of democracy. This hypothesis was tested using a proxy of change in the level of democracy for all other countries in the region. In

¹⁸⁰ Haber and Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse," 19–22.

addition, this section discusses the results of several normative control variables that were used including state maturity, colonial legacy, region, and loss of an interstate war.

a. Changes in Peer Countries' Level of Democracy

The regression results of Model One in Table 6 showed that the regional diffusion of democratic norms was a significant factor in increasing levels of democracy. Interestingly, the results for Model Two suggest that peer country democracy has far less influence upon autocratic countries, likely because autocracies tend to exist in autocratic neighborhoods. There are several reasons to suggest that the peer influence of neighboring countries has increased over time, which is not identifiable in this quantitative research. First, the end of the Cold War removed ideological restrictions to the adoption of democratic ideals. Second, this period saw a dramatic rise in the ability to share democratic ideals across borders due to the introduction of cell phones, the internet, and the increasing proliferation of radio. Third, declining transportation costs and increasing economic liberalization provided increased social and economic interaction with neighbor countries.

b. Normative Control Variables

The regression results in Table 6 indicate that the maturity of the state had a significant positive effect on the level of democracy across all polity types, including autocracies. Analyzing countries that have had regime change since World War II, the pattern continues to hold. As Table 8 shows, transitions to full democracy are the most mature while transitions to autocracy are the least mature. Of course, time itself is not the explanatory variable. Several young states achieved high levels of democracy soon after independence such as India, Jamaica, Papua New Guinea, and Trinidad. Similarly, old states such as China, Iran, and Oman continue to have low levels of democracy.

Type of Regime Change	Years since Independence (excluding colonial transfers)
Achieved Full Democracy	70
Transition resulting in Partial Democracy	59
Regression from Full Democracy to Partial Democracy	63
Transition to Autocracy	45

Table 8. Regime Change and Average Maturity

Although the majority of substantial increases in democracy since World War II occurred in British colonies (see Table 9), the British colonies also have more than their share of transitions to autocracy in countries like Nigeria, Pakistan, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Over the long term, the ratio of democratization to autocratization in British colonies was no better than the Spanish or French. Although the Russian and Turkish colonies had surprisingly high democratization rates among a small number of cases, no colonial power had a statistically significant long-term effect on the level of democracy across their colonies (see Table 6).

	None	UK	ESP	FRA	Otto	NL	US	RU	JP	Port	GER	Belg	IT
Democ	17%	29%	18%	15%	6%	4%	1%	6%	2%	3%	2%	1%	1%
Autoc	17%	38%	23%	16%	3%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	0%	2%	1%
Ratio	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.7	1.1	0.2	1.8	0.9	1.1	N/A	0.5	0.5

Table 9. Regime Change and Colonial Legacy¹⁸¹

Table 6 also shows no statistically significant relationship between region and level of democracy. While some regions have more democracy than others, every region has some democracy present. OECD, Central and South America have especially good records with democracy. However, Latin American democracy only began its considerable upward trend in 1980 (see Figure 12).

¹⁸¹ United Kingdom, Spain, France, Ottoman, Netherlands, United States, Russia, Japan, Portugal, Germany, Belgium, and Italy.




Figure 12. Latin America Democracy Trend

Upward trends in the level of democracy in Asia and Africa beginning in 1980 and 1990, respectively, suggest either that region is not a significant determining factor or that its influence has waned over time (Figure 13). Surprisingly, Southwest Asia has surpassed South Asia in both number of democracies and average polity score. However, this democracy advantage is largely driven by states on the outskirts of the region: Armenia, Cyprus, Georgia, Israel, Lebanon, and Turkey. But, there were significant political liberalizations in Bahrain, Iran, Jordan and Yemen as well. It is interesting to note that the African regions have higher averages of democracy than Southwest and South Asia. Even in highly autocratic North Africa, polity scores have increased in Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia.




Figure 13. Asian and African¹⁸²

¹⁸² Note that the trend prior to 1965 is distorted due to the low number of independent countries.

Besides above-average successes in South Africa and Central America, most developing regions had a similar ratio of democratization to autocratization (Table 10). From these results, it is difficult to argue that a specific region is incompatible with increased levels of democracy.

	OECD ¹⁸³	West Africa	North Africa	East Africa	South Africa	SW Asia	South Asia	East Asia	South Amer	Cntrl Amer
Democ	17%	13%	1%	6%	7%	6%	8%	13%	14%	9%
Autoc	7%	17%	1%	8%	6%	8%	10%	14%	18%	7%
Ratio	2.5	0.8	0.9	0.7	1.3	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.4

Table 10. Regime Change and Region

The loss of an interstate war had no statistically significant impact on the level of democracy (Table 6). Of 25 war losses since 1946, about half resulted in significant regime change. Perhaps one of the most famous examples is the collapse of Argentina's military regime after its defeat in the Falklands War. A more recent example is Serbia's conversion to democracy after its defeat in the Kosovo Conflict at the hands of NATO. While the loss of war acts as a catalyst for a change in the level of democracy, it has no effect on the direction of that change. For example, defeat in war was also a catalyst for breakdown of democracy in Azerbaijan and Syria.

D. SUMMARY

There is no single structural factor that will produce democracy. Almost all of the factors reviewed have some type of influence on the level of democracy (see Table 11). Increases in security, income, and diffusion are more likely to create increases in the level of democracy. Concomitantly, decreasing levels of security, income, and diffusion are more likely to result in a decreased level of democracy. However, the relationship is not linear. Intrastate violence, poverty, and under-development appear to have a centripetal

¹⁸³ Excluding Japan, Australia, Mexico, and New Zealand.

effect upon regimes, pulling them towards the middle of the polity spectrum. High levels of income, industrialization, and security are common features of both full democracies and full autocracies.

Hypothesis	Finding
Δ Security \rightarrow Δ Democracy	Although not determinative alone, security is positively related to democracy.
Δ Development \rightarrow Δ Democracy	Development does not induce democracy. Assists in achieving and maintaining a high level of democracy, but relevance is waning over time.
Δ Income \rightarrow Δ Democracy	Curvilinear relationship; income pushes democracy towards the extremes.
Δ Diffusion \rightarrow Δ Democracy	Positive effect overall, though more limited on autocracies; most influential in 1980s and following

Table 11. Summary of Hypotheses Results

The relationship between the four structural variables and democracy was not stable over time. This variation is the result of actor preferences. Structural factors do not work in a vacuum, they influence the cost benefit calculations of actors who have or desire a personal stake in their government. It is only as the structural factors change to modify the costs and benefits of regime types that civil society, the military, or the ruling executive takes actions to change the level of democracy. For example, as a decrease in the level of intrastate violence is responsible for both increases and decreases in democracy, it is the actors' response to the change in violence that determines the resulting level of democracy. The results for this chapter indicate that actors are more likely to adopt high levels of democracy if there are high levels of security, income, industrialization, and diffusion of norms. Of the four categories, the most important are security and diffusion of norms. The evidence from this study suggests that the increasing importance of the diffusion of norms is contributing to the decreasing explanatory power of industrialization and income.

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IV. MEXICO: DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION DESPITE VIOLENCE

Mexico was widely hailed as a democracy in 2000 when the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) finally lost the presidency after more than 70 years of rule. But, the processes that allowed this democratic outcome had been in place since 1994, the same year as the Chiapas uprising. Mexico was explored as a case because democratization occurred in conjunction with an increase in intrastate violence, a theoretical obstacle to democratization. Further, the quantitative results from Chapter III indicate that violence has a negative effect on the level of democracy. Yet the timing of the Chiapas Rebellion and major electoral reforms indicated that a dramatic increase in violence may have actually improved Mexico's level of democracy. The case of Mexico is also interesting because for decades, Mexico defied the democratic theories that argued that a moderate GDP and significant industrialization would generate a democratic government. Since 1917, Mexico has been a democracy on paper. But prior to 1977, Mexico's government was essentially a rotating dictatorship with de facto one party rule. When political reform did come, significant increases in Mexico's level of democracy occurred in spite of increasing intrastate (i.e., domestic) violence.

In this chapter, the analytical model proposed in Chapter II is used to analyze the factors that influenced Mexico's level of democracy since World War II. Keep in mind that the level of democracy is considered a measure of the competitiveness, openness, and regulation of a state's electoral processes and its post-electoral accountability. The model views the level of democracy as the result of the interaction of actors who are influenced by structural factors. The model can be viewed as a supply and demand function. Actors, influenced by structural factors, determine the supply and demand components. The resulting supply-demand equilibrium is the level of democracy.

As discussed in Chapter II, demand for democracy in a country is a rational choice of individuals and groups within a society. This study examines the effect that the economy, the security situation, and the diffusion of democratic norms have on citizens' demand for democracy. Increasing internal security, economic income, economic

industrialization, and the diffusion of norms are expected to increase the demand for democracy within a country. In some cases, this process is delayed by high oil rents or accelerated by an economic crisis. Conversely, we expect high or increasing intrastate violence, low-income, and low industrialization to have a deterrent or regressive effect upon democratization. However, this regressive effect may be mitigated by the diffusion of democratic norms.

On the other side of the demand-supply equation, institutions make rational choice decisions to dedicate time, resources, and prestige to supplying democracy. The institutions with the most impact on democracy include the military, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), political parties, and the ruling regime. These institutions are affected by the same economic, security, and diffusion factors that shape the citizens' demand for democracy, though not necessarily in the same manner or to the same magnitude.

In this study's effort to identify the determinants of the levels of democracy, this chapter seeks to determine the factors that influenced Mexico's achievement and two-term sustainment of a high level of democracy in spite of rising violence. This chapter begins with a brief background on the political history of Mexico. The citizens' demand for democracy is presented in Section B in three parts: the economy, security, and norms. Despite economic success in Mexico through the 1970s, demand for democracy was subdued. The Mexican Revolution had destroyed the national political power of the landholders while the dominant PRI made industrial workers and small farmers the beneficiaries of the autocratic system. Mexico warded off widespread citizen demands for democracy by distributing benefits in a way that committed the majority of the population into backing the one-party system. Widespread demand for democracy did not arrive until the 1980s economic crisis drastically reduced the regime's distribution of benefits. The dramatic rise in violence in the 1990s, driven by the increasing power of the drug cartels in Northern Mexico and rising economic tensions in southern Mexico, decreased confidence in the PRI's ability to govern. The economic crisis and the social turmoil had both drastically increased the costs and reduced the benefits of maintaining the autocratic regime. Meanwhile, the gradual convergence of a free press, high literacy

rates, the end of the Cold War, and the pro-democracy stance of the Church highlighted the imperfections in Mexico's democracy. The economic crises and increasing violence of the 1980s and 1990s also appeared to instill an increased demand for democracy. At a minimum, these factors motivated an increased demand for change that required democratic processes in order to occur. Appropriately, Fox's winning coalition in the 2000 election was called the Alliance for Change

The institutions' supply of democracy is broken into four parts within Section C: the military, NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime. The acquiescence of the military, the support of the business community, the pro-democracy activism of NGOs, and the decisions of political parties were all-important elements in permitting the growth and sustenance of democracy. The military permitted political reforms due to its professionalization and the reduced benefits of maintaining the autocratic regime. Unions also felt the decreased benefits of the autocracy while pro-democracy NGOs formed alliances to conduct election monitoring. The most critical element, though, appears to be the regime itself as it created the key electoral laws that allowed the opposition to legally take power. The part on the ruling regime is discussed in two separate time periods: pre and post 1976.

A. BRIEF HISTORY OF MEXICAN POLITICS

In the 16th century, Spain conquered several tribes within modern-day Mexico. Colonial ties were essentially severed after the French invasion of Spain in 1808. After more than a decade of war, Mexico became independent in 1821. Mexico's first century as an independent nation was grueling. Although there were brief periods of elections, changeover was rarely democratic. Few presidents were allowed to finish their terms. Presidential tenure was counted in months, sometimes days, especially during the first 25 years, which was racked by coups and revolts. For example, General Santa Anna was president, or acting-president, eleven non-consecutive times, though often for only a few weeks or months. His longest two terms were 12 and 28 months.

In 1846, the United States invaded Mexico over a territorial dispute in Texas. As part of the peace terms, the United States expropriated about half of Mexico's territory,

much of it sparsely inhabited. The U.S. withdrawal from Mexico left the country in political chaos that culminated in the 1858–1861 War of Reform. The civil war left Mexico weak. In 1864, France invaded and installed Maximilian as emperor. By 1867, the Mexicans evicted the French and executed Maximilian.

After almost a decade of a semblance of political stability, President Lerdo announced his intent to seek re-election in 1876. Porfirio Díaz, a vehement advocate of the no re-election norm, led a successful revolt against Lerdo. Ironically, Díaz would be continuously re-elected over the next 35 years. Of course, elections during Díaz's reign had predetermined outcomes. Democracy was curtailed in the name of social stability. The reign of Díaz was stable, relatively peaceful, and achieved great advances in modern infrastructure. Yet, a variety of groups tired of the long dictatorship. Armed revolts sprang up in a free-for-all civil war: the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Rebels were led by Emiliano Zapata in the south, Francisco Madero in the center, and Pancho Villa in the north.

The loose alliance quickly fell apart after Madero became President. Unhappy with Madero's policies, Zapata's forces returned to armed rebellion. A coup brought Victoriano Huerta to the presidency. In response to Huerta's coup, Villa, Carranza, and Obregon joined the rebellion. Also opposed to the military coup due to its unconstitutionality, Woodrow Wilson sent U.S. forces to occupy Veracruz. Carranza ended up on top, deposing Huerta, but Zapata and Villa continued to rebel. Amid the chaos, the 1917 Constitution created a federal, presidential system with plurality representation. In a dispute over presidential succession, Carranza was assassinated by forces loyal to one of Carranza's own former generals: Obregon. Within a decade, Obregon, Zapata, and Villa were all assassinated.

In 1929, after almost twenty years of bloodshed, backstabbing, and power grabbing, the surviving military and political elites created the National Revolutionary Party as a collusive power-sharing arrangement to avoid further bloodshed. The party name was briefly changed in the 1930s to the Party of the Mexican Revolution when President Cárdenas reorganized the party into three building blocks: peasants, labor, and the popular sector. The peasants and labor had well-organized unions. The popular

sector was ill defined but arguably represented the unorganized middle class. The party took on the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) name in 1946. The establishment of a party of the revolution turned Mexico's paper democracy into an autocracy with a regular schedule of power rotation.

Mexico's level of democracy increased incrementally over time, each increment motivated by a different factor. In 1977, intrastate violence drove Mexico to migrate to a participatory autocracy; the regime introduced a mixed proportional representation system to entice rebel leaders to enter the political system. A decade later, economic crisis ended one-party rule as the PRI super majority ended in 1988. Disgruntled by the widespread fraud of the 1988 presidential election, NGOs flocked into the field to monitor elections in 1994. The electoral code ensuring free elections finally caught up in 1997 partly in response to rising intrastate violence. The culmination of the reforms was the National Action Party (PAN) presidential victory in 2000. So far, Mexico's democracy has survived.

B. SHAPING INTERESTS: DEMAND FOR DEMOCRACY

This section analyzes the change in demand for democracy in Mexico's citizens in three parts. The first part addresses various aspects of Mexico's economy: income, industrialization, oil rents, and economic crisis. The second part addresses the effect of intrastate violence, both insurgent and organized crime. The final part analyzes the diffusion of democratic norms.

1. The Rise and Fall of Clientalism in Mexico: Income, Industrialization, Oil and Crisis

From the discussion in Chapter II, we expect that economic income and economic development will have a positive impact on the level of democracy. A growing economic income should lead to the development of a middle class. As citizens achieve middle class status, they have the ability to divert their resources from life sustainment to social interactions and political activism. Economic development leads to demand for democracy through increased literacy, industrialization, and the formation of unions and

professional organizations. The findings from this section suggest that while increasing levels of income and development spread democratic ideals, those ideals did not lead to significant pro-democracy action until combined with a catalyst such as a severe economic crisis.

By any economic measure, Mexico's increase in democracy should have occurred much earlier than 1994. On the income side, Mexico had a two-decade economic boom in the post-war era known as the "Mexico Miracle." GDP per capita surpassed \$3,000 in 1954, \$4,000 in 1964, and \$6,000 in 1975. Instead of increasing palpable demand for democracy, the successful economy under the PRI negated widespread calls for increased democracy. Mexico warded off widespread citizen demands for democracy by distributing benefits through patronage that committed the majority of the population into backing the one-party system. As long as the economy was good and services were provided, there was no reason to vote out the PRI or demand more democratic processes. The patronage model was sustained by oil revenues and debt.

On the development side, industry was booming. The Diaz era laid the core of the industrial infrastructure prior to the turn of the century: railroads, communications (phone/telegraph), and a postal service. It is possible that the increased literacy and education associated with this period of industrialization led to an increased demand for democracy among the citizenry, many of whom rallied around the revolutionaries. The revolution brought political change, but democracy only on paper. The Mexican Revolution transformed society. A small middle class appeared though Mexico was still primarily a rural society. The landed class and their *latifundias* (estates) were dismantled. The workers and the farmers were given preeminent status as the new power brokers in politics. To an extent, the social changes of the revolution defused demand for democracy. Instead of agitating for increased say against the landed class, the laborers had a prominent bargaining position in the new order. Industrialization brought the expected precursors of democracy. Literacy broached 60%. Strong unions, supported by the government, formed around industrial workers and farmers. But, as long as the regime met the needs of the unions, the masses had little need for democracy.

The tempering effect of the revolution upon democracy was temporary. As industrialization continued, economic growth favored industry at the expense of agriculture. World War II turned the tables decidedly in favor of the industrial workers. As the U.S. retooled its industry to produce war materials, Mexico developed industry to produce substitutes for the former American imports. Construction flourished; highways, dams and airports were built. After the war, Mexico decided to continue with import substitute industrialization (ISI), cultivating industries in steel, chemicals, textiles, rubber, construction, and electronics. In 1966, Mexico's industrial and services labor force overtook the size of the agriculture labor force. By the 1980s, Mexico seemed overripe for democracy via development. The agricultural community was only 30% of the labor force. Those farmers that remained were no longer unorganized and uneducated. Expanded rural education programs delivered a literacy rate of 90%. Tough economic times forced farm laborers to expand into industrial or service jobs during the off-season.

The diminishment of the agricultural community was an instrumental factor towards increasing citizens' demand for democracy. As the agricultural community shrank and their political power diminished, some farmers turned towards violence as a method to influence policy. The culmination of literacy, education, and the interests of the agricultural workers suggests that economic development had some explanatory power after all. Perhaps the effect of economic development upon democracy in Mexico was delayed due to the high divergence in income and industrialization across Mexico's regions. The majority of Mexico's GDP is concentrated in Mexico City, Mexico State, Nuevo Leon, and Jalisco.¹⁸⁴ The north and central states have industries such as the auto manufacturing plants in Puebla, Aguascalientes, Jalisco, and Nuevo Leon (see Figure 14). The southern states have very little industry. The terrain is primarily jungle and mountains with mostly small cities. The area is not conducive to either large retail outlets or a large business presence: there is just not a large enough concentration of people to warrant the investment. This suggests that the regional imbalance in industrialization led to regional divergence in the demand for democracy. Although citizens in the south

¹⁸⁴ Monterrey, in the state of Nuevo Leon, is the business center of the north. Guadalajara, in the state of Jalisco, is a hub for information technology.

wanted increased political voice due to their economic woes, they initially lacked the organization, education, and literacy necessary to foment effective democratic action. As the rural areas developed, the farmers' marginalized status limited their ability to affect politics or political reform causing some to turn to insurgency.



Figure 14. Map of Mexico with State Political Boundaries

The strong economy and the union clients maintained the urban population as stakeholders in the PRI regime. The PRI's luck ran out in 1982. Plummeting oil prices limited the government's ability to dole out subsidies and other patronage. These same macroeconomic pressures also crushed the Mexican economy. With inflation skyrocketing, defaults of loans in U.S. dollars jumped, further depressing the economy. Mexico suffered negative GDP growth for seven consecutive years primarily under President Madrid from 1982 to 1988, culminating in a cumulative GDP loss of 12%. In 1985, Madrid made the difficult decision to abandon ISI and adopt free market policies in an effort to correct Mexico's economic ills. Madrid began by privatizing several state companies and by joining GATT. Many companies were not ready for the competition.

ISI businesses were soundly crushed by inflation and an end to cheap government credit resulting in significant job losses. The economy would improve only marginally over the next decade. Inflation would eventually be reigned in, but GDP remained weak and would only fully recover in 1999.

The economic crisis turned the business community into pro-democracy advocates. The business community benefited from the autocratic regime only as long as the economy was growing as it did from the 1940s through the 1970s. But as the economy soured, so too did the business community's opinion of the PRI. Small and medium size entrepreneurs were dismayed by the government's decision to nationalize the banks in 1982. This event, combined with the economic crisis of the 1980s, drove the business community to the PAN.¹⁸⁵ As the economic crisis worsened during the 1994 peso crisis, small business and middle class debtors formed a loose coalition known as El Barzón to protest against the government's economic policies. Big companies also favored democracy. At the end of the Cold War, the importance of politics as an investment consideration took on new emphasis. Leaders of Mexico's powerful monopolies and duopolies (e.g., TELMEX and PEMEX) became pro-democracy because democracy was good for business. Democracy held little threat to corporations since the lack of competition enabled businesses to negotiate with bureaucrats over regulation enforcement and budget appropriations with little fear of reprisal.

The economic malaise of the 1980s polarized Mexican political opinions going into the 1988 elections.¹⁸⁶ Further, the poor government response to the 1985 Mexico City earthquake made the government appear inept. Many citizens had lost faith in the PRI's ability to govern. However, massive electoral fraud managed to keep the PRI in power for another six years. The 1982 economic crisis did not directly bring about regime change. The public lost faith in the PRI's ability to manage the economy.

¹⁸⁵ Roderic Ai Camp, *Entrepreneurs and Politics in Twentieth-Century Mexico* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 136–8; Rogelio Hernandez-Rodriguez, "The Renovation of Old Institutions: State Governors and the Political Transition in Mexico " *Latin American Politics & Society* 45, no. 4 (2003): 100–1.

¹⁸⁶ Jorge I. Domínguez and James A. McCann, *Democratizing Mexico: Public Opinion and Electoral Choices* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

However, other parties were not seen as more adept at handling the economy.¹⁸⁷ The prolonged crisis brought about an increased demand for change among the citizens, which began a sequence of events that culminated in political reforms. The immediate effect of the crisis was the implementation of a minor reform that changed the structure for calculating the makeup of the legislature. Through this reform, the voters were able to end the super majority of the PRI during the 1988 elections. Although the PRI managed to win the presidency, the widespread fraud associated with the election mobilized citizens to support election monitoring during the 1994 elections.

2. Intrastate Violence

As discussed in Chapter II, an outbreak in violence is expected to deter democratization or encourage a regime to move towards autocracy. Further, a transition to democracy during a period of intrastate violence is unlikely to sustain democracy as a significant segment of the population was not involved in the design of the democratic processes. Contrary to expectation, intrastate violence appeared to have little negative effect on demand in Mexico. Instead, insurgency violence served as a vehicle to highlight the plight of the oppressed to the general public while increasing organized criminal violence helped fuel demands for a change in political leadership.

For much of the 19th century, Mexico was an unstable hybrid regime with frequent armed rebellions and political change through the use of force. The dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz brought a thirty-year respite to the violence. Over time, Diaz's policies and tenacious hold on power ostracized some of his powerful compatriots. Civil war erupted and culminated in the Mexican Revolution. Even after the revolution, the violence continued until the end of the Cristero Rebellion. In an effort to end the violence, a coalition was built to support a one-party system, ending the brief hybrid democracy established under the 1917 Constitution. The one-party system ended the

¹⁸⁷ James McCann, "The Changing Mexican Electorate: Political Interest, Expertise and Party Support in the 1980s and 1990s," in *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections*, ed. Mónica Serrano (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1998), 33–5. Beatriz Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 225.

rebellions. Not only did the violence cause a desire for autocratization, but autocratization led to a decrease in violence. In Mexico's case, it was not autocratic repression that led to decreased violence, but the creation of a coalition that would ensure that the powerful members of society received the benefits of the new regime. As the system was designed to placate the interests of the elites, eventually segments of society came to believe that they were not receiving the benefits of the revolution.

A wave of demonstrations for increased pay and benefits erupted in the 1950s. It began with the teacher's union. Requesting a salary increase, the teacher's union withdrew from the government-client umbrella union, the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM). Demonstrations were violently dispersed by the special police unit known as the *granaderos* (grenadiers, known for using clubs, tear gas, and occasionally bayonets). The teachers were merely the first. Later demonstrations by students and various unions such as electricians, telegraphers, doctors, oil workers, and railroad workers would receive similar treatment. The government used a combination of coercion (i.e., brute force, arrests of leaders, government-orchestrated protests and media stories, and mass firings) and incentives (e.g., increased salaries) to break strikes. To justify its brutal action, the government claimed that the protests were a communist conspiracy instigated by foreigners. The government's control of the media and its skillful isolation of each protesting union initially constrained demands for political change.

Eventually, though, the protest spirit migrated to the universities. While the universities had long sympathized with the demonstrators, students were catalyzed into action after the police brutally dispersed a brawling crowd during a high school football game. But instead of intimidating the students into line, the event sparked a cycle of demonstrations and repressions: the students would protest the brutality of the police only to be brutally repressed again. The government attempted to break the cycle in 1968. The military occupation of several of the largest universities in Mexico failed to curtail the students who continued to hold mass rallies. One such rally was held in the square at Tlatelolco. A large student rally with a heavy military presence was an ordinary occurrence. But in this case, shots rang out. The military opened fire. It went poorly for

the students. The death toll was never released. Afterwards, the military claimed student snipers started the shooting. More plausibly, critics suggest that it was a government setup. Although the media did not cover the event, word spread. The event shook both the public and the military.

The brutal repression of the unions and the students sparked several small-scale revolts in the 1960s and 70s: Mexico's "Dirty War." Few of these revolts had any serious capabilities or major operations. For example, one such group that managed a single major operation was the Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas del Pueblo. The group's primary activity was conducting bank robberies but they did manage to kidnap the American Consul at Guadalajara and demand the release of political prisoners. Other armed groups were similar. They predominantly carried out criminal activities in something of a Robin Hood fashion to counter the perceived injustices of the system. The list of armed revolutionary organizations is long: Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario, National Revolutionary Civic Association, and the Army of the Poor and the Peasant's Brigade Against Injustice, the Mexican Insurgent Army, Forces of National Liberation, and the Clandestine Workers and Campesinos Popular Union were some of the more prominent names. These organizations were principally local with little coordination across groups.

The oil crisis of the 1970s gave Mexico the opportunity to spend its way out of social dissent. The 1973 OPEC Oil Embargo exacerbated by the 1979 Iranian Revolution created skyrocketing oil prices. Mexican government spending doubled in 1972 and doubled again in 1973.¹⁸⁸ Relying partly on oil revenues and partly on debt, Mexico embarked upon a giant ponzi scheme of government spending that could be sustained only as long as oil prices remained high and foreign credit remained easy. Despite the increased spending, the insurgent crisis escalated. In response, the army occupied the state of Guerrero in 1974. The military intervened in Puebla, Tlaxcala, and Sonora to

¹⁸⁸ Personal communication with Luis Rubio, 25 Aug 2009.

evict agricultural squatters. In the case of Sonora, the intervention resulted in the death of several agricultural workers in what some refer to as the San Ignacio Río Muerto massacre.¹⁸⁹

The electoral reforms of 1977 drew senior rebel leaders into the political realm with the inclusion of small, leftist parties including the Mexican Communist Party. The next year, President Portillo granted amnesty to the rebels. With the rebels forgiven and incorporated into the political game, social instability appeared to be over. However, the stability was short-lived.

The oil crisis arrived in 1982. The economy was only beginning to recover in 1994 when the peso crisis hit. The economic pain was not burdened evenly. Wealth generation in Mexico is concentrated in Mexico City, the seven northern states (manufacturing, services, trade), and the Yucatan (oil and tourism). Four of the six poorest Mexican states are in the volatile south: Chiapas, Guerrero, Michoacán, and Oaxaca. Chiapas is by far the poorest. The economic crises hit these poor states the hardest. Poverty is often blamed for the rise of the southern Mexican guerrilla groups of the 1990s.¹⁹⁰ Yet, this is an incomplete answer. Chiapas had suffered from rural poverty long before 1994. In fact, it is likely that the surviving elements of the guerrilla groups in the 1960s and 70s fomented the seeds of the 1990s revolts of the Zapatistas and the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP).

Although Chiapas had long been poor, tensions within Chiapas and between Chiapas and the central government were increasing throughout the 1980s. In an attempt to fix the economy, the government's economic liberalizations of the 1980s and 1990s hit the southern states' primary source of income: agriculture. Meanwhile, Chiapas was suffering from land conflicts. Chiapas had a growing population from both natural growth and an influx of Guatemalan refugees. Combined with a reduction in arable land

¹⁸⁹ *Always near, Always Far: The Armed Forces in Mexico*, 1st ed. (San Francisco, Calif.: Global Exchange, 2000), 7.

¹⁹⁰ Jose Luis Velasco, *Insurgency [Sic], Authoritarianism, and Drug Trafficking in Mexico's "Democratization"*, *Latin American Studies* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 33–6.

due to erosion and attempts to expand by large landholders, a powder keg was created.¹⁹¹ Of course, some argue that land and poverty were merely catalysts to mobilize the population. In their mind, the real dispute was for indigenous rights and autonomy.¹⁹²

Unlike prior revolts, Chiapas received significant national and international attention. The localized nature of previous insurgencies combined with tight government control on the media prevented widespread demands for political reform as a result of the violence in the 1960s and 1970s. Although Chiapas was still a localized conflict, the rise of an independent Mexican media in the late 1980s suddenly brought the issue to national attention. Although the Chiapas rebellion was not particularly violent, the Zapatistas garnered broad national and international support through their adept use of the internet in a portrayal of the Zapatistas as the champions of the indigenous poor.

The Zapatista Rebellion was only one incident that contributed to a growing sense that Mexico was sinking into chaos. Only three days prior to the 1988 presidential election, two aides to the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) candidate were assassinated. Shortly after the Zapatista uprising in January 1994, PRI presidential candidate Colosio was assassinated in March. In September, José Ruiz Massieu, the secretary-general of the PRI, was assassinated. Evidence in the Massieu murder implicated Raul Salinas, brother of sitting President Carlos Salinas, in the murder. The chaos of 1994 created an unfavorable investment climate for Mexico. Temporary, but consequential, drops in foreign direct investment and portfolio investment put pressure on the peso, forcing a devaluation. The devaluation had a ripple effect as many Mexican bonds were payable in dollars, drastically increasing the cost of interest payments. By December, the Mexican government was in crisis and looked to the U.S. government for a bailout.

¹⁹¹ Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Mexico's Unfinished Symphony: The Zapatista Movement," in *Mexico's Politics and Society in Transition*, ed. Joseph Tulchin and Andrew Selee (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 110–1.

¹⁹² Luis Hernández and Laura Carslen, "Indigenous Rights: The Battle for Constitutional Reform in Mexico," in *Dilemmas of Political Change in Mexico*, ed. Kevin J. Middlebrook (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 2004), 442–3.

Social instability continued. In Aguas Blancas, police ambushed farmers on their way to a protest in Guerrero in 1995. The next year, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) began conducting small attacks against police and military in Oaxaca, Puebla, and the state of Mexico. Small guerrilla groups, such as the Insurgent Popular Revolutionary Army (ERPI) in Guerrero, began to form. Within a decade, declared guerrilla groups existed in 20 of 31 Mexican states though primarily in isolated areas.¹⁹³ In Chiapas, the government quickly abandoned military force as a means to resolve the conflict, giving the Zapatistas a wide berth within its home territory of Chiapas. However, the violence continued as landholder-backed paramilitary groups began targeting Zapatista sympathizers. Several were killed in what some call the Acteal massacre in 1997. The violence showed in the high murder rates throughout the southern states of Mexico: Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Michoacán.¹⁹⁴ The small insurgencies spreading across Mexico were a clear sign for an increased demand for political change.

However, the threat of the insurgencies to urban areas was remote. The three major centers of economic growth—Mexico City, Monterrey, and Guadalajara—were far from the rebels. Organized crime, on the other hand, appeared to be an increasingly serious threat, partly instigated by the poor economy. Overall crime statistics rose 20% from 1983 to 1985. Crime would continue to rise throughout the decade. By 1991, crime was 50% higher than prior to the crisis (1980).¹⁹⁵ From 1974–1990, the number of homicides in Mexico doubled. Despite the perception that crime continued to increase in the 1990s, homicides per capita were down more than 40% from 1990 to 2006.¹⁹⁶ However, in the late 1990s, crime became high profile; kidnappings in Mexico City, organized crime turf-war shoot-outs in the northern cities, and the occasional

¹⁹³ Velasco, *Insurgency [Sic], Authoritarianism, and Drug Trafficking in Mexico's "Democratization,"* 37.

¹⁹⁴ Beatriz Magaloni and Guillermo Zepeda, "Democratization, Judicial and Law Enforcement Institutions, and the Rule of Law in Mexico," in *Dilemmas of Political Change in Mexico*, ed. Kevin J. Middlebrook (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 2004), 178–9.

¹⁹⁵ Carlos Elizondo, "After the Second of July: Challenges and Opportunities for the Fox Administration," in *Mexico's Politics and Society in Transition* ed. Joseph Tulchin and Andrew Selee (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 41.

¹⁹⁶ Informacion Estadistica.

assassination of a police chief or journalist. The overwhelming brutality and brazenness of the violence (and the corresponding increase in media coverage) overshadowed the reality of the statistics.

Paradoxically, while the perception was that violence in Mexico was increasing, the violence was also fairly remote. Violence was low (per capita) in Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey, the three largest cities in Mexico, the seats of power and industry. The majority of the violence in the north was between organized criminal groups. One expert estimated that 80% of deaths related to the drug war are intra-criminal turf wars fighting over the routes not yet controlled by the military. The remaining casualties come from military operations and assassinations of police chiefs and journalists.¹⁹⁷

In the not so distant past, organized crime was a client of the PRI. Drug trafficking had been occurring for almost a century. Opium smuggling from Mexico into the United States became rampant in the 1920s after the United States banned the substance. By the time that Mexico made opium illegal in 1926, opium traffickers had already developed close relationships with state governors and military leaders.¹⁹⁸ Drug smugglers incorporated themselves into the patron-client system at the local level. The relationship provided tax revenue and campaign contributions to the local government while providing government and military protection to the traffickers. This somewhat symbiotic relationship broke down in 1977 as the Mexican government attempted to crack down on organized crime and corruption.¹⁹⁹ As part of its anti-drug and anti-corruption stance, the government began to prosecute government employees involved in trafficking, gradually pushing control of trafficking activities to those outside of the government's influence into the domains of organized crime.

¹⁹⁷ Personal communication with Raul Benitez Manuat, 3 Sep 2009.

¹⁹⁸ Luis Astorga, "Mexico: Drugs and Politics," in *The Political Economy of the Drug Industry*, ed. Menno Vellinga (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004), 87.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 79; Stanley A. Pimentel, "The Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico," in *Organized Crime & Democratic Governability*, ed. John Bailey and Roy Godson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 33–4.

The privatization of the Mexican organized criminal groups occurred while the U.S. drug war was picking up steam under Ronald Reagan. As cocaine became popular in the United States, Mexico became the major transportation route for cocaine as the U.S. counterdrug operations increased the risk of Caribbean routes into Florida. As the transportation route was shifting, the United States put pressure on the Columbian cartels. The Medellin Cartel was largely destroyed by the death of its leader, Pablo Escobar, in 1993. Police and military operations dismantled the Cali Cartel leadership in 1995. The demise of the Columbian cartels raised the rewards considerably for the risks of trafficking. The existing Mexican organized criminal groups grew to fill the vacuum, partly assisted by the efforts of Raul Salinas, brother of the President. Organized crime became dominant on the west and east coast (Sinaloa and Quintana Roo act as transshipment points) and along the U.S.-Mexico border (especially Tijuana and Juarez). Over time, the organizations extended their power through almost every state in Mexico corrupting many local police, judges, and elected officials. While corruption may have fueled an increased demand for democracy, increased democracy had a limited effect on decreasing corruption.

Numerous government reorganizations have been undertaken in efforts to fight corruption. In 2001, President Fox disbanded the Federal Judicial Police and replaced it with the Agencia Federal de Investigación (AFI) in the Mexican Attorney General's Office. The Attorney General's Office itself had previously undergone its own reorganization in 1996. However, after all of these reorganizations, the AFI was still considered heavily corrupt.²⁰⁰ More recently, President Calderón placed the Policía Federal Preventiva (PFP) and the AFI under one command in a Federal Police Corps. Perhaps more important was Calderon's introduction of the Oficina de Confidencia, an organization for conducting background investigations and polygraphs for officers. However, ridding the local police and judicial institutions of corruption is an immensely more difficult task. The federal police make up only 5% of Mexico's 400,000 police. Initial steps were taken to reduce corruption at the local level. Federal police conduct ballistics checks of local police weapons to check for connections with local crimes. The

²⁰⁰ Colleen W. Cook, "Mexico's Drug Cartels," (Congressional Research Service, 16 Oct 2007), 9.

government deployed federal police and federal troops against organized crime in an attempt to circumvent local corruption. In some extreme cases such as Nuevo Laredo and Nuevo Leon, the federal government conducted mass suspensions and mass firings of suspected corrupt police officers.

Unfortunately for Mexico, the crack down on corruption has not resulted in a strengthening of the rule of law in Mexico. In fact, it is difficult to tell if serious progress has been made as many “Mexicans will tell you they fear the police more than the criminals.”²⁰¹ To make the security situation worse, after mass firings of corrupt police in the 1990s, many unemployed police went to work for organized crime and their enforcer gangs (e.g., the Zetas).

The study of intrastate violence in Mexico is a complex topic. Organized crime is not a traditional insurgency. They do not seek to overthrow the government. Their aims are financial. Yet, they are not apolitical. Organized crime seeks to influence the local government through corruption and coercion to enact policies that benefit their interests. In Mexico, Organized crime seems to have more similarities to the insurgents than they have differences. Both tend to avoid violence against civilians, instead concentrating on police forces. Both have no interest in creating a new political regime, but instead want to advance their interests within the current political system.²⁰²

Despite the wide publicity, the level of violence in Mexico was relatively low over the past sixty years. Even the Chiapas Rebellion involved few casualties. Yet, the demonstrative effect of the ongoing violence between paramilitaries and Zapatistas, the military and insurgents, and the turf battles among organized crime syndicates is far greater than the low numbers would suggest. In a sense, Mexico has been inundated with wars between organizations since the early 1990s. Although there is much concern about the level of violence in Mexico, the majority of the violence is remote. While social violence did not appear to effect political participation at the national level, the states with the lowest voter turnout in 2006 were the states with the highest level of homicides

²⁰¹ Ramón Eduardo Ruiz, *On the Rim of Mexico: Encounters of the Rich and Poor* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2000), 97.

²⁰² Personal communication with Jorge Chabat, 27 Aug 2009.

per capita: Baja California Norte, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Guerrero, and Michoacán.²⁰³ The perception of increasing criminal violence with corrupt government compliance and the eruption of small-scale revolts in southern Mexico reinforced a growing assessment that the PRI had lost its ability to govern effectively. But, in order to replace the PRI, an increase in the level of democracy was necessary.

3. The Diffusion of Norms: The Emperor Has No Clothes

As discussed in Chapter II, the spread of democratic ideas provides citizens increased awareness of the benefits of democracy relative to autocracy and an improved ability to analyze the existing level of democracy. These norms highlight the inadequacy of democratic processes in hybrid regimes and underscore democracy as the rational choice. Norms have a wide variety of inputs including colonial legacy, ethno-religious identity, access to information, international influence, and religious organizations. While Spanish autocratic traditions and ethnic divergence initially constrained democratic norms in Mexico, the gradual convergence of a free press, high literacy rates, the end of the Cold War, and the pro-democracy stance of the Church highlighted the imperfections in Mexico's political regime.

The specific long-term effect of the Spanish colonial legacy on Mexico's democratic norms is somewhat ambiguous. The colonial period emphasized a central autocratic figure with decentralized autocratic execution. As one of only two Spanish viceroys (vice-king), the viceroy in Mexico had absolute authority over the northern portion of the Spanish New World. But the government had only a tenuous hold over much of the rural territory. While the authority to create law was centralized, real authority was executed through the distributed branches of the Catholic Church. As Spain entered a debt crisis, King Philip II depleted the power of the viceroy by selling political offices in Mexico, allowing local *caudillos* (strongmen) to secure their power.²⁰⁴

²⁰³ Instituto Nacional Estadística e Geografía, "Elecciones federales – presidente – lista nominal – votos – 2006 – entidad federativa," 2006; online: www.inegi.org.mx (accessed 18 Aug 2010); actual percentages: 46%: Baja Cal Norte and Guerrero; 48%: Chiapas and Chihuahua; 50%: Michoacán; 67%: DF and Yucatán; 68%: Tabasco.

²⁰⁴ Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman, *The Course of Mexican History*, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

The Spanish colonial legacy could be blamed for many of Mexico's ills, real or perceived: over-centralization of resources, the establishment of patron-client networks, the use of political office for personal gain, and a weak rule of law. However, the Spanish experience alone does not explain the resilience of these traits as several former Spanish colonies managed to work through these challenges far earlier in their political development. Lorenzo Meyer argues that the colonial legacy is more likely to have a long-term detrimental effect upon development when imposed upon a large indigenous population. "It is a long process to develop the idea of citizenship after centuries of repressing indigenous peoples."²⁰⁵ Mexico certainly qualified as a colony with a large indigenous population. Even a century after independence, in 1910, 30% of the population identified themselves as Indian from one of twenty-three different major tribes, primarily concentrated in south central Mexico. By the late 1990s, the population was only 7% Indian.²⁰⁶ Although issues of discrimination, egalitarianism, indigenous rights, and autonomy persisted, it is plausible that the decrease in ethnic divergence reduced the perceived costs of switching to democracy.

While the colonial legacy had a lasting impact on society, the Mexican Revolution changed the course of political development. The Mexican Revolution ushered in an important procedure of democracy: peaceful transfer of power through regular elections. While the results were pre-determined, the process established two societal norms in Mexico, reinforced over 80 years. First, leaders should be elected. Second, elected officials should not be able to stay past their term or run for re-election. The no re-election norm not only prevented a one-man dictatorship, but it kept opposition groups involved in politics with the elusive hope of future victory. Over time, many Mexicans would come to realize that their democracy had no clothes and it was embarrassing. Internal and external factors would culminate in the early 1990s to provide insights into the imperfections of Mexico's democracy.

²⁰⁵ Personal communication with Lorenzo Meyer, 2 Sep 2009.

²⁰⁶ The census likely under-represents the indigenous populations since it measures by language spoken instead of by heritage.

For much of the 20th century, hiding the imperfections of Mexico's democracy was easy. There was little free press in Mexico until the mid 1980s. The PRI controlled the media through distribution and revocation of broadcasting licenses, subsidies, cheap credit, tax policies, and large purchases by government agencies. Although print media required no licenses, government agencies were the primary advertisers and, in many cases, paid the bulk of a journalist's income.²⁰⁷ Perhaps the best evidence of the PRI's control was the lack of media coverage of the 1968 Tlatelolco Massacre. Into the 1980s, academics and journalists received threatening phone calls in response to articles that portrayed the government in a negative light.²⁰⁸

The turning point for Mexican media was the 1985 Mexico City earthquake. Over the previous decade, successful media outlets developed their own financial resources, providing them the flexibility to survive the loss of government funding. Independent radio and print media outlets capitalized on citizens' outrage over the government's inept disaster response after the earthquake. The competition forced other media to respond in kind, eventually leading to increased coverage of government scandals and the government's economic failures.²⁰⁹

The increasingly independent media also highlighted the growing support of the opposition. Non-PRI parties were on the rise in local elections since the early 1980s. The first non-PRI governor was elected in 1989. Over the next decade, ten more governorships fell into non-PRI hands. A similar pattern was emulated at the municipal level. These victories by the opposition parties may have convinced voters of the fairness of the national elections and encouraged citizen engagement in the political process.²¹⁰

The free press received another boost in 1994. The fraud of the 1988 elections had tainted the public's view of elections. Disgruntled that this tarnished his own

²⁰⁷ Chappell Lawson, "Building the Fourth Estate: Media Opening and Democratization in Mexico," in *Dilemmas of Political Change in Mexico*, ed. Kevin J. Middlebrook (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 2004), 375–9.

²⁰⁸ Personal communication with Luis Rubio, 25 Aug 2009.

²⁰⁹ Lawson, "Building the Fourth Estate: Media Opening and Democratization in Mexico," 391.

²¹⁰ Jonathan Hiskey and Shaun Bowler, "Local Context and Democratization in Mexico," *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 1 (2005): 64–9.

legitimacy, President Zedillo encouraged a free press.²¹¹ Independence for television media finally arrived in 1997 when Televisa's President Emilio Azcárraga, a long-time PRI supporter, died and was replaced by his all-business son.

The free press was an important factor in the 2000 election. The media coverage of Fox's 2000 landslide victory based upon exit polls and verified by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) made it nearly impossible for the PRI to stay in power without a dramatic shift towards autocracy. However, saying that Mexico has a free press is somewhat misleading. While the government no longer represses the press, organized criminal groups do. Organized criminal intimidation and violence against journalists is a major problem, especially in the northern border states. Despite a lack of investigative journalism into organized crime, the media played a key role in highlighting the flaws in Mexico's paper democracy and increased the accountability for regime policies. The increased freedom of the media permitted the spread of information such as the increase in criminal violence, the details of the peso crisis, failings in government services such as disaster response, and election fraud.

The introduction of the free press also improved citizens' capabilities to learn about other democracies and how those democracies perceived Mexican politics. As Mexico's economic crisis dragged on in the 1980s, the regime turned to international trade in an effort to correct its economic woes. In so doing, Mexico both increased the interaction of Mexicans with democratic countries and increased foreign scrutiny of Mexico's politics. Although Mexico had ignored international complaints about human rights abuses for decades, Mexico's entry into GATT in 1986 and the loosening of international investment rules brought an increased interest in politics as an element of assessing the risks of investing in Mexico. Initially, there was limited international concern about democracy. For instance, opposition complaints to the Organization of American States and the United Nations about electoral fraud during the 1988 election went nowhere. But, the collapse of communism led to a self-conscious concern of Mexico's image as a developed country. As Mexico began to join trade agreements with

²¹¹ Personal communication with Luis Rubio, 25 Aug 2009.

other developed countries, the disparity in democracy was often highlighted as a concern by their democratic partner. For example, several U.S. Congressmen were critical of Mexico's record on human rights and electoral fraud. U.S. officials informally recommended that Salinas establish a Human Rights Commission and invite foreign election observers in order to increase the prospects for the approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by the U.S. Congress.

Throughout the 1990s, Mexico strengthened ties with democratic countries, signing free trade agreements with Chile, Canada, the United States, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Columbia, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. In 1994, Mexico joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, an organization dominated by democracies. While the United States has long had close ties to Mexico's northern border states, NAFTA brought deeper penetration into Mexico. Meanwhile, the growing Mexican migrant community within the United States maintained ties with their hometowns often sending remittances and information. All of these inter-connections provided ample opportunity for the diffusion of democratic norms into Mexican society.

The final building block to consider for democratic norms in Mexico is the Catholic Church. Originally used as a tool by the Spanish to subjugate the indigenous population, the Catholic Church's influence was constrained by anti-Church laws in the 1917 Constitution, the defeat of the subsequent pro-Church Cristero Rebellion in the 1920s, and anti-church teachings in public school.²¹² While stripped of political power, the Church continued to have great moral influence over a society that was predominantly Catholic, very religious, and often superstitious. In a delayed response to the pronouncements of the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church in Mexico built several socio-economic based NGOs and began publicly endorsing democracy in the late 1980s. In one particular incident, in July, 1986, the bishops of Chihuahua threatened to suspend Mass in protest of local election fraud. Although the Vatican convinced the bishops that such a move was too extreme, the incident encouraged the Conference of

²¹² Roderic Ai Camp, *Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation*, 5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 145.

Mexican Bishops to declare their support for free elections.²¹³ Since the Catholic Church is one of the most trusted institutions in the country, it seems fair to conclude that the Church's pro-democracy stance had an important impact on increasing the demand for democracy in Mexico.²¹⁴ In recognition of the growing influence of the Church, President Salinas removed the anti-clerical laws from the constitution, established diplomatic relations with the Vatican, and legalized Catholic schools.

In sum, the timing of significant changes in the diffusion of democratic norms suggests that they were an important element to increasing demand for democracy in Mexico. For much of the twentieth century, the citizens had low expectations for democracy: regular presidential elections without the option for reelection. While Mexico's historical legacy can be blamed for many of its social ills, colonization does not fully answer why Mexico's autocratic regime lasted while the rest of Latin America democratized. But, the late 1980s brought the convergence of a rising independent media, increasing economic interaction with democracies, and advocacy of democracy by the Catholic Church. These three conditions delivered tremendous opportunity for the diffusion of norms. The timing of these three conditions preceded indicators of increasing anti-government activity from the shift away from the PRI during the 1988 elections to the outpouring of support for independent election monitoring during the 1994 election. Even as the economic, security, and diffusion factors converged to create an upsurge in the demand for democracy, demand alone had little influence on the actual level of democracy. While the citizens were able to mobilize in order to monitor the 1994 elections, it was the change in preferences of the suppliers of democracy that truly changed the nature of Mexico's democracy.

C. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: SUPPLYING DEMOCRACY

As mentioned in Chapter II, supply of democracy is a measure of the action, or inaction, taken by political institutions in support of or against the implementation,

²¹³ Vikram Chand, *Mexico's Political Awakening* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 193.

²¹⁴ Camp, *Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation*, 58.

maintenance, or removal of democratic processes. The suppliers of democracy are largely influenced by the same economic, security, and informational factors that influence demand. At times, suppliers may be influenced directly by changes in demand though a change in demand does not dictate a change in supply. The factors that influenced demand do not have the same magnitude or even the same direction of influence upon supply.

A variety of political institutions were responsible for delivering democracy to Mexico. The acquiescence of the military, the support of the business community, the activism of NGOs, and the decisions of political parties were all-important elements in permitting the growth and sustenance of democracy. The most critical element, though, appears to be the regime itself. The ruling party made the key electoral laws that allowed the opposition to legally take power.

1. Mexico's Military

As discussed in Chapter II, the factors discussed above which influence civil society also influences the military's decision to remain apolitical or to allow civilian control of the military. Mexico does not have civilian control of the military which makes the apolitical nature of the Mexican military in the latter twentieth century seem too good to be true. Seemingly, the military acknowledged the importance of the ideals of the revolution and willingly initiated its own withdrawal from politics. It drastically cut its own budget and later extricated itself from the executive for the sake of the people.

As the Mexican Revolution came to a close and the new government took control in 1917, more than half of the country's paltry budget was dedicated to the new army. Within fifteen years (1933), the military budget was reduced to a quarter of government expenses. By the 1950s, it was consistently in the single digits. Yet, the reduction was less from funding cuts to the military than it was from an expansion of the overall budget. The military expenditures in 1963 were essentially the same as those in 1933.²¹⁵

²¹⁵ James Wallace Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change since 1910*, 2d ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 102–3.

Nearly all Mexican presidents prior to 1946 were generals or former generals. But, it was not a traditional military regime. The military-presidents of the early 20th century were not professional soldiers. The conservative Mexican Army of the 19th century was dissolved with the Teoloyucan Treaties of 1914 after Huerta's counter-revolutionary regime fizzled. Post-revolutionary presidents were revolutionary generals. They were not 30-year veterans. They had risen to rank during combat in the Mexican Revolution or the Cristero Rebellion.

During his term in the 1940s, President Ávila Camacho, the last military president, eased the transition to civilian rule by securing several benefits for the military: national headquarters and hospital, military engineering and medical schools, and schools for military children. His successor, President Alemán, founded the Bank of the Army and Navy and created large military housing areas. Having provided the military benefits, Alemán and his successor, President Ruiz Cortines, began limiting the military's political power by naming fewer military personnel to their cabinet.²¹⁶ Even so, the Mexican military did not go quietly. A coup against President Alemán in the 1940s was averted by the intercession of former military-president Cardenas. A general ran as an opposition candidate during the 1952 presidential elections. After the civilian Ruiz Cortines won, coup worries convinced him to eject several old generals out of the PRI and force some generals to retire.²¹⁷

While the military gave up regulatory authority, it retained its core benefits: a stable military budget and de facto autonomy. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy continued to be military officers that answered only to the President. The military had its own bank and operated its own military-industrial complex. The congressional committee that put together the military budget was stacked with former military.²¹⁸ There was little oversight of army spending. Out-sourced services were sometimes paid for in cash or with personal checks. In a sense, there was

²¹⁶ Enrique Krauze, *Mexico: Biography of Power: A History of Modern Mexico, 1810–1996*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: HarperCollinsPublishers, 1997), 512, 70.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 611.

²¹⁸ Personal communication with Anthanasios Hristoulas, 1 Sep 2009.

an unwritten civil-military agreement: military will not get involved in political life and in return the civil authorities will allow the military to do whatever it wants.²¹⁹

One of the most interesting aspects of the military is its apolitical nature: a rare commodity in Latin America. The military received many benefits from the PRI ruling regime. But, as the PRI patron lost power, the military took no action to restore it. There are a variety of reasons why. The Mexican Army was not a traditional client of the PRI. The army controlled most of the government oversight mechanisms giving it substantial independence from the PRI and the President. This independent power provided a lack of need to intervene in politics. Over 80 years, a tradition of non-intervention evolved. It was reinforced by Mexico's professional military education emphasis on the defense of the constitution and submission to authority.²²⁰

In addition to the military's independence, tensions between the military and PRI policies had been growing for over a decade. During the 1988 presidential elections, many senior military officials supported Cardenas' nationalist revolutionary ideals over Salinas, the technocrat. Allegedly, Salinas bought back the military dissenters with pay raises.²²¹ At the end of his *sesenio*, Salinas would put the Mexican Army into a situation that tarnished the Army's image: Chiapas. The Army was still sensitive about its image after the 1968 student massacre. Salinas, under informal pressure from the United States, established a Human Rights Commission in 1990. Human rights violations in Chiapas were widely publicized as part of the 25-year anniversary of the 1969 student massacre. At one point, the army was on the verge of capturing sub-commander Marcos, the leader of the Zapatistas, when President Salinas scrubbed the mission in order to increase the potential for peace negotiations. The army was angry that it lost face for the failure to capture Marcos.²²²

Relations between the military and the PRI further deteriorated under Zedillo. The military prized their ability to police their own; civilian courts do not have

²¹⁹ Personal communication with Anthanasios Hristoulas, 1 Sep 2009.

²²⁰ Camp, *Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation*, 140.

²²¹ Personal communication with Benitez Manuat, 3 Sep 2009.

²²² Ibid..

jurisdiction over military members. The military was dismayed by the very public arrests in the late 1990s of Drug czar General Jesus Gutierrez-Rebollo and three other generals for links to drug traffickers. The broad publicity made it akin to an attack on the Army's honor. Additionally, it raised suspicions that the arrests were selective and politically motivated.²²³ An attempt by the administration, though denied by the Supreme Court, to move human rights violations to civilian court further chafed the military.

Surprisingly, increasing social violence in the early 1990s did not appear to encourage a preference for autocratization in the Army. While Chiapas and the rise of organized crime were considered threats to national security, the level of violence did not pose a direct threat to overthrow of the state. The military partly blamed the PRI regime for its failure to secure victory in Chiapas and may have reduced the military's opposition to regime change. Arguably, the evolution of professional norms was also an important contributor to the military's non-intervention.

2. Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)

As discussed in Chapter II, NGOs have neither the force of the military to implement democracy nor the authority to adopt changes to the constitution. However, NGOs do have the ability to monitor the freeness of elections and provide increased accountability of the other suppliers of democracy. For much of the twentieth century, union-based NGOs in Mexico were incentivized to maintain the autocratic system. The 1980s brought the rise of non-union NGOs and the organization of the business community; both interested in political reform.

For decades, the patron-client system kept power away from business leaders and in the hands of labor unions and farmer organizations. Instead of being champions of democracy, the unions were tools of the state. The government co-opted two national unions, the Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM) and the National Confederation of Peasants (CNC), into supporting the government. The PRI rewarded the support of the CTM with labor reforms and wage increases while the CNC received land redistributions,

²²³ Personal communication with Jorge Chabat, 27 Aug 2009.

ejidos (communal lands), debt forgiveness, electricity, crop subsidies and price supports. In exchange for these perks, the unions granted votes and provided workers to be driven to political rallies, hold up issued banners and yell instructed cheers.²²⁴ Defections from the national unions were dealt with a combination of repression and incentives to counter strikes and coerce reintegration.

Keeping the unions happy was easy during and after World War II. As U.S. factories converted to producing war materials, Mexico began an Import-Substitution Industrialization (ISI) program that provided ample support to the labor market. Mexican agricultural workers flooded the U.S. market as U.S. laborers were pulled from the fields to fill the military ranks. As the U.S. economy recovered post-war, the agricultural labor market tightened and the ISI companies were suddenly less competitive. But, subsidies from oil revenues were able to protect Mexican businesses temporarily. However, high oil prices encouraged overspending and an overextension of debt that could not be sustained. The economy had become a house of cards that relied upon high oil prices to stay upright.

A combination of economic crisis, trade liberalization, and inflation led to the demise of state-labor patronage. Much of the patronage desired by the CTM and the CNC was contrary to the free-market principles adopted by Presidents de la Madrid and Salinas.²²⁵ The union's reliability as a vote-provider was weakened by the bad economy. The combination of wage controls and inflation was especially painful for workers, straining their confidence in the CTM's ability to defend their interests. On the flipside, the reduction in the CTM's ability to guarantee votes made them a less attractive client for the state's shrinking resources.

Trade liberalization had an equally devastating effect on the CNC. The economic importance of the agricultural community was marginalized. The turmoil of the 1980s caused a dramatic restructuring of the Mexican economy. Oil and agriculture were replaced with the manufacturing of goods such as cars, chemicals, and electronics. As its

²²⁴ Krauze, *Mexico: Biography of Power: A History of Modern Mexico, 1810–1996*, 613.

²²⁵ Katrina Burgess, "Mexican Labor at a Crossroads," in *Mexico's Politics and Society in Transition*, ed. Joseph Tulchin and Andrew Selee (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 81.

economic contribution was waning, the farming community was facing disaster. Coffee prices collapsed 50% in 1989, crushing the already poor states of Chiapas and Guerrero. Prices remained low through May 1994.²²⁶ In preparation for NAFTA, price supports for most agricultural products were removed in 1990. In the midst of these shocks, Salinas announced the end of land distribution and the privatization of the communal *ejidos*. As NAFTA officially took effect in January 1994, price supports were removed for corn and beans, Mexico's top two crops. The CNC's benefits for sustaining the autocracy evaporated.

The non-union NGO movement grew dramatically in the 1980s. With the attention of the Catholic Church and increasing interest of international NGOs, a local NGO community materialized primarily around the issue of human rights, forming NGO alliances such as the Forum for Mutual Support, Convergence of Civic Organizations for Democracy, and the Mexican Action Network Against Free Trade.²²⁷ NGOs became alternative channels for voicing dissent outside of the traditional closed political system. The local reputation of many NGOs got a boost from their performance in the 1985 Mexico City earthquake. NGO funding and manpower jumped after the 1994 Chiapas uprising. During the same year, NGOs formed election-monitoring groups into a loose coalition called the Civic Alliance to observe the presidential elections.

3. Political Parties

Political parties are important to democracy for two reasons. First, the opposition provides a limited constraining effect upon the ruling regime's policy options. Second, political parties act as the pinnacles of group interests. Issues of security, economy, and norms are important drivers for shaping mobilization and policy preferences of the incumbent and opposition parties.

²²⁶ International Coffee Organization, "ICO Indicator Prices," http://www.ico.org/new_historical.asp (accessed 1 Mar 2010).

²²⁷ Alberto Olvera, "Civil Society in Mexico at Century's End," in *Dilemmas of Political Change in Mexico*, ed. Kevin J. Middlebrook (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 2004), 415–8.

Although much power in Mexico was centralized, the President was not all-powerful. The PRI had some influence over presidential decisions: selection of the next president, hiring and firing of governors, party president, and cabinet members. The PRI portrayed itself as the embodiment of the ideals of the Revolution and the 1917 Constitution. The PRI made itself appear one with the state, choosing the colors of the Mexican flag as its logo. References to the “Revolution” were an important part of political rhetoric, providing a sense of legitimacy to the party. The implication being that a vote against the PRI was an abandonment of Revolutionary ideals. But by the 1980s, the term began to hold little tangible meaning for younger voters and fell into disuse among the de la Madrid and Salinas administrations.²²⁸

For many decades, opposition to the PRI was limited. During the 1940s, Mexico, like many other countries of the era, banned fascist and communist parties. However, Mexico also used the reform as a pretext to raise party registration thresholds, effectively limiting significant national political participation for the next 30 years to two parties: the PRI and the PAN. The National Action Party (PAN), a conservative party, formed in 1939 but had little serious political power until 1989. Support for the PAN started to grow, especially in the industrialized northern states, in 1978 when the PAN decided to be more inclusive and less ideologically bound in order to win more votes.²²⁹ The rise of the PAN was less about the PAN than it was about frustration with the PRI. The industrial north flocked to the PAN during the economic disaster of the 1980s. By the 1990s, the PRI was losing control. It was helpless to prevent rising crime, economic crisis and was losing its ability to reward and punish its clients.

The year 1988 marked the beginning of the end for the PRI. The PRI had experienced party splits before. Presidential hopefuls in 1940, 1946, and 1952, frustrated after being passed over as the PRI presidential nominee, defected to create their own party. But, 1988 was different. There was a deep ideological split. The PRI was no longer the democratic socialism party of the left, but had become a moderate party

²²⁸ Personal communication with Rogelio Hernández, 3 Sep 2009.

²²⁹ Hernandez-Rodriguez, "The Renovation of Old Institutions: State Governors and the Political Transition in Mexico": 97–8.

adopting the free market principles of the PAN. The left wing of the PRI defected and created the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), drawing support from the rural south, the far left, and intellectuals in Mexico City. The PRI was intact and still competitive, but suffering from internal disarray and a loss of party identity without a distinctive ideology.²³⁰ The development of a third major party made coalition politics the de facto method for electoral victory. In 2000, PRD voters crossed over to vote for the PAN as polls suggested that Fox had the best chance for victory against the PRI. The fracture of the PRI was an important factor in the PAN 2000 victory.

Today, the PAN, PRD, and PRI are very powerful organizations. The parties determine the presidential candidates and have a significant hand in the design of electoral reforms. Party power is heavily concentrated. Since Mexico has no primary system and few ideological differentiations between the PRI and its two opponents, there is a significant lack of party loyalty and little incentive to register with a particular party. For instance, the PRD candidate almost won the 2006 presidential election. Yet, the voting in 2009 showed that the PRD had essentially been deserted. Even so, each of the three major parties has a significant stake in maintaining the current political system in order to receive substantial subsidies from the government.

4. The Ruling Regime: Gradually Increasing the Degrees of Democracy

From Chapter II, the ruling regime is anticipated to adopt electoral changes when it is in its best interests and the interests of the regime's key supporters. Mexico had six periods of major political reform. The first period is the establishment of the 1917 Constitution during the Mexican Revolution. Five major revisions to the constitution began in 1977 with the modification of the legislature from a pure majoritarian system into a hybrid majoritarian-proportional representation system. Reforms in the 1980s revised the method of calculating seats within the hybrid system, enabling the opposition to finally dislodge the super majority of the PRI. In the early 1990s, the IFE was created to minimize fraud. However, the IFE was not independent of the executive branch until

²³⁰ Regelio Hernández, "The Partido Revolucionario Institucional," in *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections*, ed. Mónica Serrano (London: Regelio Hernández, "The Partido Revolucionario Institucional," 1998), 82–5.

the reforms of 1996. The PAN victory in 2000 was not a change in the level of democracy. But, because the PAN's victory indicated that the previous electoral reforms finally created a democratic election, 2000 is widely hailed as an important milestone in Mexico's democratic history.

a. A Rotating Dictatorship: Autocratic Mexico 1917–1976

The Revolution installed what appeared to be democratic processes into Mexican politics. But, democracy was limited. Elections existed, but they had little competition. Presidential succession was determined largely by the outgoing President. Though Mexico excluded few groups from political participation, elections were not really free. As the holder of executive and legislative power, the PRI coerced and incentivized loyalty to the party through the distribution of benefits and resources. The PRI created what some call a hegemonic party: “collusive pacts among ruling party politicians to divide the spoils of office among themselves.”²³¹ The very purpose of creating the PRI was collusion to prevent personal power grabs.

Few limits existed on Presidential authority beyond the no-reelection clause. Commitment to the clause was strongly reinforced by President Obregón's assassination when he attempted to serve a second term in 1928. The President's power was constrained neither by the legislature nor the Constitution. As one president explained, “The Constitution is not our law but our shield and our flag.”²³² However, the Presidency was constrained by the PRI senior leaders. Within this constraint, the President could fire elected officials at will and name his replacement through the *dedazo* (the fingering) process.²³³ Each president benefitted from the continuation of autocracy. Even though they would have to end their term after six years, each president named his

²³¹ Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*, 79.

²³² Adolfo López Mateos, Mexican Minister of Labor, February 5, 1957, address delivered at the centenary of the Liberal Constitution of 1857 as quoted in Krauze, *Mexico: Biography of Power: A History of Modern Mexico, 1810–1996*, 631.

²³³ Domínguez and McCann, *Democratizing Mexico: Public Opinion and Electoral Choices*, 15.

successor. Because of this process, the next president was beholden to the previous one and would ensure that his predecessor was treated properly or, at least, not prosecuted for his corrupt practices.

Arguably, the later major political reforms were made possible by the foundational reforms of 1946 and 1964. In reaction to the electoral violence of the 1940 presidential election between two generals, President Manuel Ávila Camacho centralized the management of elections and polling places under government control in 1946. Prior to this, citizens literally fought to control polling places. The change reduced election violence and set the foundation for other reforms to build upon.²³⁴ However, Ávila is perhaps more famous for his designation of the first civilian President as his successor. Two factors appear to have influenced Ávila's tradeoff between democratic and autocratic practices. First, Ávila had taken measures to secure the future needs of the military with the provision of facilities, housing, and military bank. The military was essentially autonomous and had limited future benefit for controlling the presidency. Secondly, a world war had ended. Fascist military regimes across the world were being dismantled. Mexico was initially pro-German. But, after U-boats sank two Mexican oil tankers, Mexico declared war on Germany and banned the fascist party. It is possible that improving the country's image was a factor in determining Ávila's decision to select a civilian. Although the extreme fascist elements within Mexico were not in positions of power, Mexico's government did have some similar traits to fascist regimes: one-party rule, a nationalist ideology, a military dictator (although rotating), partially anti-clerical, and tight control of the economy.

The reform of 1964 introduced the concept of proportional representation to Mexico. It was the first of several iterations. The reforms were approved by President Adolfo López Mateos to avert political crisis. Upset by evidence of fraud during the 1958 presidential election, the PAN threatened to walk out of the government and transform Mexican politics from a de facto to an actual one-party state. In a conciliatory

²³⁴ Federico Estévez, e-mail to author, 8 Sep 2009; see also Krauze, *Mexico: Biography of Power: A History of Modern Mexico, 1810–1996*, 560–1.

measure, the regime introduced limited proportional representation with low thresholds (two and a half percent of the national vote). The law guaranteed the PAN seats without the need to win a contested election.

b. Political Reform

The first political reform to significantly affect the level of democracy was motivated by political crisis. The PAN decided not to (or failed to decide to) nominate a candidate for the 1976 presidential elections. The result was an unopposed election for the sole PRI candidate. With only one candidate running, it looked like a Soviet election. In an effort to avoid a similar embarrassment in the future, the threshold for party registration was significantly reduced, permitting the development of several new small opposition parties. The regime also took the opportunity to entice rebel leaders out of the field.²³⁵ By 1977, armed revolt had dragged on for more than a decade. Domestic and international criticisms of Mexico's repression were increasing. The Army, worried about its tarnished image after the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre, wanted out of the repression business. For the regime, the costs of maintaining one party rule were beginning to outweigh the benefits. The regime specifically designed the reform to appeal to the rebels, including the lifting of the ban on communist parties and the revision to the calculation of proportional representation which would guarantee that even small parties would have seats in the legislature.

Despite this modification, the PRI maintained a super-majority in the legislature which allowed them to modify the constitution at will. They did. One expert estimated the number of constitutional changes at 400.²³⁶ A combination of political reforms in the 1980s ended the PRI's super majority status, largely driven by the economic crisis. The PRI, worried about social unrest and fraud protests, relaxed controls on local elections.²³⁷ Since the economic crisis had created widespread

²³⁵ Andreas Schedler, *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2006); Jose Luis Velasco, *Insurgency [Sic], Authoritarianism, and Drug Trafficking in Mexico's "Democratization,"* Latin American Studies (New York: Routledge, 2005).

²³⁶ Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*, 15.

²³⁷ Chand, *Mexico's Political Awakening*, 33.

disenchantment with the PRI, the new local election rules permitted increasing local PAN victories in the 1980s. Worried about opposition gains in the local and regional elections, Madrid enacted a new electoral law that toughened party registration requirements and ensured that the leading party had dominating control of Congress—ensuring that the leading party had at least 50%, but no more than 70% of the seats.²³⁸ The reform had changed the rules just enough to end the PRI's super majority during the 1988 elections and gave the PAN its first governorship in 1989.

While the PRI lost the super majority in 1988, they retained the Presidency. However, widespread fraud, a little too obvious, was used to elect Salinas. The Salinas presidency was a time of growing uncertainty of the future. The potential consequences of another major fraud were potentially dire. People perceived that "Chiapas was an example of what might happen if the government did not change."²³⁹ The Colosio assassination only increased the uncertainty, providing a sense that "anything could happen."²⁴⁰ In response, Salinas created the IFE to oversee elections. Like its predecessor, the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC), the IFE was placed under the authority of the executive branch's Ministry of the Interior. The Ministry had complete authority over party registration and chairmanship of the electoral oversight body (FEC/IFE). Reforms to the FEC/IFE were a façade that left control with the PRI. The introduction of independent Votes Councillors into the IFE was also suspect since they were executive appointees.²⁴¹ Despite the imperfections of the IFE, the active involvement of the Civic Alliance to monitor the 1994 elections appeared to result in an election that was largely free, though not truly competitive since Salinas had chosen Zedillo as his successor.

²³⁸ José Crespo, "Party Competition in Mexico: Evolution and Prospects," in *Dilemmas of Political Change in Mexico* ed. Kevin J. Middlebrook (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 2004), 69–70; Alonso Lujambio, "Mexican Parties and Congressional Politics in the 1990s," in *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections*, ed. Mónica Serrano (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998), 173.

²³⁹ Personal communication with Jorge Chabat, 27 Aug 2009.

²⁴⁰ Personal communication with Andreas Schedler, 27 Aug 2009.

²⁴¹ Jean-François Prud'home, "The Instituto Federal Electoral (Ife): Building an Impartial Electoral Authority," in *Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections*, ed. Mónica Serrano (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, 1998), 142–9.

Truly free and competitive elections were crafted by a group of academics and politicians and signed by President Zedillo in 1996. In a twist of fate, Zedillo's selection as the PRI candidate was an accident. Electoral rules prevented presidential candidates from holding government office within 6 months of the election. Colosio was assassinated with less than six months prior to the election, limiting the PRI's pool of potential replacements. The only person available within Salinas' inner circle was Ernesto Zedillo; an economist that had left the Secretary of Education in order to be Colosio's campaign manager. Zedillo was a professional technocrat that rose through the ranks of the central bank. Some suggest that democratic reforms were a key part of Zedillo's agenda.²⁴² For example, his first law granted the independence of the Supreme Court. Zedillo selected a PRI party leader, Santiago Oñate, who was conducive to political reform negotiations with the PRD and PAN.²⁴³ In 1996, he implemented the recommendations of the Chapultepec Negotiations and made the IFE autonomous from both the executive branch and the PRI. The 1997 loss of the PRI majority in the Senate and the mayor's seat in Mexico City indicated that the elections had become truly free and competitive. In the run-up to the 2000 election, Zedillo removed himself from the presidential nomination process, moving the responsibility to the party.

By 2000, the dice had already been thrown. There were no significant electoral reforms between 1996 and the 2000 election. Within this study's definition of democracy, a second order transfer in power is not a required threshold for a country to become a democracy. However, in Mexico's case, the transfer of power was necessary to bring about freer elections. The election of PAN's Vicente Fox was a clear indicator of the monumental changes in Mexico's electoral laws. Although the electoral groundwork had been laid down for several years, the election of the opposition was necessary in this case in order to sever the coercive hold that the PRI had over several labor and peasant organizations. Fox's election dispelled most doubts that Mexico had finally achieved a democratic, though imperfect, government.

²⁴² Personal communication with Luis Rubio, 25 Aug 2009.

²⁴³ Hernández, "The Partido Revolucionario Institucional," 89.

D. SUMMARY

Mexico was a partial autocracy throughout much of the 19th century. The recurring violence combined with an economic crisis drove the country into full dictatorship in 1880. After thirty years, the benefits of maintaining Diaz's dictatorship decreased, leading to a power struggle. The initial revolutionary government was another partial autocracy. But, an additional decade of rebellion pushed the government to adopt an autocracy with minimal democratic processes. Election violence in 1940 led to federal control of the electoral system in 1946. The 1970s guerrilla wars and the 1980s economic crisis pushed Mexico to incrementally adopt more democratic processes.

Demand for democracy in Mexico exploded as a perfect storm of three powerful forces hit during the 1980s. First, Mexico suffered two economic crises within a dozen years. The crises and the state's response severed the traditional PRI patron-client relationships shifting economic power from the unions to business leaders. Second, rising crime, the Zapatista uprising and political assassinations fueled the perception that social upheaval was imminent. As it did in 1977, the PRI allowed political reform in order to avert the spread of uprisings. Third, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of autocracies across the globe, increased literacy, and foreign pressure from new free trade partners encouraged the adoption of democratic norms and highlighted the lack of democratic processes in Mexico. Demand for democracy in the 1980s was frustrated by widespread electoral fraud during the 1988 presidential election that, in turn, resulted in the pivotal 1993-1996 electoral reforms. The effects of these reforms were proven in the 1997 legislative elections and the 2000 presidential election with major victories for the opposition.

Demand for democracy in Mexico was driven by economic crisis and the diffusion of democratic norms. The suppliers of democracy responded to different mechanisms. The regime and the PRI adopted electoral reforms in response to violence in 1946, 1977, 1994, and 1997. Outrage to the obvious 1988 election fraud sparked NGOs to monitor the 1994 elections and the regime and the PRI to adopt the 1993 electoral reforms.

A return to the autocratic regime of 1976 or even the electoral autocracy of 1993 seems unlikely. Democratic norms have spread deep roots in Mexico, slowly cultivated over 30 years. The political parties, NGOs, and business community have a stake in maintaining a democratic system. Currently, the military has little to benefit from a return to autocracy. However, Mexico's democracy is far from perfect. The Mexican Constitution, as designed, does not optimize the democratic process. The limited proportional representation keeps small parties in the political system without providing them any serious influence. The presidential system is not well constrained by the legislature. Although a federal system, the centralized nature of tax revenue, services and resource distribution provides only limited autonomy to state and local governments. The return of clientalism or a turn towards populism is a concern. Although most Mexicans believe that democracy is the best form of government, they are not satisfied with the performance of democracy, likely because many Mexicans view equality as a critical part of democracy.²⁴⁴

At the sub-national level, many states under PRI control (notably in the south) continue to be "authoritarian enclaves" with episodes of fraud, intimidation, and bossism.²⁴⁵ Although many of the northern states have improved their electoral systems through voter registries and electoral oversight, several of the local governments are influenced by organized crime. In some rare cases, individuals with family connections to organized crime are in local office: Michoacan (La Familia Michoacan), Nuevo Leon, and San Fernando in Chihuahua. But most criminal groups exercise less direct influence. Organized crime's money and influence give them significant de facto control at the local level, especially in regards to nominations of police chiefs. While there are certainly clusters of good governance, many local governments are either small town dictatorships or a mafia-dominated democracy.

²⁴⁴ Camp, *Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation*, 72.

²⁴⁵ Chappell H. Lawson, "Mexico's Unfinished Transition: Democratization and Authoritarian Enclaves in Mexico," *Mexican Studies* 16, no. 2 (2000): 277, 86.

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V. PHILIPPINES: A RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY OVERCOMES INSURGENCY AND POVERTY

In late February 1986, the Philippines became a democracy overnight as dictator Ferdinand Marcos stepped down in the face of the People Power Revolution; handing power over to a democratic government. The Philippines case is explored because this substantial increase in the level of democracy occurred during a period of high levels of intrastate violence and a relatively low level of income and industrialization; all theoretical obstacles to democratization. The Philippines case is also interesting in that democracy was not a return to the status quo ante; the post-Marcos regime had a significantly higher level of democracy than the pre-Marcos regime.

In this chapter, the analytical model from Chapter II is used to analyze the determinants of the Philippines' level of democracy since independence in 1946. Specifically, this chapter seeks to identify those factors that enabled the Philippines, despite significant barriers, to achieve a high level of democracy. The existing literature and the quantitative results from Chapter III both indicate that below average income combined with two major insurgencies should have been considerable obstacles to the achievement of a high level of democracy.

As discussed in Chapter II, the analytical model views the level of democracy as the result of the interaction of actors. The model can be viewed as a supply and demand function. Actors, influenced by structural factors, determine the supply and demand components. The resulting supply-demand equilibrium is the level of democracy. In the context of this study, the level of democracy is a measure of the process to select representatives through free, competitive elections, with open participation, and within the un-manipulated constraints of electoral rules. Demand for democracy in a country is a rational choice of individuals and groups within a society. This study examines the effect that the economy, the security situation, and the diffusion of democratic norms have on citizens' demand for democracy. We expect increasing internal security, economic income, economic industrialization, and the diffusion of norms to increase the

demand for democracy within a country. Conversely, we expect high or increasing intrastate violence, low-income, and low industrialization to have a deterrent or regressive effect upon democratization.

On the other side of the demand-supply equation, institutions make rational choice decisions to dedicate time, resources, and prestige to supplying (or limiting the supply of) democracy. The institutions with the most impact on democracy include the military, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), political parties, and the ruling regime. These institutions are affected by the same economic, security, and diffusion factors that shape the citizens' demand for democracy, though not necessarily in the same manner or to the same magnitude.

This chapter begins with a brief background on the political history of the Philippines. The citizens' demand for democracy is presented in three parts: the economy, security, and norms. The institution's supply of democracy is broken into four sections: the military, NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime. The section on the ruling regime is discussed in three separate time periods: pre-martial law, martial law, and post-People Power.

The Philippines democratized despite relatively low levels of national income and industrialization. Significant regional variations in income and industrialization enabled the development of democratic ideals in urban areas as modern technology and government policy changed the structure of agricultural society making the country more conducive to democracy. Industry and income boomed in the major metropolitan areas, especially in Manila, Cebu, and Davao. These cities created regional industrial hubs ensuring that the democratic effects of industrialization and income were spread to each of the three major island chains. Industrialization led to reduced land dependence for the wealthy, increased size of the middle-income tier, and high levels of literacy. The industrialization of the 1970s and 1980s, combined with the 1980s economic crisis, is a plausible explanatory cause for the increase in demand for democracy in the Philippines, encapsulated by the People Power Revolution of 1986.

Increasing intrastate violence from 1969 to 1971 led to an increasing acceptance among citizens of a reduction in the level of democracy as a tradeoff for increased security. Since then, violence had little effect on changes in democracy. Philippine democracy survived prolonged insurgency with little support for a reduction in democracy as a method of resolving the conflict. This stance is likely due to the lack of insurgent targeting of civilians combined with the geographical remoteness of the insurgencies. Further, the development of democratic norms also played a role. While pre-colonial and colonial autocratic traditions and ethnic divergence may have initially constrained democratic norms, the early establishment of electoral norms, increasing education, and the significant influence of information technology played key roles in building, mobilizing, and sustaining interest in democracy. The capability for the diffusion of norms developed through increasing social interconnectedness, higher university education rates, increasing interconnectedness with foreign democracies, and the rise of an independent media. While increasing democratic norms may explain the increased demand for democracy in the Philippines, it is not a sufficient explanation for the timing of the People Power revolt.

The dramatic increase in the level of democracy in 1986 was the result of key actors. The economic crisis and the government assassination of Benigno Aquino mobilized the masses, the business community, and the Catholic Church to protest against Marcos. A split in the military comprised Marcos' ability to use repression to maintain the autocracy. Finally, the notification that the United States would no longer support his rule left Marcos little choice but to abdicate his position.

A. BRIEF HISTORY OF PHILIPPINE POLITICS

Spain added the Philippines to its colonial empire in 1565. The colonization of the Philippines was not as thorough as other colonies. The Spanish did not have enough presence to dominate the entire 7,000-island archipelago. Of the eleven largest islands where the majority of the population resided, Spanish forces were concentrated in the northern islands (Luzon) with some influence on the central islands (Visayas) and little influence in the southern islands (Mindanao) (see Figure 15). An insurgency against

Spanish rule erupted in 1896. But, Spanish rule was not toppled until U.S. naval forces under Commodore Dewey annihilated the Spanish fleet in Manila Harbor in May 1898. Although U.S. forces would not capture Manila from the Spanish until 13 August, on 12 June 1898, Emilio Aguinaldo led a declaration of Philippine independence from Spain. But, Aguinaldo had a critical problem: the liberating army was not ready for an independent Philippines.



Figure 15. Map of Philippines with Region Political Boundaries

As part of the December 10, 1898 Treaty of Paris that ended the Spanish-American War, Spain ceded control of the Philippines to the United States. Disillusioned by the lack of independence, the insurgency that began under Spanish rule revived in February 1899. The rebellion was not a mass nationalist uprising, but an attempt by

economic elites to extend their political status to rule the country.²⁴⁶ The rebellion was largely a Luzon affair. U.S. forces quickly subdued most of the Visayas and signed a treaty, though fleeting, with Mindanao.

Aguinaldo's vision and even the structure of the insurgent army provided insights into the future of Philippine politics. The framework of Aguinaldo's new government was designed to perpetuate the power of the landowner elites who had dominated the economy under later Spanish rule. The staff for the insurgent army was not selected based on merit, but upon personalities and social relationships.²⁴⁷ As the chances for rebel victory faded, many elites found it more advantageous to support the U.S. in order to ensure their prominent status post-conflict.²⁴⁸ By collaborating with the Americans, the elites were rewarded with political power. Ironically, the resulting civilian government under the Americans looked very similar to the 1898 Aguinaldo government.

The Americans introduced an independent judiciary, political elections, and a professional civil service. The Americans were quick to involve Filipinos into the government, hiring them into the civil service and permitting them to hold political office including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The first elections (for municipal office) were held in 1901. The United States gradually handed over increased control of the government, culminating in the Philippines' status as a commonwealth in 1935 and independence in 1946.

Upon independence, the Philippines became a partial democracy with a two-party system that acted like one-party rule. Elections were neither free nor competitive, marred by mafia-style coercion and violence. In order to save the Philippines from itself, President Marcos turned the Philippines into a dictatorship through the declaration of martial law in 1971. Marcos' rule was accompanied by two insurgencies and an economic crisis, which led to Marcos' downfall and the return of democracy through the

²⁴⁶ Glenn Anthony May, *Battle for Batangas: A Philippine Province at War* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1993), 70.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 168.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 203.

People Power Revolution of 1986. The factors that led to the rise of People Power and an increased demand for democracy are discussed in the next section.

B. SHAPING INTERESTS: DEMAND FOR DEMOCRACY

This section analyzes the change in demand for democracy in the Philippine citizens in three parts. The first part addresses various aspects of the Philippine economy: income, industrialization, and economic crisis. The second part addresses the effect of insurgency violence. The final part analyzes the diffusion of democratic norms.

1. The Rise and Fall of Clientalism in the Philippines: Income, Industrialization, and Crisis

From the discussion in Chapter II, we expect that economic income and economic development will have a positive impact on the level of democracy. Growing income should lead to the development of a middle class. As citizens achieve middle class status, they have the ability to divert their resources from life sustainment to social interactions and political activism. Economic development leads to demand for democracy through increased literacy, industrialization, and the formation of unions and professional organizations, which can be critical elements to the growth of democracy. Surprisingly, the Philippines had significant levels of development and income, though highly concentrated in a few locations. The findings from this section suggest that while increasing levels of localized income and development, especially in the capital region, may have spread democratic ideals, those ideals did not lead to significant pro-democracy action until combined with a severe economic crisis.

Over the past fifty years, Philippines gradually migrated from a low-income to a lower-middle income economy. The economy crested over \$2000 GDP per capita in 1959 and \$3000 in 1976 (and again in 1988 after recovering from the economic crisis of the 1980s). Since then, the economy slowly inched its way towards \$4000. But as of 2008, 30% of the population continued to live below the poverty line (a ten point improvement from 1987). By 1960, 30% of the population was classified as living in the middle-income tier. Of course, this varied greatly by region with a high of 47% in the

NCR to a low of 11% in the Cagayan Valley.²⁴⁹ By 1985, the middle-tier income earners rose to about 46% of the national population.²⁵⁰ This substantial increase in the middle-income tier during a time of great population growth suggests that the development of a large middle class is a plausible explanation for increased demand for democracy in the Philippines. Within the National Capital Region (NCR), the bristling mega-malls suggest that there is an ample middle class. But, the experience in the NCR is misleading as the poverty rate there is only five percent. With the exception of the Bicol Region, Luzon's regions are the country's leaders in the least amount of poverty. About 40% of GDP comes from a hub of services and industry concentrated in the NCR and the surrounding region in southwest Luzon. The majority of people under the poverty line live in the rural areas, working in agriculture.²⁵¹ The disparity in income and poverty levels in the Philippines suggests that income has contributed to the growth of democracy in the large metropolitan areas, but would imply a lack of democratic ideals in the rural areas. To get more insight, we next analyze the economic development of the Philippines.

The Spanish did little to develop the Philippines economically, using only Manila as a transit point for goods between New Spain and China. Manila's status as a trading port boomed during the 19th century as Britain and the United States became major purchasers of Philippine sugar. The boom brought the Philippines its first taste of industry through the development of sugar mills while creating an increased demand for land and a significant transition to cash crops. The adoption of cash crops led to the rise of a moderately wealthy class of non-Spaniards that became literate and well educated. As the country transitioned to U.S. colonial rule, the landowners gained political power. As the U.S. governor expropriated the church's lands (90% of all land in the Philippines), he delegated authority for redistribution to the Bureau of Lands. Legislators used their

²⁴⁹ Bureau of the Census and Statistics, *Family Income and Expenditure 1965* (Manila: Republic of the Philippines), Special Release 66 dated 1968, Table 1. Note: the majority of this document does not have page numbers. It appears to be a compendium of smaller releases.

²⁵⁰ National Census and Statistics Office, *1985 Family Income and Expenditures Survey* (Manila: Republic of the Philippines, 1987), 1–13.

²⁵¹ Solita Collas-Monsod, "The War Against Poverty: A Status Report," in David G. Timberman, ed. *The Philippines: New Directions in Domestic Policy and Foreign Relations* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), 91.

influence with the Bureau to acquire additional acreage.²⁵² In this manner, the landowners were able to secure their position as the economic and political elite of the Philippines, creating a patron-client system with the landowners as patron and the farm workers as clients. Within this framework, there was little demand for democracy as the patron would demand complete loyalty from his workers and squash any attempts to organize.

The first signs of significant industrialization arrived in the late 1940s. Dropping agriculture prices, cuts in U.S. post-war reconstruction spending, and increasing goods imports led to the adoption of trade barriers, import-substitution industrialization (ISI) and modern agricultural techniques. As profits on cash crops declined, large landowners diversified into mills, import-export, banking, and light manufacturing. In order to remain competitive and improve margins, landowners turned to increasing mechanization and transient workers, decreasing reliance on personal relations. As farm workers became more transient, they became less dependent upon a single landlord, shifting their loyalties from the landowner to rural organizations working against exploitation.²⁵³

The closure of the Cuban sugar market to the United States after the 1959 revolution was a boon to the Philippine sugar industry. Yet, it was only a boon to the wealthy farmers. Farming had become capital intensive with the adoption of high-yield seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, and mechanized equipment.²⁵⁴ The capital requirement made large farms more efficient; small farmers did not have the necessary capital, often defaulting on their loans.²⁵⁵ Large landowners expanded their holdings by taking over the defaulted lands as well as untitled lands of farmers who had neither the political

²⁵² Eva-Lotta E. Hedman and John Thayer Sidel, *Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial Legacies, Post-Colonial Trajectories*, Politics in Asia Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 2000), 72.

²⁵³ David Wurfel, *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay*, Politics and International Relations of Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 71.

²⁵⁴ Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *Everyday Politics in the Philippines: Class and Status Relations in a Central Luzon Village* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 4.

²⁵⁵ Wurfel, *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay*, 55.

connections nor the resources to protect their claim.²⁵⁶ As the agriculture economy struggled, most small farmers obtained secondary sources of income in the off-season, often in the services sector.²⁵⁷ As the overseas Filipino worker program grew, remittances (which make up 10% of GDP) gave the poor some leeway to ignore financial intimidation from the landlords. The political power of landlords diminished as the cost of election campaigns grew, the independence of the workers increased, and the number of tenants declined.²⁵⁸

The power of the landowners was drastically reduced by the rise of Ferdinand Marcos to the Presidency. Several segments of the population supported the move to autocracy as Marcos promised banking and land reforms in order to reduce the power of the landed oligarchy. Support for Marcos grew thin over the decade as Marcos failed to deliver the promised reforms. But, Marcos did manage to defuse the power of the landlords. At the height of sugar prices in the mid-1970s, Marcos created government corporations with monopolies on the trading of sugar and coconuts. This economic intervention gave Marcos control of prices, subsidies, and loans for farmers. Economic power was transferred from the landowners (Marcos' potential rivals) to a handful of Marcos' cronies that ran the government monopolies. Marcos' policies drove large landowners, small farmers, and the business community towards the opposition while increasing the independence of farm workers.²⁵⁹

The dominance of agriculture waned under the Marcos regime. In 1985, the manufacturing sector gained parity with the agricultural sector for contribution to GDP while the non-agriculture labor force surpassed the agriculture labor force. From 1960 to 1985, agriculture's share of exports dropped from 64% to 26%.²⁶⁰ GDP from services

²⁵⁶ Gregg R. Jones, *Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 91.

²⁵⁷ Kerkvliet, *Everyday Politics in the Philippines: Class and Status Relations in a Central Luzon Village*, 71.

²⁵⁸ Mark R. Thompson, *The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 20.

²⁵⁹ Gary Hawes, *The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export*, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 80–2.

²⁶⁰ Cristina David, "Agriculture," in Balisacan and Hill, 180.

such as transportation and trade doubled. Despite the movement towards industry and services, economic development did little to build workers' organizations. Prior to 1987, worker organizations were weak; they were either tainted by links to communism or collaborated with the Marcos regime in order to survive.

The potential for democratic ideals was instead spread through the development of education and literacy. Early investments in the 1950s and 1960s in education and the proliferation of universities provided the necessary skilled workers for the growing industry and service sectors. The national literacy rate surpassed 84% in 1985, slightly exceeding the rates of other developing democracies of the time in Brazil, Columbia, Peru, and Venezuela.²⁶¹ Education rates were high, at least in Luzon.²⁶² Marcos' control of the teaching curriculum was somewhat limited, especially in the universities he regularly repressed. Small farmers became increasingly educated and interconnected through the development of rural education and cheap cell phones. As the Philippines' population grew 50% from 1972 to 1985, the country was flooded with young, well-educated, socially connected, and technologically savvy demographics. Economic development, then, did appear to provide some impetus towards demand for democracy. Post-Marcos development continued to support this trend as literacy surpassed 93% in 2000 as the Philippines turned to electronics and clothing as the driver of the economy.²⁶³

While economic development increased the potential for spreading democratic ideals, economic crisis spurred demands for regime change. Initially, Marcos insulated the citizens from the shocks of economic crisis. Marcos softened the economic blow of the 1969 foreign exchange and balance-of-payments crisis, instigated by Marcos' overspending of state funds on his reelection, through IMF loans.²⁶⁴ In 1975–6, sugar prices collapsed. Marcos kept the economy going through debt borrowings, which were

²⁶¹ UNESCO Institute for Statistics, "Literacy and Nonformal Education Section," (UNESCO, 2002).

²⁶² *2008 Statistics Yearbook*, 10–6.

²⁶³ National Statistics Office, *1994 Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippines* (Manila: Republic of the Philippines, 1994), 27; National Statistics Office, *2005 Foreign Trade Statistics of the Philippines* (Manila: Republic of the Philippines, 2005), 5–3, 6–6, 9–10.; National Economic Development Authority, *NEDA Statistical Yearbook of the Philippines 1975* (Manila: Republic of the Philippines, 1975), 392–5.

²⁶⁴ Emmaneul de Dios and Paul Hutchcroft, "Political Economy," in Balisacan and Hill, 48.

mostly squandered among his cronies. Meanwhile, Marcos tripled the size of the bureaucracy.²⁶⁵ The Philippine revenue system was a giant, unsustainable ponzi scheme that began to break down in 1981 as a local banking crisis led to a general economic collapse.

The Philippine banking sector was always unstable. There were numerous small family-owned banks created not to build profits, but to serve as a loan machine for kinship businesses. Banking regulation was weak and typically only enforced on those without political connections.²⁶⁶ This arrangement resulted in occasional bank runs, but in 1981, it led to a serious crisis. A combination of macro-economic variables influence by the 1979 oil crisis including rising oil prices, rising interest rates, and increased competition created liquidity problems for Philippine industry, prominently led by the textile sector. One prominent owner, Dewey Dee, fled the country, defaulting on a huge loan. His flight initiated a credit crunch as local banks and international investors suspected that Dee's default was the first of more to come. A combination of short-term money tightening and bank runs forced several small banks and businesses into bankruptcy. The subsequent wave of layoffs the following year sparked a general strike by the textile workers.

The government initiated a second crisis when the military assassinated Benigno Aquino, Jr. in August of 1983. The assassination "unleashed outrage across socioeconomic lines against the Marcoses' material accumulation, arbitrary repression, and dynastic ambitions."²⁶⁷ The assassination turned the economic recession into a crisis as international banks and investors lost confidence in the country's stability, refusing to lend short-term financing necessary to meet debt payments.²⁶⁸ The Philippines endured several economic recessions in the post-war period, but the 1981–1985 recession was

²⁶⁵ Raul Guzman, Alex Brillantes, and Arturo Pacho, "The Bureaucracy," in Guzman and Reforma, 187.

²⁶⁶ Paul D. Hutchcroft, *Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 108.

²⁶⁷ Thompson, *The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines*, 115.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 119.

different. The mid-1980s economic contraction was the largest in post-independence history: almost a 20% drop in GDP per capita. Industry carried the brunt of the loss (~15% loss compared to a 6% loss in agriculture and a 3% loss in services).²⁶⁹ The economic landscape was scattered with massive layoffs and bankrupt businesses. The Philippines hit rock bottom in 1985. Inflation hit 55%, high by Philippine standards. Government expenditures dropped over 30%.²⁷⁰ A combination of drought and typhoons ruined local crops while a global glut led to a severe drop in the price of sugar. Poverty was crushing; 44% of the population in the NCR was under the poverty line. They were the best off. Several regions had up to three quarters of their population living in poverty.²⁷¹

Lacking international investors, Marcos turned to the IMF. As a condition of its assistance, the IMF required the dissolution of government corporations including those running the sugar and coconut trade. Marcos had already cut most of society out of the patronage system. Now, the IMF forced Marcos to cut out his cronies. Further, free market technocrats led by Prime Minister Virata carried out structural adjustment in coordination with the IMF, depreciating the Philippine peso 40%.

Marcos' economic policies had already alienated the business community. But, the prolonged economic crisis convinced many citizens that it was time for a change in leadership. However, it is impossible to isolate the economic crisis as the single variable that led to a change in democracy. As the 1986 snap election approached, mass protests erupted over the acquittal of General Ver and the expected sham election. The anti-Marcos protests continued after the election resulted in accusations of widespread fraud. Only after the defection of senior military leaders and the call to protest by Church leaders did the massive People Power Revolt take form. The culmination of protest issues makes it impossible to isolate the effect of a single variable.

²⁶⁹ A. M. Balisacan and Hal Hill, *The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 8–11.

²⁷⁰ Gerardo Sicat and Rahimaisa Abdula, "Public Finance," in Balisacan and Hill, 112.

²⁷¹ National Statistical Coordination Board, *1992 Statistics Yearbook* (Makati: Republic of the Philippines, 1992), 2–19; National Statistics Office, *2008 Statistics Yearbook* (Manila: Republic of the Philippines, 2008), 2–26 – 2–27.

Only the most severe economic crisis had a significant effect on the level of democracy in the Philippines. Economic crisis was not the causal factor for People Power. However, the economic crisis did provide a mobilization base that was catalyzed into People Power. The crises of the 1990s such as the electricity shortage, the bankruptcy of the Central Bank, and the Asian Financial Crisis were all significant, but none of the crises compared to that of the 1980s. The fact that there was little public support for the coups against Aquino suggests that the 1990s economic crisis in the Philippines did not substantially decrease citizens' demand for democracy.

2. Intrastate Violence

As discussed in Chapter II, an outbreak in violence should deter democratization or encourage a regime to move towards autocracy. Further, a transition to democracy during a period of intrastate violence is unlikely to sustain democracy as a significant segment of the population was not involved in the design of the democratic processes. As expected by the hypothesis, this section finds that increasing intrastate violence from 1969 to 1971 led to an increasing acceptance among citizens of a reduction in the level of democracy as a tradeoff for increased security. However, contrary to the hypothesis, Philippine democracy increased during a period of high violence and for more than 20 years survived prolonged insurgency. The insurgency since 1986 did not motivate widespread demands for a return to autocracy largely due to the lack of insurgent targeting of civilians combined with the geographical remoteness of the insurgencies.

The past one hundred years was turbulent for the Philippines. Economic and separatist discontent fermented under American rule. Independence did not bring the Philippines peace. The last fifty years were peppered with insurgencies and coups. Contemporary insurgency groups in the Philippines can be loosely grouped into three types: communist, ethno-nationalist, and Islamist. The three insurgencies began in 1969, 1971, and 1977, respectively.

All three insurgencies originated under Marcos' rule. However, attributing the increase in intrastate violence to the decrease in the level of democracy is misplaced since the roots of the insurgency go back substantially further. The communist insurgency was

primarily motivated by economic issues that arose during the 1930s rural unrest over landlord and farmer tenancy disputes. As large landowners began to dominate the agricultural community in the post World War II era, land redistribution became a symbol of justice and economic egalitarianism among poor farmers. Encouraged by the success of the Chinese Communists, the rural unrest culminated in the Huk Rebellion of the 1950s. Although the Huks were defeated, much of their ideology was reborn under the armed banner of the communist New People's Army (NPA) in 1969.

The increase in intrastate violence was a significant cause of the country's decrease in the level of democracy. Months after the NPA began its attacks, Marcos began portraying himself as the solution to the violence, using the classic "guns, goons, and gold" strategy to secure his 1969 reelection. Although the strategy was not new, the breadth with which Marcos used government forces and resources marked a considerable expansion of the power of the executive and the inability or unwillingness of the legislature to challenge his actions. The threat of the communist insurrection subdued political challenges to Marcos' abuse of power. In 1970, the political arm of NPA, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), supported and instigated student protests. One such protest in January at Mendiola Bridge resulted in the death of several protestors. The military reacted by occupying the University of Philippines campus in Diliman, Quezon City. Meanwhile, a public debate about the implications of martial law was in full swing. While low-level attacks and protests provided a general sense of insecurity, one specific attack had a major effect.

In August 1971, the Liberal Party (a major opposition party) held a campaign rally in the Plaza Miranda. NPA soldiers tossed several grenades into the crowd causing several casualties. Apparently, Marcos did not feel that this incident alone provided enough justification for martial law. The next month, Marcos had the military fake communist attacks upon the defense minister's car and the Manila power grid in order to justify his declaration of martial law. Upon declaration, Marcos dissolved the legislature, eliminating both political competition and legislative restraints upon his rule. Further, Marcos began a ruthless program of repressing his political opposition.

The citizenry was split on the declaration of martial law. Security fears convinced many citizens to initially support Marcos. Others believed that Marcos was behind the bombing of his opposition and was using the Plaza Miranda event as a pretext to consolidate power and limit critiques of his government. In either case, the rise of intrastate violence acted as a catalyst towards the reduction of the level of democracy. In turn, the reduction in the level of democracy incited more violence.

The declaration of martial law sparked a violent reaction from the recently created Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Like the NPA, the Muslim insurgency in Mindanao was rooted in economics. As the Christian northerners migrated to Mindanao throughout the twentieth century, they took legal title of significant areas of the island. There is a perception among many that the northerners took advantage of the local's lack of literacy and knowledge on property law even if few Muslims were forced from their lands.²⁷² There was a general feeling that Muslims were being excluded from the system or being treated as a type of subservient caste. Mindanao was historically underdeveloped and under-resourced due in part to its difficult terrain of mountains and dense forests as well as its remoteness from the capital in Manila. The Muslim area of Mindanao was one of the poorest regions in the country. At many times, its per capita GDP was half that of the second poorest region.²⁷³

The catalyst for rebellion came in 1968. The Army created a special all-Muslim elite unit based at Corregidor. The soldiers balked when they found their mission would include fighting against fellow Muslim Moros using unconventional warfare against Malays in contested Sabah. For their mutiny, the majority of the unit was executed. The incident, known as the Jabidah Massacre, outraged Muslim Filipinos. Open rebellion began in 1971 under the banner of the MNLF in order to establish an independent Moro state in Mindanao.

After several years of fighting, the MNLF agreed to a ceasefire in 1976 in exchange for local autonomy. Some members, disgruntled by the MNLF's conciliatory

²⁷² Personal communication with Chito Gascon, 8 Aug 2009.

²⁷³ 2008 *Statistics Yearbook*, 3–56.

stance, created the splinter group Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1977. The MILF became a far more conservative organization, demanding not only independence, but an Islamist state. Like the MNLF, the level of violence continued to ebb and flow as several ceasefires were brokered and then broken.

It is also possible that increasing violence led to the end of martial law and a correspondingly marginal increase in the level of democracy. In 1980, economic nationalists began an urban bombing campaign against pro-Marcos businesses. Marcos' economic policies favored a handful of international exporters at the expense of small, domestic businessmen. However, the direct correlation is weak. The bombing campaign held little threat to the regime itself. Instead, it was merely an indicator of one more segment of society that felt ostracized by Marcos' policies. Although it is plausible that the bombing campaign threatened the profits of Marcos' cronies, an end to martial law would neither provide more protection to Marcos' allies nor change the economic policy that instigated the urban terrorism.

To some extent, increases in the level of democracy coincided with reduced levels of insurgency. After the end of martial law in 1981, MNLF violence in Mindanao decreased substantially. While the end of repression likely played a part, Marcos was also able to limit the insurgency by bribing leaders with seats on the autonomous legislature.

The 1986 deposing of Marcos had a limited immediate effect on the insurgencies. Newly elected President Aquino quickly drafted a ceasefire with the MNLF promising autonomy in exchange for a renouncement to independence. Ceasefires with the MILF were more tenuous.²⁷⁴ The transition to democracy created a debate within the CPP over the need to continue armed struggle. Although the Communist Party was still illegal, the potential for legal political gains through other leftist parties caused a split within the CPP.²⁷⁵ Unable to decide, the CPP sat out the elections of the 1980s in favor of

²⁷⁴ The MILF ceasefire is in danger after a July 2007 incident in which some MILF members supported an ASG ambush on AFP troops.

²⁷⁵ Jones, *Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement*, 163; Clifton Sherrill, "Promoting Democracy: Results of Democratization Efforts in the Philippines," *Asian Affairs* (2006): 219.

continuing armed struggle. A variety of factors influenced a change of mind throughout many of the CPP. The success of several small parties during the 1988 legislative elections provided evidence that political gains could be made through the new system. Throughout the 1980s, successful government operations, the growth of local anti-communist paramilitary groups, and an internal CPP mole-hunt purge decimated local NPA cells. Popular support for the NPA was further hurt by the Aquino administration's promise for land reform.

Although land reform was enacted under the 1988 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), it did little to solve the issues of agrarian society. Key Aquino supporters, including landowners, businessmen, and the military, opposed significant land reform and ensured provisions were included which would neuter the law.²⁷⁶ These provisions provided a ten-year phased approach and exemptions to redistribution. The long window of implementation gave landowners time to modify their practices in order to qualify for a redistribution exemption. One method of exemption was to divide the land into smaller holdings so that the land would fall below the minimum acreage threshold for distribution. Typically, these other holdings would be retitled using pseudonyms, friends, and relatives as titleholders.²⁷⁷ The second method of exemption was to replace the existing crop with a crop that was exempt from redistribution. Critics complained that CARP favored landlord rights over tenant rights and was ineffective at correcting the inequitable distribution of land, especially among cash crops.²⁷⁸ Thus, the ideological basis for the CPP continued to thrive in some small rural barangays (villages). Despite the ineffectiveness of land reform, the level of NPA violence began to decrease in 1990.

Ironically, the same year saw the establishment of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), an organization with links to Al Qaeda affiliate Jeemah Islamiah. ASG began as an

²⁷⁶ James Putzel, *A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines* (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1992), 249.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 238.

²⁷⁸ Jeffrey M. Riedinger, *Agrarian Reform in the Philippines: Democratic Transitions and Redistributive Reform* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), 70–104. Solita Collas-Monsod, "Decentralization, democracy, and development," in Timberman, ed. *The Philippines: New Directions in Domestic Policy and Foreign Relations*, 96.

insurgent group, based in the southwestern archipelago that bridges Mindanao to Indonesia, with the intent of establishing an Islamic state. However, ASG evolved into a conglomeration of groups varying from criminal elements to radical Islamic groups. Unlike other Philippine insurgency groups, the ASG primarily attacks civilians, especially tourists, using bombings, kidnappings, and executions. Despite ASG's emergence, overall levels of violence in the Philippines gradually decreased since 1986.

Increasing the level of democracy may have had a positive effect on decreasing the overall level of insurgency violence. However, the decrease in violence was gradual and the overall level of violence is still considerably high. Meanwhile, fluctuations in the level of insurgency (e.g., ceasefires and ceasefire failures) had no significant effect on the sustainment of the Philippines' high level of democracy in the post-Marcos period. The lack of interaction between the two variables appears due to the insurgencies' regional nature and civilian-avoidance tactics. The insurgencies are primarily limited to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and various lightly populated rural areas. Acting more like organized crime, the insurgencies are not a direct threat to the average citizen and rarely prevent citizens from participating in the political process. Besides sporadic activities of ASG, insurgency violence is primarily targeted at government forces. However, the insurgents regularly coerce voting, collect protection money in the form of revolutionary taxes (cash or in-kind), and extort a permit to campaign tax from politicians.

To date, the prolonged insurgent violence has not resulted in calls for reductions in democracy. In most parts of the country, this stance is likely due to the lack of insurgent targeting of civilians combined with the geographical remoteness of the insurgencies. However, there are pockets of anecdotal stories of citizens reflecting upon the growth and security of the early martial law period with nostalgia. They look admiringly at Singapore's benign dictatorship. For example, ARMM citizens expressed their preference for democracy with a single candidate in an effort to reduce election violence.

3. The Diffusion of Norms: The Emperor Has No Clothes

As discussed in Chapter II, the spread of democratic ideas provides citizens increased awareness of the benefits of democracy relative to autocracy and an improved ability to analyze the existing level of democracy. We expect that these norms will highlight the inadequacy of democratic processes in hybrid regimes and underscore democracy as the rational choice. Norms have a wide variety of inputs including historical legacy, ethno-religious identity, access to information, religious organizations, and foreign influence. While pre-colonial and colonial autocratic traditions and ethnic divergence may have initially constrained democratic norms, the early establishment of electoral norms, increasing education, and the significant influence of information technology played key roles in building, mobilizing, and sustaining interest in democracy in the Philippines.

A combination of pre-colonial and colonial social and political structures left a legacy of political power rooted in kinship and patronage.²⁷⁹ The legacy brought anti-democratic undertones, leaving little room for politics based upon ideology or common interests. Despite a shared Malay ancestry, a pre-colonial divergence in ethnicity, religion, language, and governance resulted in a clan-based society based on kinship ties.²⁸⁰ The divergence is still seen in contemporary Philippines. Only a third of Filipinos claim Tagalog ethnicity, the largest ethnic group. Six other ethnic groups (Cebuano, Ilocano, Bisaya, Hiligaynon Ilonggo, Bikol, and Waray), each with their own indigenous language, make up almost half of the population. Ethnic Chinese also had an important impact on the Philippines. Early traders to the Philippine islands, Chinese immigrants progressed during the 19th century sugar boom as merchants and bankers; some expanding their Philippine landholdings through money lending (i.e.,

²⁷⁹ Mary Racelis Hollnsteiner, *The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality* (Quezon City: Community Development Research Council, University of the Philippines, 1963); Carl H. Landé, *Leaders, Factions, and Parties; the Structure of Philippine Politics*, Yale University. Southeast Asia Studies. Monograph Series, (New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies distributor: Cellar Book Shop, Detroit, 1965); Alfred W. McCoy, *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*, Monograph Series (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1993).

²⁸⁰ In recognition of the Malay heritage, there was a brief attempt in 1963 to create Maphilindo, a confederation between the three Malay-based countries of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

repossession).²⁸¹ Over time, these Chinese Filipinos came to dominate the economy. For example, in 2006, seven of the ten richest families in the Philippines were of Chinese descent.²⁸² Despite the divergence, ethnicity was not a significant source of conflict in post-independence Philippines. The sole exception is Mindanao where religious tension, poverty, and property disputes fueled conflict and diminished the relevance of ethnic cleavage as the explanatory factor.

More important than ethnicity was kinship. Kinship ties were an important element of survival. Pre-colonial barangay politics were based upon patronage. The villagers provided their loyalty and labor to the chief. The barangay chief, in turn, provided job security and leadership for various purposes such as physical security, food security, and justice. If the chief failed to provide, he would be replaced, incentivizing the chief to distribute patronage. However, other services such as education, shelter, and medical care were accessed through an extended kinship network.²⁸³

While the Spanish colonists delivered some services to the urban areas, rural communities continued to subsist through the kinship network.²⁸⁴ The Spanish colonial legacy is often blamed for integrating patronage into the political system due to the centralization of political power into a supreme ruler as the ultimate patron. But, the legacy is somewhat overstated. The Philippines was a remote colony. Technically governed by the Viceroy in Mexico, the Governor-General in Manila had significant autonomy and could selectively enforce the rulings of his superiors. However, the government in Manila had little physical ability to enforce its laws. Compared to its Latin American colonies, few Spanish moved to the Philippines. Those that did

²⁸¹ Wurfel, *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay*, 5.

²⁸² Suzanne Nam, "The Philippines 40 Richest," *Forbes Online* (2008), http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/15/richest-philippines-billionaires-biz-philippinerichest08-cx_sn_1015philippines_land.html (accessed 12 Feb 2010). Of note, Lucio Tan was involved in a tax cheating scandal, but absolved by President Arroyo. Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. was both a supporter of Marcos and related to Corazon Aquino.

²⁸³ Alfred W. McCoy, *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*, Monograph Series (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), 7; Mary Racelis Hollnsteiner, *The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality* (Quezon City: Community Development Research Council, University of the Philippines, 1963), 188–9.

²⁸⁴ Carl H. Landé, *Leaders, Factions, and Parties; the Structure of Philippine Politics* (New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1965), 9–10.

concentrated in Manila as facilitators of trade between China and Latin America. The governor maintained administrative control through pre-colonial barangay chieftans and political control through the Catholic Church; the only significant Spanish group to permeate throughout the islands. Instead of being the cause of patronage, the Spanish merely perpetuated the kinship networks and patronage system already employed by the barangays.

As the Philippines developed economically, wealth became an additional source of patronage. Wealth provided independence from the government and dependent workers. The client was dependent upon the patron for his livelihood. This financial dependence, combined with a distrust of strangers, deterred clients from undertaking collective action that might sever the relationship with his patron.²⁸⁵ In politics, clients would vote for their patron (or his designee) rather than risk severing the profitable relationship.

The American colonizers expanded the distribution of urban services considerably, expanding education, medical care, and government employment. But, the additional services did not replace the kinship system entirely. Instead, as the Americans opened politics and the bureaucracy to the indigenous population, the kinship networks and patronage system extended into politics. Elections were initially tightly constrained as political participation and suffrage were limited to land owners. Since the majority of landowners were wealthy, the limitation elevated those that were economically powerful under the Spanish into political power under the Americans. Once elected, politicians used their office to enrich themselves, family, and friends with government jobs, contracts, and preferential business regulations. Local authorities abused their regulatory power to grant their own business monopolistic power, protect their illegal activities, and seize land. National legislators used their influence to expand their landholdings and get

²⁸⁵ Landé, *Leaders, Factions, and Parties*, 43–5.

cheap loans from the national bank.²⁸⁶ In a somewhat circular fashion, political power came to be dominated by a few, wealthy families in what some refer to pejoratively as an oligarchy of political dynasties.²⁸⁷

In time, patronage became a multi-tiered pyramid. Agricultural workers and tenant farmers were clients of wealthy landlords that provided job security. Wealthy patrons became clients of the state, providing their support (and the votes of their clients) to politicians that could protect their land and business interests. Politicians, in turn, became clients of the president, providing political support and votes in return for pork projects.²⁸⁸ Of course, clients would remain loyal to the patron only as long as the benefits of patronage continued to flow. However, many patrons used violence, intimidation, regulatory enforcement, or withholding of government resources to punish defectors. At the local level, several extreme forms of patronage arose during the collapse of the central government during World War II as regional politicians turned into Mafioso-style political bosses.²⁸⁹ Despite the return of a central government, local bosses continued to plague Philippine politics.

The patronage system was further perpetuated by the U.S. colonial administration and the subsequent Philippine administrations. The expansion of the state's clients reinforced the centralization of political power. Despite the existence of elections and Civil Governor Taft's priority on decentralization, the bicameral Philippine Legislature had little independent power since it could not override the American Governor's veto, which he maintained until the Philippines was designated a commonwealth of the United States in 1935.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁶ John Thayer Sidel, *Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines*, East-West Center Series on Contemporary Issues in Asia and the Pacific (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), 17, 49, 79–80.

²⁸⁷ Benedict Anderson, "Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams," *New Left Review* (1988).

²⁸⁸ Benedict Kerkvliet, "Toward a More Comprehensive Analysis of Philippine Politics: Beyond the Patron-Client, Factional Framework," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 26, no. 2 (1995): 403.

²⁸⁹ McCoy, *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*, 7.

²⁹⁰ Paul D. Hutchcroft, "Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900–1913," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 2 (2000): 283–6.

In 1935, Manuel Quezon was elected the second President of the Philippines.²⁹¹ The 1935 Constitution increased political participation, but lacked competition and constitutional rigidity. Suffrage expanded to all literate adult males (women's suffrage was added in 1937). But, the dominance of the Nacionalista Party created a virtual one-party system. This political dominance enabled Quezon to amend the Constitution to permit his re-election. Quezon liberally interpreted the 1935 Constitution, hiring and firing local officials at will making almost all elected officials beholden to the President for their position. Local politicians were key to national politics since they could direct their clients how to vote. Although Quezon's second term was cut short in 1942 by the Japanese invasion, Quezon left a tradition of a de facto one-party system, Constitutional manipulation, and patronage that would carry over into post independence Philippines.

Despite the corruptive influence of the kinship network and the patronage system, elections became an established habit. Although regularly coerced and often tainted by violence, elections occurred regularly in much of the Philippines since 1901 except for brief hiatuses during the Japanese occupation and Marcos' martial law. Certainly, the democratic ideals of the United States were diffused among at least a segment of the population during the U.S. occupation of the islands.

The lasting effect of the kinship network and the patronage system upon contemporary Philippine politics is somewhat ambiguous. Evidence of political dynasties and pork-barrel patronage can be found in most democracies. The increasing independence of Philippine workers disabled the patronage system as a source of votes. However, campaign financing is still seen as a method for obtaining preferential regulatory treatment for businesses.

As for political dynasties, there is a lack of empirical evidence to indicate that they are overrepresented in the Philippines relative to other democracies. Certainly political dynasties exist in the Philippines. Corazon Aquino came from the wealthy Cojuangco family. Her father and brother were congressmen; her uncle and cousin, governors. Her husband, Benigno served as a governor and a senator. His father and

²⁹¹ Emilio Aguinaldo was the first president of the short-lived First Philippine Republic.

brother were senators, his uncle a congressman. However, describing Philippine politics as an elite oligarchy is an overstatement. To some extent, political dynasties are a natural by-product of democratic elections.²⁹² For example, Adams and Roosevelt had famous political dynasties in the United States. Prominent contemporary political dynasties include the Kennedys, the Bushes, and the Clintons while less prominent include Pelosi, Dodd, Dole, Romney, Gore, Taft, Rockefeller, Long, Baker, and Tsongas.

Although the patronage system continued to survive into contemporary times, information technology played a key role in shaping Philippine democratic norms and as a catalyst to mobilize citizens to demand regime change. Under martial law, Marcos banned opposition media, leaving outlets in the power of his personal cronies. Marcos used the media to portray himself as a charismatic figure: a physically and mentally powerful man with the knowledge, influence, and stamina to solve the problems of the Philippines. Marcos had staked his presidential reputation entirely upon his personality and his performance. In the end, no amount of media cover-up could hide the cracks. By the early 1980s, Marcos was suffering from a serious kidney problem and could not hide his infirmities, missing weeks of work at a time. In his absence, his wife Imelda took up the mantle of power. As his health deteriorated, it also became obvious to many prior supporters that Marcos' policies were failing to solve the Philippines' major political problems.

In the midst of increasing opposition, Marcos' increasing frailty, and Imelda's increasing power, government forces assassinated opposition leader Benigno Aquino as he departed his flight on return from exile in the United States. The flight was full of international journalists and cameramen. The event received intense international press coverage as video footage of the event travelled across the Philippines despite the relatively low level of technology. Whatever gains the regime had intended to gain, the move backfired as Benigno became a martyr for the opposition. His assassination was compared to the 1896 execution of Jose Rizal, a national hero of the Philippine

²⁹² For a more detailed exploration see Stephen Hess, *America's Political Dynasties* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997); Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó, and Jason Snyder, "Political Dynasties," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 76, no. 1 (2009): 115–42.

independence movement that some claimed was a Filipino Christ. Despite government attempts to blame the communists and cover their tracks through a fact-finding commission, public outrage turned many citizens to the opposition.

Information technology provided both an increasing sense of disapproval from the international community as well as the knowledge that developing countries could succeed as a democracy. Aquino's assassination received widespread international condemnation. Certainly, an element of this judgment was passed to a small segment of Filipinos through close economic partners in the United States, Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, and Europe. Additionally, Philippine intellectuals were aware of the wave of democratic transitions in Latin America during the early 1980s. However, there is little evidence to suggest that either regional influence or global trends had a significant effect on the citizens' preference for democracy in the Philippines. In 1987, the Philippines was the democratic trendsetter for the region.

In a more direct manner, information technology was used as a call for mobilization during EDSA I and EDSA II.²⁹³ In 1986, Cardinal Sin announced the call to rebellion over Radio Bandito. In 2001, the call to rebellion was passed via cell phones, a growing popular commodity among the well-educated urban youth, an increasingly significant demographic. The importance of cell phones as a contributor to democracy in the Philippines continued to grow as cell phone penetration grew from 10% in 2000 to almost 60% in 2007. Average citizens became empowered as election monitors, using cell phones to send texts, photos, and videos of election improprieties to local news channels.²⁹⁴

Technology was not a major factor in the diffusion of democratic norms in the Philippines prior to 1986. Elections were an established norm well before independence. However, information technology acted as a catalyst for democratic mobilization as well as a sustaining influence on democracy. Various attempts by presidents to change the constitution received widespread negative publicity. The media was also influential in

²⁹³ EDSA is the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, the primary route of march for the protestors.

²⁹⁴ Personal communication with Ferdinand Pingul, 7 Aug 2009.

maintaining citizen interest in politics through a combination of investigative journalism and sensationalism.²⁹⁵ Voter participation across the Philippines is high. One explanation is that Philippines politics is entertainment: a mix of cock-fighting and Mexican soap opera.²⁹⁶ In a sample two-week period in August, articles critical of Arroyo made front-page news on a daily basis. Topics included extravagant dinners while in New York City, freeing communists in order to motivate peace talks, and holding hands with former President Estrada during a wedding. During Corazon Aquino's funeral, a mayor mentioned that the large numbers of people that showed during the funeral procession suggested that people power would prevent Arroyo from extending her power beyond her term. Newspapers sensationalized the eulogy as a call for revolution to depose Arroyo. Perhaps this same media sensationalism shaped the citizens' expectations for democracy. Since the average Filipino views democracy as the freedom to do as you please, there is a general dissatisfaction in the performance of Philippine democracy despite their preference for the sustainment of democracy.²⁹⁷

C. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: SUPPLYING DEMOCRACY

As mentioned in Chapter II, supply of democracy is a measure of the action, or inaction, taken by political institutions in support of or against the implementation or removal of democratic processes. The suppliers of democracy are largely influenced by the same economic, security, and informational factors that influence demand. At times, suppliers may be influenced directly by changes in demand. Of course, a change in demand does not dictate a change in supply. The factors that influenced demand may not have the same magnitude or even the same direction of influence upon supply.

A variety of political institutions were responsible for delivering democracy to the Philippines. The split within the military, the activism of NGOs, and the actions of political parties were all-important elements in permitting the growth and sustenance of

²⁹⁵ Personal communication with Ferdinand Pingul, 7 Aug 2009.

²⁹⁶ Personal communication with Joel Rocamora, 11 Aug 2009.

²⁹⁷ Social Weather Stations.

democracy. The most critical element, though, appears to be the regime itself. It was Marcos' decision to step down that enabled democracy to blossom.

1. The Philippine Military

As discussed in Chapter II, the factors discussed above which influence civil society also influenced the military's preference for democracy. In the case of the Philippines, the military did not have a homogenous set of preferences. This divergence in the military led to a critical split in senior military leadership. The corresponding showdown resulted in the People Power Revolution.

The pre-martial law military was largely apolitical, choosing not to interfere in the politics of the Philippines' partially democratic processes. However, the military took no steps to prevent Marcos from stealing the 1969 elections. Logic suggests that the military, or at least senior leaders, supported the declaration of martial law in 1971. First, it would be difficult to impose martial law if the military opposed it. Second, international events and a vehement anti-communist U.S. policy likely convinced the military that the NPA was a serious threat to national security. While the threat of a communist takeover of the regime may not have been imminent, U.S. forces were withdrawing from Vietnam while communist insurgencies were gaining the upper hand in Cambodia and Laos. As the Philippine Army had a battalion of troops supporting the U.S. mission in Vietnam, the military was likely closely monitoring the progress of the communist insurgents and may have heightened the sense of Philippine vulnerability.

During martial law, the military leadership had little interest in increasing the level of democracy. Among the rural communities, political reform equated to land reform and economic equality. The military saw rural communities as hotbeds of insurgency and opposed political reform, in part, because they believed it "rewarded" the rebellious peasants.²⁹⁸ Reform would be equivalent to appeasing the NPA. In addition,

²⁹⁸ Putzel, *A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines*, 249.

Marcos provided incentives to the military for maintaining martial law: doubling the size of the military, increasing salaries, and providing opportunities for commanders to exploit local economies.

However, the imposition of martial law and other Marcos policies gradually created a split within the military. In order to maximize loyalty, Marcos granted senior military positions based upon personal loyalty and family ties. While the military was on the front lines of the counterinsurgency, they were also used to repress political dissent. These factors led to the creation of the Reform of the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) in the early 1980s with the goal of professionalizing the armed forces. RAM advocated a return to merit-based promotions and an increased emphasis on the protection of human rights. Many military members were especially disturbed by the military's involvement in the Aquino assassination.

The split became openly evident in 1986 when Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos defected from Marcos' government.²⁹⁹ Enrile and Ramos had virtually no military forces while General Ver, the chief of staff, controlled the majority of the Army. Attempts to crush the mutiny by force failed as civilians, especially nuns and priests, interceded to protect the defectors, physically placing themselves as a barrier to attack. Aircraft that could pass over the civilians could not bring themselves to attack their fellow officers and risk hitting civilians. Mortar and helicopter units responding to the scene defected to the protestors. Aircraft deployed to deliver additional loyal troops intentionally flew to the wrong embarkation points.

Certainly, it is a stretch to say that the military brought about democracy. But, the compliance of the military was a necessary element to the increase in the level of democracy. The defections of Enrile and Ramos acted as a catalyst to test the loyalty of the army. It was the Army's normative value of the people over the dictator that allowed

²⁹⁹ It is possible that Enrile and Ramos left in protest of Marcos' widespread fraud in the 1986 election. However, evidence suggests that Enrile was motivated by his impending arrest; either over a power struggle with another cabinet member or over rumors that Enrile was planning a coup.

democracy to flourish in the Philippines. Also, an element of luck played its part. If any aircraft or unit that had been present chose Marcos over the people, the result would have been a massacre.

As Aquino replaced Marcos as President, it became obvious that segments of the military continued to have serious reservations about democracy. Loyalist members of the military wanted to return Marcos to power. Enrile and his RAM supporters wanted to establish a Latin American-style military junta to maintain the perceived benefits of martial law. Aquino's early actions disenfranchised many in the military through the release of communist prisoners, cutbacks in the military budget, and the establishment of a human rights commission. Many in the military felt that Aquino betrayed them since the military helped her gain power. The result was seven major coup attempts against Aquino between July 1986 and December 1989. After the first coup attempt, Aquino began to embrace the military by increasing the 1986 defense budget, endorsing Ramos' counterinsurgency plan, and by weakening the human rights commission.³⁰⁰ The final coup against Aquino in 1989 was deterred by a U.S. military show of force in support of the regime.³⁰¹

In the post Marcos years, the armed forces became more professionalized and independent of the executive. The military was extremely loyal to President Ramos, a former Armed Forces Chief of Staff. However, President Estrada had no such influence. As street protests culminated in EDSA II in 2001, the military notified President Estrada that they could no longer support him. After fifteen years without a coup, a small group of officers attempted a coup against President Arroyo in 2006 as a protest to electoral fraud. But, the group had no widespread support in the military. Even so, the military opposed Arroyo's attempt to declare martial law after the coup attempt.

³⁰⁰ Mark R. Thompson, "Off the Endangered List: Philippine Democratization in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 28, no. 2 (1996): 189.

³⁰¹ At Aquino's funeral in 2009, former coup plotters apologized; expressing that democracy was the better choice over a military dictatorship.

2. NGOs

As discussed in Chapter II, NGOs have neither the force of the military to implement democracy nor the authority to adopt changes to the constitution. However, NGOs do have the ability to monitor the freeness of elections and provide increased accountability of the other suppliers of democracy. In this context, the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) had a limited effect on improving the supply of democracy through election monitoring. The Catholic Church had no effect on supply, but did mobilize political parties and citizens into action. But, the importance of NGOs in the Philippines arose after the fall of Marcos. They were instrumental in maintaining Philippines' relatively high level of democracy.

After Quirino won the 1949 presidential election using widespread fraud and violence, NAMFREL mobilized citizens to ensure free elections for the 1951 senatorial elections and the 1953 presidential election (similar to the Civil Alliance in Mexico after Salinas' victory in 1988).³⁰² In subsequent years, NAMFREL continued to advocate for electoral reforms and fraud reduction but, by itself, could not deliver a fully free election. NAMFREL reported outright fraud and voter intimidation at the polls, but was powerless to break the patron's coercive grip on clients, prevent political assassinations, or remove the fear of violent reprisal for deciding to enter a political competition. As NAMFREL reduced opportunities for vote fraud at election sites, politicians shifted their patronage to the vote-counters. As votes were aggregated at each level of government, politicians had ample opportunity to influence the final count.³⁰³

After the Second Vatican Council in 1965, the Philippine Catholic Church took an active role in promoting social justice. The church generated several NGOs including the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF). Initially very popular due to its promotion of land reform and tenancy protection, the organization deteriorated after its leaders collaborated with Marcos during martial law. Despite the failure of the FFF, the Church became a

³⁰² Hedman and Sidel, *Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial Legacies, Post-Colonial Trajectories*, 20–2. Hedman and Sidel, *Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial Legacies, Post-Colonial Trajectories*.

³⁰³ This method is locally referred to as “dag-dag bawas” (literally, add subtract).

leading opponent of martial law. Within the first year of martial law, the military raided several Catholic Churches and schools. Upset by this, the Church brokered an agreement with the military to coordinate raids with top Church officials. After the military broke the agreement in August 1974, Cardinal Sin, the Archbishop of Manila, led a protest prayer vigil in the Manila Cathedral. Additionally, the Church began to openly support the opposition, creating an informal anti-Marcos alliance with the business community and the Cojuangco clan (excluding Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.) during the 1984 Batasan elections. When Enrile and Ramos defected from Marcos' government in 1986, Cardinal Sin publicly endorsed the military mutiny over the radio. With the Church's encouragement, the citizens came out in droves to support the mutiny against Marcos. In the case of the Philippines, Church NGOs did little to supply democracy. Instead, the Church was instrumental in mobilizing the opposition party and mass protests.

After the fall of Marcos, NGOs became prolific. The 1987 Constitution specifically recognized NGOs' rights to participate in Philippine politics. The law recognized NGOs as fourteen independent sectors. Thirteen of the sectors are referred to as People's Organizations (PO). These organizations are based on demographic features such as farmers, indigenous peoples, urban poor, disaster victims, children, and women. The POs tend to be narrow in scope. For instance, the farmer PO focuses on agrarian reform issues, showing little success in other issue areas. The fourteenth sector is a catch-all group of cause-based NGOs that do not fit into the other thirteen sectors.³⁰⁴

Partly due to this special political status, the number of NGOs doubled between 1986 and 1995.³⁰⁵ The increasing influence of NGOs led to several reforms that provided increased political participation for NGOs at both the local and national level. The Local Government Code of 1991 included NGOs as a part of the local government's decision-making process. The code specified that sub-national legislatures should include a variety of NGO representatives such as those representing women, workers, and the rural poor. At the national level, Ramos agreed to the creation of the NGO assembly

³⁰⁴ Beyond this point, I refer to the NGO and PO collectively as NGO.

³⁰⁵ Gerard Clarke, *The Politics of Ngos in South-East Asia: Participation and Protest in the Philippines*, Politics in Asia Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 1998), 71.

system. The assembly system established a coordination hierarchy of sector councils. Each sector council nominated a single representative, approved by the President, to attend the cabinet-level NGO Assembly. In effect, it is a system of organized lobbying of the executive branch.

However, NGO success in implementing political reforms was mixed. Although the NGO Assembly and the Local Government Code inculcated NGOs into the government's decision-making process, government committees found ways to exclude the NGOs when desired or neutralize their policy recommendations.³⁰⁶ For example, several NGOs combined forces to draft the Party List Law and the Anti-Dynasty Bill. Although both laws were endorsed by the Commission on Elections and President Ramos, the Congress adopted, but neutered, the Party List Law, while the dynasty-dominated rules committee prevented discussion on the Anti-Dynasty Bill.³⁰⁷

Despite their meager political power, the social mobilization capability of NGOs is credited with a variety of demonstrations to defend the 1987 constitution. For instance, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines and Caucus of Development NGOs (CODE-NGO) led protests that convinced Estrada to cancel his plans to amend the constitution to his personal benefit. Similar protests convinced Arroyo not to request constitutional changes that would enable her to run for Prime Minister. Most recently, a coalition of NGOs led by NAMFREL advocated the automation of voting in order to prevent vote count manipulation.

3. Political Parties

Political parties are important to democracy for two reasons. The opposition provides a limited constraining effect upon the ruling regime's policy options. Second, political parties act as the pinnacles of group interests. Issues of security, economy, and norms are important drivers for motivating an opposition to form, voice its dissent, and mobilize the citizens to demand change. An alliance of opposition parties was critical to

³⁰⁶ Kent Eaton, "Restoration or Transformation? 'Trapos' Versus Ngos in the Democratization of the Philippines," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 62, no. 2 (2003): 485.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*: 479–81.

the downfall of Marcos. Without the alliance, there would have been little justification for the People Power Revolution to demand Marcos to step down. Since the defeat of Marcos, political parties have maximized the spectrum of political participation.

Prior to martial law, political parties had little relevance. The legislature was an “indistinct two-party system” in which the two parties “held power in alternation despite the absence of visible differences in their respective platforms and programmes [sic] of government.”³⁰⁸ Election results were somewhat predetermined, limiting the presidency to a select group of insiders. Of the first six presidents (Osmena, Roxas, Quirino, Magsaysay, Garcia, Macapagal), all had served as either Vice President or as a Cabinet Secretary.³⁰⁹

Political parties mattered little for either legislative or local elections as these were generally dominated by violence, intimidation and bribery; “guns, goons, and gold.”³¹⁰ The system gave disproportionate power to the wealthy since they could afford to buy the votes of the poor or hire thugs. Goons were typically used to intimidate voters at the not-so-secret ballot booth. Goons also served as tools of violence to coerce the opposition or, less frequently, kill political rivals. In some cases, politicians (responsible for the hiring, promotion and assignment of police) turned the police under their authority into a private army, using them to run their election campaigns and illegal activities.³¹¹ As the party mattered little during the election, party switching was common. Switching ensured continued access to pork, though only a limited number were allowed to switch lest the pork be spread too thin. Those unable or unwilling to switch became the voice of the opposition.

³⁰⁸ Luzviminda Tancango, “The Electoral System and Political Parties in the Philippines,” in *Government and Politics of the Philippines*, ed. José Pascual Guzmán de Alba and Mila A. Reforma (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 90–1.

³⁰⁹ Roxas was Secretary of Finance, Magsaysay was Defence.

³¹⁰ McCoy, *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines*, 188–94; Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, *Contested Democracy and the Left in the Philippines after Marcos*, Yale Southeast Asia Monographs (New Haven, CT: Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 2007), 2; Thompson, “Off the Endangered List: Philippine Democratization in Comparative Perspective,” 186; Paul D. Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora, “Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines,” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 3(2003): 274.

³¹¹ Hedman and Sidel, *Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial Legacies, Post-Colonial Trajectories*, 39–40.

The declaration of martial law removed the opposition from the government. Therefore, the opposition during martial law was not a political party, per se, but a coalition of political clans that allied with the Church and the business community. The opposition was not particularly powerful until the assassination of Benigno Aquino motivated the formation of an alliance. Gradually, this alliance coalesced around Corazon “Cory” Aquino as the prospective leader. The alliance portrayed Aquino as a simple, widowed housewife working to bring justice to the Philippines by deposing Marcos, the tyrant dictator. In some cases, this portrayal took on religious images, depicting the competition as a battle between the Virgin Mary and Pontius Pilate. As a widower of a man assassinated by the government, Cory Aquino wielded disproportionate influence. She was very successful in her calls for a civil disobedience campaign and a boycott against pro-Marcos businesses, media, and banks. In the end, it was the power of the opposition to get votes that brought Aquino into power.

In the post-Marcos period, opposition parties returned to their typical weak state. The design of the 1935 Constitution was perceived as flawed because it resulted in a lack of ideology-based parties. In an attempt to correct this flaw, the 1987 Constitution allowed multiple parties with low registration thresholds. Although there were a plethora of new parties, only the parties on the extreme right and left had a serious commitment to ideology. Party-switching of candidates was still common in order to increase the opportunity for pork barrel spending. The majority of citizens had no affiliation with a political party. The lack of a primary system and lack of politician commitment to a single party resulted in little party loyalty among the masses. There is little stability in the field as new parties continue to form. Parties form primarily for one of two reasons: to run a presidential candidate or to compete for party list representation. As the major parties select their presidential candidates, those that thought that they should have been the nominee often create their own party. For example, both Ramos and Estrada won the presidency after failing to be nominated, leaving their party, and forming their own party.

Parties are also created in order to take advantage of the party list proportional representation system. This system sets aside 20% of the lower house seats for minor parties (the major parties that dominate the other 80% of the seats are excluded from

participation). While the system ensures that small parties are represented, it creates an unintended incentive to create new parties. The system is essentially a fight for the political scraps. Since the number of seats that any one party can attain in the party list system was capped at three, the more successful minor parties will create splinter parties in order to gain more seats. For instance, the communist party (which runs through front parties), ran for party list seats across five different parties which expands its potential catch up to 15 seats. On the downside, there is little ideological differentiation between splinter parties. The party list system provided disincentives for small party consolidation, strong ideological platforms, and party loyalty.³¹²

4. The Ruling Regime

From Chapter II, it is expected that the ruling regime will adopt electoral changes when it is in its best interests and the interests of the regime's key supporters. Marcos reduced the level of democracy in response to increasing insurgent violence, but appeared to be also influenced by the desire to remain in power. Marcos was convinced to step down by a combination of public protests, the split in the military, and U.S. influence. Popular protests continued to deter presidents from attempts to manipulate the constitution. Protests, in conjunction with military pressure, convinced Estrada to step down from the presidency.

After liberation and independence, the new Philippine government adopted the traditions of pre-invasion politics: a de facto one-party system, Constitutional manipulation, and patronage. Besides the banning of the Communist party, political participation was widely inclusive. Politics remained relatively unchanged for almost 20 years until Ferdinand Marcos won the presidency in 1965 in a relatively free and fair election. Marcos took several steps to consolidate his power. During his term, Marcos named himself Defense Secretary and increased his control of the military by putting loyal officers into positions of power. Marcos made his cousin and childhood friend, Fabian Ver, the Armed Forces Chief of Staff. When forced to suspend Ver during the investigation into Aquino's assassination, Marcos put one of his second cousins, Fidel

³¹² Personal communication with Joel Rocamora, 11 Aug 2009.

Ramos, as the acting Chief of Staff. With the military under his control, Marcos ended democracy in 1972 with the declaration of martial law. A combination of factors likely motivated Marcos' decision for martial law. Marcos publicly blamed the communist insurgency and its terrorist attacks, but Marcos was likely also concerned about the growing power of the opposition behind Benigno Aquino and Eugenio Lopez.³¹³

Marcos' politics under martial law subsequently wiped out all semblances of democratic processes. Marcos abolished local elections, appointing and removing local officials at will. Marcos maintained order through repression and aggressive coercion of the opposition, the media, and the justice system. Media outlets not owned by Marcos' allies were shut down. Journalists critical of the regime were often arrested. Martial law gave Marcos the power to replace judges at will and reassign cases to military tribunals, over which Marcos had total control. Marcos threatened the Supreme Court with abolishment if it reached an unfavorable decision.

In 1973, Marcos dissolved congress and had a new Constitution drafted. Delaying the implementation of Article XVII of the Constitution to create a National Assembly, Marcos instead created the Batasang Bayan. The Batasang Bayan was limited to an advisory role to the President and only met for three days in 1976. In the meantime, economic pressure was mounting. Sugar prices collapsed. Economic crisis was averted through increased government spending. In order to solidify his patronage network and to provide a semblance of a return to normalcy, Marcos had the Constitution further amended in 1976 to create the Batasang Pambansa as a national legislature. This amendment created a mixed presidential-parliamentary system with Marcos as president, prime minister and lead legislator.

Perhaps Marcos had good intentions when he first declared martial law. However, his political and economic decisions gradually ostracized almost all major power groups in Philippine society. His policies were a threat to a wide range of interests, culminating in a broad coalition demanding his ouster. The Catholic Church was angered by government raids and lack of respect for religious sanctity. The business

³¹³ Wurfel, *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay*, 21.

community was angered by the monopoly power directed to Marcos' cronies, the inept government response to the banking crisis, and the deep recession that followed. A portion of the military was angry about Marcos' misuse of the military and the lack of merit-based promotions. Human rights groups were critical of his regime's repressive tactics. Despite large offensives against the NPA and a ceasefire with the MNLF, citizens were not substantially more secure than before martial law. The MILF refused to abide by the ceasefire signed by the MNLF. Small segments of the business community began an urban terrorist campaign. As all of these tensions simmered, the banking crisis and ensuing economic crisis was the catalyst to force political change.

On 9 January 1981, the flight of Dewey Dee led to the Philippine banking crisis. Twelve days later, Marcos proclaimed the end of martial law. Marcos started to slowly liberalize in 1981 by putting lipstick on the pig. The liberalizations, including the lifting of martial law, were entirely fraudulent, but involved the development of some democratic processes. Elections were seen as a potential outlet for rising tensions. The regime permitted Barangay elections in 1982 and provincial and legislative elections in 1984. Although the opposition only won one third of the seats, the following year they attempted to impeach Marcos. Although the move was easily deflected, the United States pressured Marcos to hold presidential elections in order to legitimize his continued hold on power. After all, it had been 15 years since he was last elected.

Marcos called for a snap presidential election in which he faced an opposition unified behind Corazon Aquino. Marcos won the election through widespread fraud. Outraged, people filled the streets in protest. The People Power demonstration was a clear indicator that the citizens wanted regime change. However, the peaceful removal of Marcos was not foreordained. Marcos had several options as he retained the loyalty of the majority of the Army.

The catalyst for Marcos' decision to step down can be partly tied to the actions of the United States. Marcos was dependent upon U.S. political support, financial aid, and cooperation in securing IMF loans. The United States also operated large Navy and Air Force facilities near Manila. Immediately after the Aquino assassination, U.S. Congressmen and State Department officials began to distance themselves from the

Marcos regime.³¹⁴ In time, President Reagan decided that it was time for Marcos to step down. As the crisis in the Philippines peaked in February 1986, Senator Paul Laxalt, Reagan's informal emissary to Marcos, told Marcos that the time had come to "cut, and cut cleanly."³¹⁵ By the end of the day, Marcos, his family and key supporters were on a U.S. transport out of the country. This analysis is not intended to suggest that the United States single-handedly brought democracy to the Philippines. It simply means that U.S. policy and actions were critical to influencing the choices of a key supplier of democracy, the regime.

After the people power demonstration in 1986, popular protests continued to have a powerful effect on Philippine politics. After the fall of Marcos, each of the four subsequent presidents attempted to modify the constitution. Aquino nullified the previous constitution and directed the development of the 1987 Constitution. Ramos, Estrada, and Arroyo all attempted to convene a Constituent Assembly (ConAss) in order to amend the constitution. In all three cases, protests erupted over concerns that the assembly was an attempt by the President to extend power or eliminate term limits.

The end of dictatorship and the return of democracy resulted in the 1987 Constitution. Instead of reinstating the 1935 Constitution, Aquino called for the development of a new constitution, purged local officials of questionably loyalty, and began legislative elections in 1987. This new Constitution adopted a multi-party system in order to avoid the de facto one-party rule predominant in the pre-martial law period. The multi-party system expanded participation, enticing the first communists to participate in politics (through front parties) since 1946. Political participation was further increased with the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, which delegated resources and manpower from the national government to the local governments for the provision of basic services. Despite the increased participation,

³¹⁴ Wurfel, *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay*, 282.

³¹⁵ Raymond Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy*, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books, 1987), 439–40.

there was still much criticism of the competition. The multitude of small parties required coalition politics in order to win the presidency. The complexity of inter-party alliances continued to encourage party-switching.³¹⁶

After the first coup attempt in 1987, Aquino toned down her social reform policies (e.g., land reform, breaking up the monopolies) in order to sustain her supporting coalition of landowners and military as well as to shore up foreign investor confidence. In the end, Aquino's presidency restored many of the elites of the pre-martial law period. The new assembly and cabinet were riddled with many of the same old faces. The ownership of land and businesses was heavily concentrated within a small percentage of the population.³¹⁷ Patronage returned to politics, though not universally. While some cities in Cebu, Mindanao and Panay showed a reduction in election intimidation and clientalism, similar cities in Negros and Central Luzon showed a return to patronage.³¹⁸

President Ramos, the former Armed Forces Chief of Staff, had considerable more political options regarding state security. With no threat of a coup, Ramos legalized the Communist Party, signed a peace agreement with the MNLF, and began negotiations with the MILF. Although Ramos wanted to amend the constitution to eliminate term limits, public protests convinced Congress not to convene a ConAss. Partly motivated by the economic difficulties of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Ramos extended political participation through the 1998 Indigenous People's Rights Act that delegated control over local resources.

Political crisis erupted in 2001 in the middle of President Estrada's term. Estrada was impeached for embezzlement and running an illegal gambling operation. His supporters in the Senate intervened to prevent the presentation of evidence which showed that Estrada had been depositing large sums of money under a false name. Although Estrada had enough supporters in the senate to avoid conviction, the senate's refusal to

³¹⁶ Sherrill, "Promoting Democracy: Results of Democratization Efforts in the Philippines," 219–20.

³¹⁷ Wurfel, *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay*, 55.

³¹⁸ Benedict J. Kerkvliet and Resil B. Mojares, *From Marcos to Aquino: Local Perspectives on Political Transition in the Philippines* (Honolulu and Manila: University of Hawaii Press and Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1991), 34–5, 81, 100–1, 41–2, 223–5.

admit evidence sparked outrage in January 2001 across many of the same groups that brought down Marcos: the Catholic Church, the business community, the middle class, NGOs, and the Communist Party. Without a method of removing the President, citizens turned to street protests in what is commonly referred to as Power People II or EDSA II. In the face of the massive protests, Estrada's coalition began to fall apart. Vice President Arroyo joined the protestors. Several cabinet members resigned. However, Estrada decided to step down only after the Armed Forces Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP) notified Estrada that they no longer supported him. When pressed, the Supreme Court reviewed the situation and announced Arroyo as the new president based upon *salus populi est suprema lex* (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).³¹⁹ Although certainly not a model for a constitutional change of the presidency, the lack of constitutional options to hold the president accountable provided some justification to the action. However, it is doubtful that Estrada's removal accurately represented the "will of the people" of the Philippines since Estrada's political base was the rural communities.

Despite political reforms and the power of the people, coercion and corruption continued to plague the competitiveness of Philippine elections. After serving for three years as Estrada's replacement, Arroyo ran for president in 2004 winning amid widespread accusations of fraud. After the 2004 election, tapes surfaced implicating Arroyo in vote padding through the Commission on Elections. Arroyo survived four separate impeachment attempts. Amid a minor coup and building anti-fraud protests, Arroyo declared a state of emergency, banning all rallies. The declaration was supported by the PNP, but not by the military. After only three weeks, Arroyo ended the state of emergency. Unlike Estrada, though, the military never suggested that Arroyo should step down.

Even with the success in maintaining the level of democracy, post-Marcos presidents continued to reinforce the patronage system, using pork projects and the

³¹⁹ For a detailed account of the Estrada ouster, see Carl H. Lande, "The Return Of "People Power" In the Philippines," *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 2 (2001): 88–102.

withholding of national allocations to local governments controlled by the opposition.³²⁰ The system limits free elections if people know that a vote for a certain political party means a halt to government services rather than a change in policy. The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled in 2009 that the national government's withholding of the budget allotment was illegal.

Violence continues to be a problem at the local level as regional bosses attempt to use their power to secure their position. For instance, some suspect that the Governor of Batangas used paramilitary forces to assassinate uncooperative local politicians within his district. In a more recent example, in November 2009, the Ampatuan clan was accused of killing 22 women and 30 journalists in an attempt to prevent an opponent's registration as a candidate.

D. SUMMARY

Those that view democracy as an economically egalitarian outcome are likely to have a negative view of Philippine democracy. There is a high concentration of ownership of the means of production. Market reforms under Aquino created conditions conducive to the rebirth of powerful landowners. Large segments of the population perceive that they are not receiving the benefits of a growing economy. Anecdotal stories about underemployment (e.g., housekeepers with college educations) are widespread. However, if democracy is viewed as a method of selection and accountability of government leaders, then the Philippine has made great strides. In the Philippines case, changes in the level of income, industrialization, and violence hold no consistent explanatory value for changes in the level of democracy; instead, the democracy outcome can only be understood in the context of the actors' reactions to changes in security, the economy, and norms.

GDP, by itself, appears to be a poor explanatory cause for the levels of Philippine democracy. Economic income was on a rapid 50% rise while democracy was tumbling in the late 1960s. Conversely, after income crashed in the 1980s, democracy dramatically

³²⁰ Personal communications with Chito Gascon, 8 Aug 2009, Joel Rocamora, 11 Aug 2009, and Alex Brillantes, 11 Aug 2009.

increased. While moderate income levels in the Philippines might explain success in the sustainment of the level of democracy, changes in the level of income explains little as GDP in 1986 was the same as 1976. This case suggests that economic crisis had far more explanatory power than income levels. The economic crisis of the 1980s led to massive demonstrations, but was not an isolated factor in convincing Marcos to step down. The crisis limited Marcos' options, forcing him to cut government spending and fracture his alliance by disbanding government monopolies. NGOs ranging from business groups to the Catholic Church to wealthy landowners turned from reluctant supporters of the regime to outright opponents partly based upon the economy but also due to the assassination of Benigno Aquino. While the economic crisis contributed as a catalyst, the actions of the military and the United States were the drivers that convinced Marcos to permit a return to democracy. Interestingly, the Philippines' only other economic crisis during the period of study also resulted in an increase in the level of democracy. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis had a positive, though limited, effect on democracy as President Ramos expanded political participation through the Indigenous People's Rights Act in response to economic unrest.

The correlation between economic development and democracy in the Philippines is ambiguous. Industrialization in the Philippines took off in the 1960s and 1970s. It is plausible that a lack of industrialization, and lack of powerful organizations, contributed to the citizens' acquiescence of the collapse of democracy in 1969 and 1972. Arguably, the Philippines was simply not developed enough to resist autocratization at the time. Over the next ten years, industrial growth, though concentrated in three major cities, fostered a literate, well-educated middle-income tier. This industrialization was accompanied by a growing youth bulge that had both a high rate of college completion and underemployment. This youth bulge and the middle-income tier provided the core of the masses during the People Power Revolution. However, People Power did not guarantee that democracy would follow Marcos. The economically powerful supported democracy as the preferred alternative to the crony system under Marcos.

Intrastate violence also had a significant, though inconsistent effect on the level of democracy. The Huk Rebellion in the 1950s had no effect on the level of democracy

while the 1969 NPA Rebellion led to a sharp decrease in democracy. The difference between the two incidents can be isolated by the reaction of the ruling executive. The military and Marcos were likely influenced by the war in Southeast Asia and U.S. policy towards communism. Secretary of National Defence Magsaysay's aggressive counterinsurgency campaign broke the Huk rebellion in less than two years. After more than three years of counterinsurgency under Marcos, the NPA was still on the rise. While Marcos blamed the NPA for martial law, it may have also been a convenient excuse for the consolidation of power. Again, intrastate violence as an isolated factor does not have a consistent influence upon the level of democracy. The Philippines was able to achieve a high level of democracy in 1986 despite sustained high levels of intrastate violence. However, it is plausible that the gradual reduction of intrastate violence served to reduce the strain that intrastate violence has on sustaining high levels of democracy.

While economic crisis and insurgent violence were important causal factors in the changes in the levels of democracy, the contribution of changing democratic norms cannot be discounted. Increasing economic income and economic development certainly led to increased potential for the spread of democratic norms through increasing social interconnectedness, higher university education rates, increasing interconnectedness with foreign democracies, and the rise of an independent media. Increasing norms were evident in the birth of NAMFREL in the early 1950s as well as the People Power demonstrations. During Corazon Aquino's funeral procession in August 2009, the streets were lined with supporters. There is widespread belief that the people power of the funeral is an indicator that the people will not stand for a return to autocracy.³²¹ Much of the demand for democracy appears to be borne more from a mistrust of a Marcos-style dictatorship than any belief in democracy; a bad democracy is better than a Marcos dictatorship. While increasing democratic norms may explain the increasing demand for democracy in the Philippines, it is not a sufficient explanation for the timing of the People Power revolt.

³²¹ Personal communication with Ramon Casiple, 12 Aug 2009.

While Marcos' decision to step down was critical to the increase in democracy, his decision was largely influenced by other actors. The business community and the Catholic Church began to actively oppose Marcos, monitoring and reporting the widespread fraud during the 1986 election. The military's internal split, primarily affected by normative factors that placed protection of the people above loyalty to the ruler, limited Marcos' ability to use force to crush the opposition. Finally, the regime's own actions combined with economic crisis and increasing democratic norms led to the creation of a powerful opposition party unified around a martyr figure. In the end, U.S. influence convinced Marcos to leave peacefully and hand over his regime to the opposition.

VI. SENEGAL: THE CASE OF A POOR, UNDER-DEVELOPED DEMOCRACY

Senegal gradually adopted a high level of democracy through incremental changes over 26 years from 1974 to 2000. However, reforms since 2000 indicate that Senegal may be regressing towards a lower level of democracy. Senegal was selected as a case because this substantial democratization occurred despite extremely low levels of economic income and industrialization. Theory suggests that such an economy generally has a low diffusion of democratic norms and a significant aversion to democracy among the landlords. Senegal is also an interesting case because it is one of the few democracies in a predominantly Islamic country.

In this chapter, the analytical model discussed in Chapter II is used to analyze the determinants of Senegal's level of democracy since independence in 1960. Specifically, this chapter seeks to identify those factors that enabled Senegal to achieve a high level of democracy despite significant barriers. The model and the quantitative results from Chapter III indicate that low-income, low industrialization, and on-going insurgency should have acted as considerable obstacles to the achievement of a high level of democracy.

The analytical model views the level of democracy as the result of the interaction of actors. The model can be viewed as a supply and demand function. Actors, influenced by structural factors, determine the supply and demand components. The resulting supply-demand equilibrium is the level of democracy. In the context of this study, the level of democracy is a measure of the process to select representatives through free, competitive elections, with open participation, and within the un-manipulated constraints of electoral rules.

As discussed in Chapter II, demand for democracy is a rational choice of individuals and groups within a society. This study examines the effect that the economy, the security situation, and the diffusion of democratic norms have on citizens' demand for democracy. Increasing internal security, economic income, economic

industrialization, and the diffusion of norms increase the demand for democracy. Conversely, high or increasing intrastate violence, low-income, and low industrialization have a deterrent or regressive effect upon demand.

On the other side of the demand-supply equation, institutions make rational choice decisions to dedicate time, resources, and prestige to supplying (or limiting the supply of) democracy. The institutions with the most impact on democracy include the military, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), political parties, and the ruling regime. These institutions are affected by the same economic, security, and diffusion factors that shape the citizens' demand for democracy, though not necessarily in the same manner or to the same magnitude.

This chapter begins with a brief background on the political history of Senegal. Then, the citizens' demand for democracy is presented in three parts: the economy, security, and norms. Despite Senegal's low level of industrialization, democratic norms were relatively high at independence due to its colonial experience. While Senegal was one of only a few African countries able to vote under colonial rule, democratic norms in Senegal were limited outside of urban elite circles. Citizen political mobilization was largely a reaction to economic downturns. But, these were not specifically calls for increased democracy, but for *Sopi* (change). Security issues had little effect on the average Senegalese citizen since the Casamance insurgency was geographically remote and electoral riots were limited in scope.

The institutions' supply of democracy is broken into four sections: the military, NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime. The actions of the military, NGOs, political parties, and ruling regime were important factors in determining Senegal's level of democracy. An apolitical military and a viable, organized opposition party made increases in the level of democracy a possibility. Although religious groups actively worked to sustain the autocratic system in exchange for local power and funding, economic crisis and internal party disputes strained government patronage and fractured the ruling party; enabling a change in government to take place. The ruling regime enacted all of the major political reforms that resulted in substantial changes in the level of democracy. The ruling regime responded to varying structural factors over time.

Nearly all of the reforms were partly motivated by an attempt to provide an outlet for economic discontent. Early reforms in the 1970s were entirely economic related. Political reforms of the 1980s and 1990s were still driven by the economy, but less directly. As frustrations grew over the economy, post-election riots broke out when voting failed to result in change. Reforms were enacted to placate the demands of the rioters, but also to meet foreign conditional aid requirements. In 2000, the citizens, disgruntled by a significant cut in government services, voted out the ruling party. The ruling regime voluntarily stepped down. The military announced the results in favor of the opposition. The independent media spread the word to the citizens. Knowing that the military was averse to repression of demonstrators and that foreign aid donors might balk at a sudden increase in autocracy, the ruling regime had little choice but to step down.

A. BRIEF HISTORY OF SENEGALESE POLITICS

Prior to the 19th century invasion by France, Senegal was a disjointed collection of ten states with a patchwork of ten different ethnicities.³²² Located at a geographical crossroads, these states had gone through various stages of union and partition under several African empires including the Ghana, Tukolor, Djolof, and Mali Empires. As the regional empires collapsed, local states established weak monarchies and aristocracies. The monarchies' power was strengthened by the establishment of trade with the Portuguese in the 15th century and boosted again by the slave trade with the British and the French in the 17th century.³²³

As trade with Europe flourished, Dakar became the primary port for slaves while Saint-Louis (see Figure 16) was the primary port for trading gum arabic. These two excellent ports made Senegal an ideal bridgehead for the French to launch invasions across West Africa in the 19th century. The states gave the French a mixed welcome. While the Wolof states resisted, several states cooperated with the French in order to bring down the dominant Wolof. As the French defeated the Wolof states, the ruling

³²² Fulbe, Lebu, Serer, Wolof, Tukolor, Bambara, Diola, Fulbe, Mandinka, and Sarakollé.

³²³ Sheldon Gellar, *Democracy in Senegal: Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 25–6.

classes and the warrior aristocracy were eliminated, leaving the Mouride brotherhood (an Islamic sect dominated by the Wolof ethnic group) as the de facto leaders in northwestern and central Senegal.³²⁴ Although the French initially allowed cooperative tribal chiefs such as the Serer to maintain their authority, the local power structures were eventually dismantled and replaced by French administrators.



Figure 16. Map of Senegal

As they expanded their control across Senegal, the French encouraged the expansion of peanut cultivation as a cash crop partly through large land grants to marabouts (religious leaders) for peanut farming. The French built ports, roads, and railroads to facilitate peanut exportation. Dakar, declared the administrative capital of all of French West Africa, became the primary port serving as an important waypoint for European trade routes to South America and Sub-Saharan Africa. A two-spoke railroad with Dakar as the hub was built in the 1880s: northeast to the former capital of Saint Louis and east through the central portion of the peanut basin. Peanut farming flourished

³²⁴ Gellar, *Senegal--an African Nation between Islam and the West*, Profiles. Nations of Contemporary Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982); Donal Brian Cruise O'Brien, *Saints & Politicians: Essays in the Organisation of a Senegalese Peasant Society*, African Studies Series 15 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 87–109.

along the rail lines while the economy floundered along Senegal's eastern and southern regions. Beyond the development of infrastructure for the transportation of groundnuts, little industry was cultivated in colonial Senegal despite the significant presence of international trade and capital in Dakar.

As they increased their control and the local infrastructure, the French inadvertently sparked the spread of Islam. Previously competitive tribes were conducting trade and traveling by railroad. The traditional tribal chiefs were abolished and the rural marabouts filled the political vacuum.³²⁵ Although originally anti-imperialist, the marabouts gradually developed a cooperative relationship with the French colonial government. As decolonization approached, the administrative control of the French was carried out by the marabouts.

Senegal became independent in 1960 through a peaceful process offered by President de Gaulle. After a four-month attempt to form a federation with Mali, Senegal created its own government. Although the democratic processes were limited, the government was far more democratic than its peers. However, in less than two years, a power struggle converted the government from a competitive democracy to a one-party dictatorship. Senegal gradually increased its level of democracy over a quarter of a century. The next section explores the factors that led to citizen demands for something more in Senegal.

B. SHAPING INTERESTS: DEMAND FOR DEMOCRACY

This section analyzes the change in demand for democracy in Senegal's citizens in three parts. The first part addresses various aspects of Senegal's economy: income, industrialization, oil rents, and economic crisis. The second part addresses the effect of the insurgency. The final part analyzes the diffusion of democratic norms.

³²⁵Andrew Francis Clark, "Imperialism, Independence, and Islam in Senegal and Mali," *Africa Today* 46, no. 3/4 (1999): 156–7.

1. Income, Industrialization, and Crisis

As discussed in Chapter II, various aspects of the economy are considered important variables for the growth of democracy. An increased income level enables citizens to worry less about meeting basic needs and become more politically active. Increasing industrialization and services leads to the development of unions and professional associations. In turn, these groups become important lobbying mechanisms to ensure that the government respects the will of the people. Finally, economic crises, although not motivators for democracy, can serve as catalysts for regime change. Senegal's economic experience runs against the grain of the economic theories of democracy. Senegal has a very low level of income though there are pockets of higher income in the major cities. Senegal has been in a 50-year economic malaise with little positive movement in the country's GDP per capita. With low levels of industrialization, Senegal had few significant professional associations. Economic crises during the 1960s and 1970s motivated demand for change, but not democracy. Although Senegal has enjoyed small periods of growth, per capita GDP has been in an economic malaise since independence. However, poverty is not equally spread across the regions. Dakar and the northwestern regions with major urban centers such as Thies, Diourbel, Saint-Louis, and Louga have the lowest poverty rates in the country.³²⁶

Upon independence, Senegal's economy was entirely based upon the cultivation, milling, and international trade of peanuts. Attempts to diversify into textiles failed as the infant industry could not compete with cheap imports smuggled in through Gambia. As the primary commodity, peanuts became a target for the creation of government revenue through an export tax. In order to more efficiently maintain accountability and collect the export tax, President Leopold Senghor created a government corporation with a monopoly on the peanut trade. The monopoly had the additional benefit of localizing the economy by forcing French and Lebanese traders out of the export business. In 1962, Senghor remolded Senegal into a one-party dictatorship. As part of the rational for

³²⁶ Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Demographie (ANSD), Live Database, Conditions of Hardship and Poverty, 1996–1999; online: www.ansd.sn (accessed 15 Dec 2009).

limiting democracy, Senghor believed in modernization theory's argument that economic development should occur prior to democratization.³²⁷

At first, the Senegalese economy was kept relatively stable by French subsidies. But, as a condition of entry into the European Economic Community, France agreed to stop paying preferential prices for Senegalese peanuts. Once France ended the subsidy in 1968, local peanuts prices plunged 25% in Senegal. The following year delivered a five-year drought, exacerbating the economic problem. The crisis brought on strikes which the government settled using a combination of force and incentives.

But, the country's second decade brought more economic problems. The peanut market was hit hard in the 1970s. Because of the disproportionately large effect that peanuts had on government revenue, peanut crisis equated to economic crisis. For example, throughout the 1980s, groundnut products averaged only 5% of Senegal's GDP while averaging 20% of exports (36% in a good year).³²⁸ But, peanut exports were inconsistent as the prolonged drought hurt crop yields and farmers switched to non-taxed subsistence agriculture. In order to improve their profits, farmers began smuggling peanuts through Gambia to avoid the Senegalese export tax.³²⁹ In an effort to stem the tide, the government monopoly doubled its purchase price for peanuts. While world peanut prices were relatively stable during the late 1970s, a strong CFA Franc (pegged to the French Franc) and high oil import prices narrowed profit margins on exports. As the revenue stream continued to dry up, government debt increased while the state attempted to reign in spending. Meanwhile, in the academic literature, the development-first argument of modernization theory was losing favor. Along with this change in academic theory, economic unrest pressured Senghor to loosen electoral rules in 1974 and extend participation further in 1976.

³²⁷ Personal communication with Ibrahima Thioub, 10 Nov 2009.

³²⁸ Contributions a la Croissance du PIB, Principales Exportations de Biens, spreadsheet e-mailed to author from ANSD.

³²⁹ Senegal helped Gambia's President return to power after an attempted Marxist coup / revolution. The Senegambia Confederation was created shortly afterwards. However, Gambia continued to be a haven for smuggling exports. The confederation collapsed in 1989 after Gambia's leader suggested that the presidency of the confederation should rotate between the two countries.

Struggling to stay solvent, Senegal was hit with another drought in 1977–1980 bringing further reductions in crop yields. Unable to balance the budget while facing decreasing revenues, Senegal turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance. The IMF directed Senegal to undergo a structural adjustment program as a condition of the loan. Structural adjustment required economic liberalization and decreased government intervention in the economy. The government dissolved the peanut monopoly. But, the economy continued to suffer. Deforestation, desertification, and population growth put pressure on the remaining arable land. The export peanut market collapsed in the mid 1980s. The government's 1984 New Agricultural Policy ended government assistance to farmers. Prior to the 1984 law, the government developed the land and provided water and easy credit to farmers. The change increased capital requirements for farmers, many turning to farmer associations for help.³³⁰ As peanut exports collapsed 50% over two years, the export tax on nuts was removed in 1985.³³¹ In an effort to correct the loss of cash flow, the public administration workforce was cut by 10% in 1985 and an additional 20% in 1986.

As part of the structural adjustment, Senegal passed the 1986 New Industrial Policy. The policy lowered import tariffs and directed the privatization of government run companies. The changes essentially wiped out Senegal's struggling textile industry. The 1980s economic crisis combined with the structural adjustment caused strains to all sectors of the economy. The crisis spawned an increased demand for change, especially in urban communities, in the 1988 presidential election. But, the demand for change had little breadth. While there were many student protests, religious leaders and the business community were largely absent from the demands for electoral reform.

A preponderance of religious leaders was clients of the state. In return for local control, religious leaders provided the votes of their followers to the ruling party. Many religious leaders acted as landlord-clerics, providing land, credit, and equipment to loyal followers. The low level of industrialization in Senegal forced the business community

³³⁰ Bernard Lecomte, "Senegal: The Young Farmers of Walo & the New Agricultural Policy," *Review of African Political Economy* 55(1992): 89–91.

³³¹ Contributions a la Croissance Du Pib, ANSD.

to also be a client of the state. The lack of capital and economic growth limited business independence from the regime. Due to a lack of local capital, companies primarily received financing through French sources or through state regulators who could provide subsidized loans.³³² Additionally, most services and industries survived on government contracts. Those that spoke out against the ruling party could find government organizations choosing not to renew their contract.

However, the portions of the business community not reliant upon government expenditures did organize. The Union Nationale des Commerçants et Industriels du Sénégal (UNACOIS) represented the informal sector (untaxed and unregulated); largely small-scale traders, retailers, and transportation workers. UNACOIS was, in effect, a lobby group using protests, strikes and boycotts to oppose taxes and increased regulation. Although UNACOIS eventually lost the fight on the value-added tax, the group provided an important rally point for urban workers to participate in politics.

Since the structural adjustment of the 1980s, the Senegalese economic landscape shifted considerably. Though over two thirds of the labor force was still working in agriculture, agriculture sank to less than 30% of GDP, largely displaced by fish products and services. Over 50% of GDP was contributed by services (e.g., commerce, government services, and real estate). Industry (e.g., food processing, fertilizer, building materials, and utilities) remained a marginal sector, inching from 9% of GDP in 1980 to 13% in 2000.³³³ After 1993, chemical product exports (solid fertilizer and phosphoric acid) surpassed nuts.³³⁴ Increased oil refinery capacity in 2001 provided Senegal an opportunity to further diversify its economic portfolio.

Senegal's economic development does provide a partial explanation for the level of democracy. Senegal is clearly no longer a peanut economy. The economic liberalization of the 1980s resulted in "the diffusion of control over economic resources to include groups outside of the state [which] has created diverse centers of power, thus

³³² Momar-Coumba Diop Ibrahima Thioub, and Catherine Boone, "Economic Liberalization in Senegal: Shifting Politics of Indigenous Business Interests," *African Studies Review* 41, no. 2 (1998).

³³³ Contributions a la Croissance Du Pib, ANSD.

³³⁴ Principales Exportations De Biens, ANSD.

effectively limiting any hegemonic monopoly of political control.”³³⁵ While a successful economy is expected to result in professional associations, it was the economic crises that forced the bonding of interests among farmers’ associations and business groups.

Economic crises in Senegal were a catalyst for mobilizing protests. However, it was not until the severe crisis in the 1980s and the corresponding IMF-directed structural adjustment that businessmen and farmers began to organize into associations. By 2000, the economy had recovered. But, in order to stabilize the economy and the national debt, the government had cut services. The cut in government jobs led to a serious underemployment problem in urban Senegal as college students become a disproportionately high percentage of the unemployed. For example, in 2005, unemployment among university graduates in Dakar was 23.5%, ten points higher than those that did not attend secondary school.³³⁶ Underemployment for college graduates combined with increasing enrollment was a volatile mix. President Diouf was never able to get control of the universities, making the youth bulge an increasing electoral threat to his regime.³³⁷ While cutting government services enabled Diouf to balance the budget, the citizens punished the ruling party at the polls for the drop in services.³³⁸ Even so, the Senegalese citizens’ response to economic crisis appears relatively mild when compared to those of Mexico or the Philippines. Perhaps this mild response can partially be explained by the large numbers of Senegalese emigrants who act as a safety valve for a portion of the economically discontent.³³⁹

2. Intrastate Violence

As discussed in Chapter II, an outbreak in violence is expected to deter democratization or encourage a regime to move towards autocracy. Further, a transition

³³⁵ Leonardo Villalón, *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens in Fatick* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 261.

³³⁶ Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Demographie (ANSD), *Situation Economique et Sociale de la Region De Dakar*, January 2006.

³³⁷ Personal communication with Ibrahima Thioub, 10 Nov 2009.

³³⁸ Ibid..

³³⁹ Penda Mbow, "Senegal: The Return of Personalism," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 1 (2008): 161.

to democracy during a period of intrastate violence is unlikely to sustain democracy as a significant segment of the population was not involved in the design of the democratic processes or clearly does not agree to the “rules of the game.” Databases for political violence indicate that the insurgency in Senegal ended in 1999, indicating that there was a potential correlation between the termination of hostilities and the large increase in the level of democracy in 2000. In actuality, insurgency violence continued to persist despite the 2000 ceasefire. Regardless, the insurgency in the Casamance appeared to have little effect on Senegalese politics even at the peak of violence. The lack of effect can be attributed to the remoteness of Casamance: geographically, politically, ethnically, and religiously. The security issues in the Casamance simply do not enter the political considerations of the majority of Senegalese. Low levels of urban violence also appeared to have little effect on the overall demand for democracy. Protests and riots never presented a serious security concern.

Prior to 1982, Senegal had relatively little intrastate violence with only some minor riots and strikes. In 1982, the Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces (MFDC) began a separatist uprising in southwestern Senegal, an area dominated by Diola, a predominantly Catholic ethnic group with historic ties to the peoples in present day Guinea-Bissau. There were several reasons for the uprising including perceptions of exploitation, encroachment, and ostracism. Largely remote from Dakar due to the intercession of the Gambia River and the political boundaries of Gambia, the Diola perceived that the government provided their region less resources and favored northern emigrants with political appointments and land grants in the region.³⁴⁰ During the 1970s drought, many northern farmers moved to the lush Casamance region. The migration inevitably caused tensions over land and the perception that the government privileged the rights of the northerners at the expense of the people of Casamance.

Surprisingly, the Casamance insurgency had little impact on the rest of Senegal. This appears largely due to the fact that events in the Casamance have little effect on the security in other regions of Senegal due to its isolation. With the ocean to its West and

³⁴⁰ Sheldon Gellar, *Senegal--an African Nation between Islam and the West*, Profiles. Nations of Contemporary Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 117.

Gambia to the North, Casamance is logistically difficult to get to from northern Senegal. The ocean ferry from Dakar is slow and weather-dependent. Driving from northern Senegal requires the use of a river ferry and four customs and immigration inspections going into and out of Gambia. It is possible that citizens are also reassured by the presence of French troops in Dakar. However, the French do not provide internal security but instead are meant to deter interstate conflict. Additionally, the level of violence from the insurgency is relatively low, rarely reaching the threshold for inclusion into political violence databases. Between the Political Instability Task Force and the Major Episodes of Political Violence databases, only 1992–1999 were designated as episodes of significant violence. Although a ceasefire was signed just prior to the 2000 election, low levels of violence continued to persist. Despite the fact that opposition candidate Abdoulaye Wade attempted to politicize the Casamance insurgency by claiming that he could settle the issue within 100 days, it is doubtful that the issue had any significant effect on voting patterns beyond the relatively few areas in the Casamance where security was a major concern.

Urban unrest had a far more significant impact upon the citizenry's political preferences than the insurgency. Urban unrest began to grow during the 1984 economic crisis as students protested the lack of promised educational reforms and lack of jobs for graduates. After the 1988 elections, urban youth and university students rioted, accusing President Diouf of fraud. In response, the government arrested opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade as an instigator and closed the university for the school year. The increasing tensions were momentarily defused by an international conflict.

In response to desertification and drought, a joint effort of Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal constructed two major dams along the Senegal River in the mid-1980s dramatically increasing the value of nearby land on both sides of the Mauritania-Senegal border. Despite the political boundary that bifurcated the two shores of the Senegal River Valley, there was a common ethnicity among the black Africans that farmed the land on either side of the river. In 1988, Mauritania began a land redistribution campaign designed to increase farming efficiency by providing land to those with the capital required for modern farming. The redistribution gave the appearance that the

Mauritanian government, predominantly Arab Moors, was seizing the lands from poor blacks and giving it to wealthy Moors.³⁴¹ Senegalese public opinion widely sided with the plight of the black Africans. Tensions flared after an incident in which two Senegalese were killed by Mauritanian soldiers. Anti-Moor violence erupted in Senegal. In retribution, ethnic violence broke out in Mauritania. The conflict ended with an ethnic trade. Most Moors left Senegal while most black Africans left Mauritania. Instead of faulting the government for its failure to prevent ethnic violence, most Senegalese supported the government's aggressive stance against the Mauritaniens in support of their ethnic brothers.³⁴²

Senegal remained relatively calm until the next presidential election. In March 1993, Kéba Mbaye resigned as president of the Constitutional Council during tabulation of the presidential vote. Two months later, the vice-president of the Constitutional Council, Babacar Séye, was assassinated during the deliberation of electoral challenges. The government blamed the opposition and arrested Wade, once again, amid post-election riots. Overall, intrastate violence had little effect on the demand for democracy in Senegal. While, economic crisis and implications of election fraud motivated protests, containing these activities was within the repressive capacities of the state and presented no security threat to the overall population.

3. The Diffusion of Norms

As discussed in Chapter II, the spread of democratic ideas provides citizens increased awareness of the benefits of democracy relative to autocracy and an improved ability to analyze the existing level of democracy. These norms highlight the inadequacy of democratic processes in hybrid regimes and underscore democracy as the rational choice. Norms have a wide variety of inputs including colonial legacy, ethno-religious identity, access to information, religious organizations, and international influence. Democratic ideals in Senegal were shaped by the Senegalese political experience under

³⁴¹ Ron Parker, "The Senegal-Mauritania Conflict of 1989: A Fragile Equilibrium," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 29, no. 1 (1991): 158–9.

³⁴² *Ibid.*: 165–6.

French colonial rule and reinforced by continual contact of Senegalese urban elites with France through travel and literature. Democratic ideals gradually spread to rural areas through political rallies and independent radio.

Despite the ethno-religious diversity of Senegal, the mixing bowl effect and the predominance of the Wolof language defused group identity as an obstacle to democracy. The ebb and flow of empires and migration introduced Islam into Senegal and left the region with nine partially integrated ethnic groups. Western Senegal was the domain of the Fulbe, Lebu, Serer, and Wolof. The Tukolor had scattered concentrations along the eastern border. The south was a mixture of Bambara, Diola, Fulbe, Mandinka, and Sarakollé. Wolof is the largest of Senegal's ethnic groups comprising 40% of the population while Tukolor, Serer, and Diola are also major ethnic groups. The majority of the ethnic groups are Muslim, though the Diola, influenced by the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau, are largely Catholic. Although the separatists in the Casamance are Catholic Diola, the homogeneity of the insurgency has not caused ethnic or religious tensions for Catholics or Diola in the rest of Senegal. A frequent explanation for the collegial relationship is the "joking cousins" bond that creates a mythical kinship across tribes.³⁴³

During the majority of colonial rule, Senegalese voters were a seemingly homogenous group of urban elites. Under the French, select elites, about five percent, of Senegalese from the Four Communes (Saint Louis, Dakar, Gorée, and Rufisque) were permitted to vote beginning in 1848.³⁴⁴ Although the colonizers worked to turn the locals into Frechmen, the communes were not homogenous. They were a mix of Wolof, Serer, and Lebu; primarily Muslim but with a significant Christian minority. Although Islam is often critiqued as incompatible with democracy, Senegalese Islam is known for being tolerant and flexible.³⁴⁵ Certainly, a portion of the acceptance of democratic ideals is attributable to the French colonial system which developed political awareness among the urban Senegalese elites.

³⁴³ See Ferdinand de Jong, "A Joking Nation: Conflict Resolution in Senegal," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 39, no. 2 (2005); Dennis Galvan, "Joking Kinship as a Syncretic Institution," *CAHIERS D ETUDES AFRICAINES*, no. 184 (2006).

³⁴⁴ Gellar, *Senegal--an African Nation between Islam and the West*, 8.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., *Democracy in Senegal: Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa*, 108–23.

Democratic ideals spread little beyond the four communes until after World War II when suffrage was extended to males nationwide, a territorial assembly was created, and Senegalese representation in the French National Assembly was expanded to two deputies and three senators. In 1956, women were given the right to vote. By the time that independence arrived in 1960, Senegalese elites had a healthy supply of politicians, knowledge of democracy, and a desire to be a “modern” state. But, this development was primarily urban. Although the communes developed French-educated intellectuals for politicians, the rural population looked to the marabouts as their political leaders while universal participation did spread a national sense of citizenship with the right of participation. Perhaps the most tangible democratic outcome of colonization was Senegal’s constitutional design. Largely influenced by the French Constitution of 1958, Senegal adopted France’s mixed executive system, administrative divisions with regions and departments, and the length of the presidential term.

Urban democratic ideals were strong at independence and maintained through social interactions, the progressive university system, and the influence of international norms. There were especially significant interactions between France and Senegal; Senegal is a tourist destination for the French while France is popular among Senegalese migrant workers. To a lesser extent, Senegalese migrant workers developed significant stocks in other democracies such as Italy, Spain, the United States, and Canada.

Despite this apparent success, democratic norms had not spread to the rural communities. The French administered the rural regions through a patron-client system operated through the marabouts. Like Mexico and the Philippines, Senegal’s autocracy was highly centralized. Although each region had a governor and assembly, their actual power was limited. Rural councils gradually replaced the powerless regional assemblies beginning in 1972. Although these councils had some local regulatory authority, they lacked independence from the existing political structure. One third of council seats were reserved for the cooperatives run by the marabouts. The leader of the rural council was a representative from the Ministry of the Interior. Further, the Ministry of Interior could

replace council members at will or veto council laws. The structure of the rural council merely served to reinforce the authority of the executive and the patronage system established through the marabouts.

The rural communities at independence were largely illiterate and un-educated. National literacy rates remained less than 10% through 1980. Even as recent as 2007, only 39% of the population was literate in the national language while another 20% was literate only in Arabic or a non-national tribal language.³⁴⁶ Primary school enrollment, only 45% in 1990, in rural areas was only a third of that in the urban communities.³⁴⁷ The spread of suffrage without the spread of democratic ideals merely led to the institutionalization of patronage. Government control of print, television, and radio media also restrained the spread of democratic norms. Even as the economy developed and enabled the rise of independent newspapers and information technology, information distribution was largely constrained to Dakar.

Despite the lack of literacy and education rates, democratic ideals did spread to rural Senegal. To a large extent, egalitarian and democratic ideals were diffused by politicians themselves during political speeches delivered in local languages.³⁴⁸ Politics was often discussed in communities with an unusually high level of social interaction through grassroots associations formed around agriculture, youth groups, and women's groups. The arrival of independent radio in 1994 multiplied this interaction while providing nationwide political awareness. The independence of radio in Senegal was critical because it was and remains the primary method of information distribution. While less than five percent of Senegalese have a phone or a computer, even shepherders have a radio.³⁴⁹ However, the spread of democratic ideals through political speeches and radio presented divergent understandings of democracy. A majority of the population equated democracy to civil liberties while local academics often evaluated the

³⁴⁶ ANSD, *Du Troisieme Recensement General de la Population et de L'habitat* (2002) (The Third General Census of Population and Habitat [2002]), (June 2008), 84.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁸ Frederic Schaffer, *Democracy in Translation: Understanding Politics in an Unfamiliar Culture* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 35–6, 64–6.

³⁴⁹ Personal communication with Penda Mbow, 10 Nov 2009.

country's democracy based upon governance outcomes such as justice or corruption.³⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the importance of radio was felt during the 1996 elections when radio was a medium for reporting election irregularities and results. During the 2000 elections, the electoral monitoring power of radio was augmented with the use of cell phones by journalists and democratic activists.

C. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: SUPPLYING DEMOCRACY

As mentioned in Chapter II, supply of democracy is a measure of the action, or inaction, taken by political institutions in support of or against the implementation or removal of democratic processes. The suppliers of democracy are largely influenced by the same economic, security, and informational factors that influence demand. At times, suppliers may be influenced directly by changes in demand. Of course, a change in demand does not dictate a change in supply. The factors that influenced demand may not have the same magnitude or even the same direction of influence upon supply.

A variety of political institutions were responsible for delivering democracy to Senegal. The acquiescence of the military and the decisions of political parties were important elements in permitting the growth and sustenance of democracy. The most critical element, though, appears to be the regime itself. The ruling party made the key electoral laws that allowed the opposition to legally take power.

1. Senegal's Military

As discussed in Chapter II, the factors discussed above which influence civil society also influence the military's decision to remain apolitical or to allow civilian control of the military. In the case of Senegal, the diffusion of norms guided the military's actions. Senegal has a small, professional military with an incredible diffusion of democratic ideals, respect for the constitution, respect for other professions, and a commitment to remain above politics. Senegal's civil-military relations were shaped largely by professional military education.

³⁵⁰ Afrobarometer, Round 3, Survey in Senegal, 2005 and 2008, online: <http://afrobarometer.org/senegal.htm> (accessed 10 Oct 2009).

The Senegalese military began in the 19th century as riflemen for the French expansion across West Africa. The units were led by French officers. Upon independence, a civilian Defense Minister was placed in charge of the armed forces. However, the Senegalese military continued to rely upon French advisors in senior positions for another decade in order to cultivate a Senegalese senior officer corps based upon merit. Through the 1980s, almost all Senegalese military officers received their college education (e.g., military academy), military training (e.g., flight school), and professional military education overseas, primarily in France, the United States, and Morocco. Certainly, Senegalese officers had far more exposure to democratic norms when in France or the United States than they would have had in autocratic Senegal. Therefore, the foreign professionalization of the military appears to be a key determinant in minimizing the military's preference for intervening in politics and its preference for not repressing demonstrators.

The Senegalese military's apolitical norms were institutionalized by the second Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Jean Alfred Diallo. General Diallo kept the military from intervening in the power struggle between President Senghor and Prime Minister Mamadou Dia during the early 1960s. In 1968, General Diallo refused to use force against student protestors. Twenty years later, General Joseph Louis Tavaréz De Souza stayed faithful to the norm and refused to use force against post-election protestors.

The military's refusal to use force against anti-regime protestors suggests a considerable amount of independence from the government. Despite some of the perks provided to the military by the ruling regime, this independence left the ruling regime with a reasonable doubt as to whether the military would protect the regime in the face of widespread protests in the manner of the Philippines' People Power Revolt. Although the military chief of staff in 2000 was a close friend of Diouf's nephew, the generals in charge of the Interior Ministry and the National Electoral Observatory (ONEL) clearly indicated that they would not obstruct democracy when they declared Wade as the victor of the 2000 presidential race.

The effects of the economy and violence upon the military appear limited. Increases in intrastate violence have not led to military requests for reductions in democratic processes or freedoms in order to contain the insurgency. Although it is possible that the stalemate in Casamance disillusioned the military with Diouf's leadership, there is no evidence to suggest that this influenced the military to prefer a change.

2. NGOs

As discussed in Chapter II, NGOs have neither the force of the military to implement democracy nor the authority to adopt changes to the constitution. However, NGOs do have the ability to monitor the freeness of elections and provide increased accountability of the other suppliers of democracy. In the case of Senegal, NGOs did little to successfully increase the supply of democracy in Senegal. In fact, the marabouts were a significant obstacle to democracy as they contributed to the patronage system of coercion and incentives to warp the political system. Although there are increasing numbers of NGOs in Senegal, they have not yet had the influence required to successfully implement change during their interaction with the ruling regime.

Traditional NGOs have had little effect on democracy in Senegal. The number of NGOs in Senegal jumped in the 1980s and Senegalese are very engaged; most Senegalese belong to at least one organization and are more politically active than other developed countries.³⁵¹ Despite this, unions and civil society organizations have had little impact on the level of democracy. Historically, unions were clients of the state and had no independent voice. Contemporary unions are divided and have little influence at the national level.³⁵² The only NGO that made significant headway was *Assises Nationales*, National Forum; a coalition of NGOs, political parties, retired senior

³⁵¹ Richard Vengroff and Michael Magala, "Democratic Reform, Transition, and Consolidation: Evidence from Senegal's 2000 Presidential Election," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 39, no. 1 (2001): 137, 42–4.

³⁵² Personal communication with Babacar Diop, 4 Nov 2009.

government officials, and academics. The forum spent considerable effort evaluating and recommending constitutional design changes but was largely blocked by Wade's ruling regime.

While traditional NGOs had little effect in improving democracy, religious groups were a factor in sustaining the autocracy. By far, the most powerful non-governmental organizations in Senegal are the religious groups. Senegalese are principally members of Sufi Islam, which is organized in the country under two brotherhoods: Tijaniyya and Mouride. Although the Tijaniyya are more numerous, the Mourides are both more organized, more hierarchical, and more active politically. The power of the brotherhoods' marabouts, or religious leaders, is a combination of political savvy, religious ideology, and economic resources.

Initially, the marabouts resisted French culture. But, in time, the marabouts traded their political support to the French in exchange for peanut trading licenses and funding for mosques. Upon independence, the marabouts provided their support to Senghor in return for his maintenance of the economic status quo in which the marabouts dominated the market. The resulting structure was akin to a federal system in which the marabouts, although beholden to the government for resources, held autonomy over their areas of control. Some marabouts even had significant influence over the appointees of the local rural council.

Many Mouride marabouts rose to political prominence as part boss, part patron and part political dynasty. The marabouts's social status provided an inherent ability to coerce and incentivize the community while their influence on the distribution of state resources allowed them to establish an economic patronage system.³⁵³ Followers of the marabouts received land, credit, equipment, and spiritual benefits in exchange for loyalty and part-time labor in the marabout's field. Some followers had their children work full-time for the marabout in exchange for the child's education.³⁵⁴ In many cases, the marabout provided full-time workers with their own plot of land after ten years of

³⁵³Linda Beck, "Reining in the Marabouts? Democratization and Local Governance in Senegal," *African Affairs* 100, no. 401 (2001): 602.

³⁵⁴ Villalón, *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens in Fatick*, 118–9.

dedicated labor.³⁵⁵ However, the control of the marabouts over his followers should not be overstated. The marabouts were important individuals with good connections, but were not considered infallible with unquestionable authority.³⁵⁶

Marabout authority became a political dynasty because the marabout title was largely inherited. While there are tens of thousands of marabouts in Senegal, only a handful have more than a local following. Although not all marabouts inherited their title, the most powerful are from family dynasties because a marabout's spiritual grace is said to be inherited from the founder of the brotherhood.

In many cases, some marabouts acted as a patron to the people and a client of the state. Some marabouts ordered their followers to vote for the incumbent party, the Parti Socialist (PS). In exchange, the PS delivered state resources and recognition of the marabouts' religious authority.³⁵⁷ The relationship began to crack in 1988 when Caliph Abdou Lahatt created resentment when he ordered followers to vote for Diouf in exchange for government funding of projects in the holy city of Touba.³⁵⁸ As the next presidential election approached, public debates erupted over interpretations of a marabout's *ndigel* (religious command or recommendation). The translation of the term is ambiguous precisely because the use of the term was ambiguous. To some it was a religious command that if not followed jeopardized the transgressor's opportunity for paradise in the afterlife. To others, it was simply a recommendation that should be considered among other factors.

By 2000, citizens had largely come to separate their political and religious beliefs. Many influential marabouts supported Diouf but he lost anyway. After his victory, Wade

³⁵⁵ Donal Brian Cruise O'Brien, *Saints & Politicians: Essays in the Organisation of a Senegalese Peasant Society*, African Studies Series 15 (London ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 68.

³⁵⁶ Villalón, *Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal: Disciples and Citizens in Fatick*, 115–24; Donal Brian Cruise O'Brien, *Saints & Politicians: Essays in the Organisation of a Senegalese Peasant Society*, African Studies Series 15 (London ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 63–8; Linda J. Beck, *Brokering Democracy in Africa: The Rise of Clientelist Democracy in Senegal* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 87–91.

³⁵⁷ Beck, "Reining in the Marabouts? Democratization and Local Governance in Senegal," 612.

³⁵⁸ Linda J. Beck, *Brokering Democracy in Africa: The Rise of Clientelist Democracy in Senegal* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 91–2.

maintained the marabouts as clients of the state, giving them funding, cash, or diplomatic passports. Many perceive the marabouts, particularly the Mourides brotherhood, as a part of the ruling party. Because of this perceived tie to the ruling party, the marabouts' political recommendations for the incumbents are viewed by some with suspicion.

3. Political Parties

Political parties are important to democracy for two reasons. First, the opposition provides a limited constraining effect upon the ruling regime's policy options. Issues of security, economy, and norms are important drivers for motivating an opposition to form, voice its dissent, and mobilize the citizens to demand change. Second, the ruling party is often the power base of the coalition supporting the ruling regime. When the party fractures, the regime's ability to maintain power is weakened. In the case of Senegal, the fracturing of the ruling party and the existence of a viable, organized opposition party enabled a peaceful change in government to take place, greatly increasing the level of democracy in Senegal.

The roots of contemporary Senegalese political parties began well before independence. Initially under colonial rule, all politicians were French. Over time, the Senegalese cultivated their own politicians; electing one of their own, Blaise Diagne, to the French National Assembly in 1914. As the number of Senegalese politicians increased, political parties proliferated. One of the most popular and most powerful in the 1950s was the Bloc Democratique Senegalais (BDS). In 1958, the BDS consolidated its power by merging with several smaller parties; renaming itself the Union Progressiste Senegalais (UPS). For 40 years, the UPS, later renamed the Parti Socialiste (PS) under Senghor's three-party system, was a defender of the semi-autocratic system.

The major political parties were powerful entities. Under the one-party system, the PS determined all of the candidates in an entirely undemocratic manner. The proportional representation, party list system adopted during the 1970s institutionalized this power. Under the party list system, the party leadership determined which names were put onto the party list. Since the majority of political positions were determined by

party list and few candidates ran as independents, the party leadership largely determined candidates. Since the elections were not very competitive, the party leadership was essentially selecting the representatives.

The strength of the PS party members and their importance to the presidential coalition was not readily apparent until Diouf replaced Senghor as President. The PS party's old guard resented that Senghor chose the younger Diouf to be president. Diouf exacerbated the tensions by pushing the old guard, and their constituents, out of party power. As Diouf reduced the thresholds for party creation partly in an effort to fracture the opposition, disenfranchised party leaders created their own party; weakening the PS over the long term. Over time, the splits eventually created 73 registered political parties, though this generally equated into six to fifteen coalitions for a presidential candidate.³⁵⁹ Similar to the experience in the Philippines, the party splits resulted in ambiguous ideological differences between parties, people instead rallying around the charisma of the party leader. Recognizing the weakening of the PS, Diouf brought several of the old guard back into party power in preparation for the 1993 elections. Even so, the PS continued to suffer major defections in the 1990s. Djibo Leyti Kâ, former Minister of the Interior, split from the PS in 1998 to create the Union for Democratic Renewal. Moustapha Niasse, the Foreign Minister, split from the PS just prior to the 2000 election to create the Alliance of the Forces of Progress.

As the PS weakened during the 1990s, the opposition party led by Wade, the Parti Democratique Senegalais (PDS) gained momentum, especially among the universities and young urban adults. Population trends worked in the PDS' favor as migrants fed the urban population, university enrollment increased, and the population boom led to a youth bulge. However, party influence on the supply of democracy was indirect at best. PS actions over the 40 years of its rule largely encouraged the autocratic status quo. The weakening of the PS strained the government's ability to sustain the autocratic system. Although the PDS did not supply democracy per se, the existence of a viable, organized opposition was critical to the political change in power in 2000. However, once in

³⁵⁹ Personal communication with Nicole Tresch, 3 Nov 2009.

power, the PDS began to adopt measures that suggested an attempt to decrease the level of democracy. But, despite the efforts of the parties, the final call on political reform rested with the ruling executive.

4. The Ruling Regime: Incremental Departures from Autocracy

From Chapter II, the ruling regime will adopt electoral changes when it is in its best interests and the interests of the regime's key supporters. In the case of Senegal, the ruling regime was the direct implementer of political reforms. These reform periods can be grouped into three periods: the single party (1960-73), clientalistic democracy (1974–88), and competitive elections (1989-present). Economic unrest was a consistent motivator for Presidents Senghor and Diouf to approve democratic reforms. As the economy worsened under President Diouf, influencing factors upon reform broadened to post-election riots, international pressure, and the anti-repression norms of the military.

After independence and a brief failed experiment as a member of the Federation of Mali, Senegal created a political system based upon the French model. Free, competitive elections with open participation led to the selection of Senghor as Senegal's first president. More unusual than the free election was the acceptance of the defeat by his opponent who had significant support within the urban community. What appeared to be a shining example of African democracy quickly became a sham as the system devolved into a one-party dictatorship.

An ideological split arose between President Senghor and Prime Minister Dia. Dia's attempts to push the government to the far left resulted in his censure and imprisonment in 1962. In order to prevent such a future crisis, Senghor, with the approval of the legislature, enacted a constitutional reform that transferred additional powers to the executive branch. Senghor used his increased authority to coerce and incentivize opposition parties into joining the governing party. Parties that refused to join, such as the Marxist Parti Africain de l'Indépendance and the Bloc des Masses Senegalaises, were banned. By the 1968 legislative elections, only candidates from the governing party were competing. Senghor attempted to deflect criticism of this one-party rule by referring to the system as unified party rule. Senghor used similar coercion and

incentives to bring the various unions into the government-sponsored union, the National Union of Senegalese Workers (UNTS). Disobedient or disruptive unions were often disbanded. When the UNTS went on strike in 1968, it was dissolved by the government and replaced by another national union, the National Confederation of Senegalese Workers. Senghor's control of the political parties and the unions ensured his re-elections.

Several factors motivated Senghor to reform the Senegalese political system in the 1970s. Although Senghor certainly understood democratic ideals from his experience under French rule, his actions towards Dia and his coercive tactics against the unions and opposition parties makes it difficult to conclude that reform occurred solely because of Senghor's democratic ideals. However, Senghor did want to portray Senegal as a modern society to France and the United States. As mentioned previously, Senghor believed modernization theory's argument that development should precede democracy. But, by the 1970s, the modernization hypothesis was facing much criticism while Senegal was suffering a prolonged economic malaise. Droughts and volatile peanut prices were hurting the local economy and cutting into the government's tax revenues. In order to provide an outlet, Senghor began incrementally permitting additional parties to participate in politics. At first, with the urging of Wade, a single opposition party, the PDS, was allowed to become an official party in 1974.

Two years later in 1976, the rules were rewritten, creating a three-party system based upon predetermined ideological lines: social democratic, liberal democratic, and Marxist. The ruling party took the mantle of the social democrats. The previously banned Marxist party, the Parti Africain d'Indépendance logically took the Marxist banner. The PDS, unhappy about having to adopt a specific ideological tag, begrudgingly accepted the liberal democratic category. A few years later, in 1979, a fourth category was added for a conservative party, which was filled by the Mouvement Republicain Senegalais. Despite the reforms, one popular party was intentionally excluded, the Rassemblement National Democratique led by the charismatic and

accomplished historian, Cheikh Anta Diop.³⁶⁰ Regardless, the reforms dispersed little real political power as the three new parties initially garnered little popular support. Only with the help of the newly instituted proportional representation system did the opposition manage to gain a few seats in the legislature, technically ending the one-party system. However, representation was a mixed system with the majority of the seats still filled by a first-past-the-post majoritarian election that favored the incumbent party. The Senghor reforms provided a controlled outlet for political dissent with only a minimal increase in the level of democracy.

Despite his party's continued dominance, Senghor's control over future presidential elections was threatened by competition. In order to compensate, Senghor created a patronage network using the marabouts as his clients.³⁶¹ The patronage included the controlled distribution of land, credit, and peanut trade licenses. In turn, marabouts used these benefits to create a client base of their own which they would use to support Senghor, the ultimate distributor of benefits. The open public voting system (secret ballots were rare) enabled patrons to monitor the voting choices of their clients. Ballots were arranged by party affiliation. To vote for the opposition, a voter had to select the opposition ballot in plain view of the voting officials and those in line to vote. A vote for the opposition would quickly be known by the client's benefactor.

Senegal's debt crisis in the 1980s greatly constrained Senghor's ability to maintain the patronage network. With his support base splintering, Senghor agreed to voluntarily step down from power. When Senghor retired from the presidency in 1981, the constitutional rules of succession made Prime Minister Diouf the new President. Widely hailed at the time as a rare peaceful transition of power in African politics, the succession was entirely constructed. Senghor used the reforms of 1978 to move the

³⁶⁰ Upon his death, the University of Dakar was renamed in his honor.

³⁶¹ See Cruise O'Brien, *Saints & Politicians: Essays in the Organisation of a Senegalese Peasant Society*; Lucy Berman, *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Edward J. Schumacher, *Politics, Bureaucracy, and Rural Development in Senegal* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Robert Fatton, "Clientelism and Patronage in Senegal," *African Studies Review* 29, no. 4 (1986): 61–78.

power of appointing the Prime Minister from the National Assembly to the President and designate the Prime Minister as the successor to the President. In this manner, Senghor was able to personally determine his successor.

From the start, Diouf did not have the same political power as Senghor. The undemocratic nature of Diouf's accession was seen by many inside and outside of the government as illegitimate. In the eyes of the PS old guard, their loyalty and years of service were insulted by the selection of the young Diouf as President. Meanwhile, unrest was continuing to grow over the enduring economic slump. In an attempt to shore up his power, Diouf immediately set about instituting political reform by lifting the limitations on creating political parties. The reforms appeared democratic in nature but the effect fragmented the opposition and temporarily solidified the power of the ruling party. Ironically, over the long term the reform weakened the ruling party as it gave party leaders and government ministers the opportunity to defect from the PS without joining the ideological opposition.

Even though he won the 1988 election, Diouf was starting to lose his grip on power. His victory sparked urban protests over perceived voter fraud. Although it is possible that fraud was a factor, Diouf had significant support among the rural population. Although the opposition dominated the cities, the PDS lacked the resources to make inroads into the rural areas where the majority of the population lived.³⁶²

The election unrest, combined with continued tensions in the Casamance and increasing economic and international pressure, influenced Diouf to adopt additional reforms. In an attempt to diffuse regional tensions, Diouf enacted the Second Administrative Reform, which delegated various functions and resources to rural councils and city mayors.³⁶³ As Senegal continued to struggle through structural adjustment, Diouf turned to the French for additional financial aid. As a condition of the aid, French President Mitterand demanded political reforms. As a first step, Diouf created a coalition government in 1991, which brought four opposition leaders, including Wade, into the

³⁶² Babacar. Kanté, "Senegal's Empty Elections," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 1 (1994): 103.

³⁶³ Personal communication with Penda Mbow, 10 Nov 2009.

government as cabinet level officials. Once inside the government, the opposition leaders used the opportunity to craft a new electoral code. Under pressure from France and with an eye to preventing future electoral protests, Diouf agreed to adopt the new electoral code.

The 1992 electoral code mandated the secret ballot, implemented various rules designed to reduce vote fraud such as a national identification card, enacted Presidential term limit of two terms while increasing the term to seven years (from five), and instituted a requirement for a run-off vote if the leader did not receive votes exceeding 25% of registered voters (not votes, but registered voters). Several months after the reforms were signed into law, Wade left his government position so that he could legally compete in the 1993 presidential election.

With the new electoral rules, the opposition gained ground in the legislature. But, President Diouf won re-election. Once again, urban supporters of Wade rioted, protesting the suspected fraud. Wade was arrested, though later released, under the pretext of the murder of the vice president of the Constitutional Council. Although French pressure on Senegal for political reforms eased in 1993 when Balladur became President of France, limited increases in democracy sprang up in several of Senegal's neighbors. From 1991 through 1994, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Niger each dramatically improved their level of democracy.³⁶⁴ Senegal no longer represented the pinnacle of West African democracy. Maintaining Senegal's image as a modern country was an important priority for Diouf. As the Soviet Union collapsed, a high level of democracy came to be associated as a core element of a modern state. Diouf's support for reforms in 1996 and 1997 were likely a combination of a continuing desire to prevent post-election riots and a desire to retake Senegal's place as the beacon of modernity in West Africa. In 1996, the executive removed the Interior Ministry's oversight power of local governments. In 1997, Diouf approved the creation of the National Electoral

³⁶⁴ In Niger's case, the increase lasted only a few years.

Observatory (ONEL).³⁶⁵ ONEL was the Senegalese version of Mexico's Federal Electoral Institute; it was a non-partisan organization that worked to ensure the fairness of elections.

Although willing to adopt more democratic elections, Diouf was not interested in relinquishing power. In 1998, Diouf counteracted several of the 1992 reforms by removing presidential term limits, allowing Diouf to run for re-election. The change also founded the senate, a legislative body in which the majority of the seats were filled by Presidential appointment, further consolidating the President's power. The creation of the senate also provided Diouf a patronage outlet for party loyalists as the PS starting losing seats in the legislature.³⁶⁶

Despite these moves, Diouf lost the 2000 election to Wade. Diouf's loss was not entirely a surprise. Influenced by the independent university education, the independent media, and the decreasing government expenditures amid increasing unemployment and poverty, the increasing youth demographic voted for Wade. Meanwhile, Diouf had ostracized many of his senior political leaders who left the PS to start their own parties, weakening Diouf's support base.

Diouf had little choice but to step down. Wade's victory was widely exclaimed through the media and validated by the military generals running the electoral commission and the interior ministry. The riots after the 1988 and 1993 elections likely served as an indicator of what might occur if Diouf refused to step down. Diouf could not be sure that the military would back him. Only the year before in nearby Cote d'Ivoire, massive street protests led the military to oust President Henri Bedie. But, even if the military did support Diouf in such a move, Senegal's closet allies, France and the United States, would condemn his autocratic action and likely cut aid, a key input to keeping the Senegalese government functioning.

Wade's victory in 2000 was an indicator that the electoral reforms of the 1990s were successful. Senegal had reached its pinnacle of democracy, though it was the 1990s

³⁶⁵ Later renamed the Autonomous National Electoral Committee (CENA).

³⁶⁶ Gellar, *Democracy in Senegal: Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa*, 82.

reform and not Wade's victory itself that brought democracy. In fact, many experts argue that Senegalese democracy has taken a step back during Wade's administration. Wade's first reforms were promising. He redesigned the constitution in 2001 through a referendum, reinstating term limits for the President, reducing the President's term to five years (from seven) and abolishing the senate.³⁶⁷

After 2001, reforms took a troubling turn. Unable to institute his policies with a PS majority in the legislature, Wade called for early elections. The new legislative elections, riding the momentum of Wade's victory, formed a PDS majority legislature. In 2007, the prospects for sustaining democracy in Senegal started to look bleak. Evidence suggests that Wade rebuilt the patron-client system used by Senghor and Diouf. Reminiscent of 1988, a senior marabout said on national television that Wade's reelection in 2007 would be good for the holy city of Touba.³⁶⁸ However, the return on investment for the marabouts alliance is unclear since their ability to provide votes has been limited since the 1988 debacle. Wade gave the military the right to vote, allegedly hoping that the military would thank him with votes. Wade reinstated the senate. Just as before Wade abolished it, two thirds of the members were appointed by the President. This not only solidified Wade's hold on power, but was a method of patronage to provide senior government positions to his supporters. A twelve-party (including two major parties) opposition boycott over electoral rolls during the 2007 elections dramatically pushed the assembly further into the PDS camp. But the legislature was not entirely new. Like the Philippines experience, many PS politicians switched to PDS in recognition of the change in power.³⁶⁹

There is some concern that Wade is working to both extend his tenure and select his successor. The reinstatement of term limits in 2001 was carefully worded to ensure that Wade's 2000 election did not count towards the two-term limit. Wade helped ensure his re-election in 2007 by reducing the term limit to five years. After getting re-elected,

³⁶⁷ It is interesting to note that the previous year France reduced its presidential term from seven to five years.

³⁶⁸ Mbow, "Senegal: The Return of Personalism," 162.

³⁶⁹ Beck, *Brokering Democracy in Africa: The Rise of Clientelist Democracy in Senegal*, 149–51.

the term was lengthened back to seven years for the term beginning in 2012. Even if Wade decides not to run in 2012, many suspect that Wade will rule behind the scenes especially if a PDS member like his son, Karim Wade, is elected. Karim Wade is widely suspected of nepotism due to his prime government positions. Shortly after the senior Wade was elected, Karim became the personal advisor to the President. As a stepping stone towards the Presidency, Karim Wade ran on the Dakar city council party list in an effort to become the Mayor of Dakar. When Karim's party list failed to win enough seats on the city council to guarantee him the mayorship, he was granted a national cabinet seat as the Minister of Transportation.

The checks and balances within the government were lacking. The legislature was weak. Wade routinely exercised the presidential authority to hire and fire the Prime Minister, firing five prime ministers within seven years. Evidence of repression of the media and the opposition increased through the police and Wade's youth security team. Books providing detailed evidence of government corruption are banned. In 2005, Idrissa Seck was arrested on trumped up charges due to a growing political rivalry with President Wade. Seck was released eight months later.

Senegal's current democracy appears to be over-rated. The president's power over the prime minister, control of the senate, and a super-majority in the house, suggest dramatically less constraints on the executive than comparatively scored polities. Increasing reports of repression also suggest that Senegal is neither as competitive nor as participatory as previously thought. It would appear that Senegal has returned to the de facto one-party state, but merely under a new party. However, the March 2009 elections appear promising: the opposition won city elections in every major city, indicating that democracy continues to survive in Senegal.

The Western academic literature often exaggerates the level of democracy in Senegal perhaps because it was long a rarity across Africa. But the quality of democracy in Senegal is somewhat analogous to the country's Statue of the Renaissance. The statue is a beautiful, giant statue akin to the American's Statue of Liberty. It shows a man with a woman at his side and a baby in his arm. The statue is supposed to symbolize Africa's progress towards modernity. Although progressive in concept, everything about the

statue seems wrong. Besides the decadent opulence of the statue in a poor country, the statue has several features that complement neither the desired image nor the host country. Allegedly built by North Koreans, the figures' facial features, hair, and clothing simply do not look African. Contrary to depicting gender equality, the Barbie-skinny woman, with long straight hair blowing in the wind, is being pulled along by the muscle-bound man. The figures are scantily clad, the woman partially nude, in a community that dresses very conservatively. The ragged clothing looks like something from the jungles of a Tarzan movie instead of traditional dress. Like democracy in Senegal, the statue looks good at a glance. But, when analyzed, it has serious flaws.

D. SUMMARY

One of the driving factors behind all of Senegal's periods of democratization was Senegal's high level of democratic norms. Senegalese citizens had a high demand for democracy since colonial times. An elite desire to maintain Senegal as a modern state in the image of France and Senegal helped sustain a high demand for democracy throughout the urban community. Senegal's unusually high level of democratic norms overcame Senegal's low-income, lack of industrialization and correspondingly low education and literacy rates.

However, Senegal's pre-existing democratic norms do not adequately explain the timing of democratization. For Senegal, the most important structural influence upon actors was the economy and international pressure. The economic crisis of the 1970s drove the ruling regime to increase political participation as an outlet to public unrest. However, the changes were designed to limit the decrease in the ruling party's power. The ruling regime agreed to reforms in 1992 and 1997 due to post-electoral protests, the continuing economic crisis, and the corresponding conditional aid from France. While many of these factors continued to influence an increased demand for change during the 2000 election and the fracturing of the ruling party, the peaceful handover of power was primarily influenced by the military's aversion to repression as well as the potential for reduced aid for undertaking autocratic measures in the post-Cold War era.

Beyond the urban post-electoral protests that had only limited violence, intrastate violence had virtually no impact on Senegalese democracy. The insurgency was limited to Senegal's periphery with a relatively low level of violence. While ceasefires continued to fail, the overall death toll from the insurgency is fairly low, not even meeting the minimum threshold for many databases that track political violence. Due to its remoteness, the insurgency in Casamance was not a security concern for the majority of Senegalese and therefore, had little effect on preferences for either citizens or actors.

Each of Senegal's three Presidents has shown a tendency to revert to power consolidation. These reductions in the level of democracy were less a result of structural factors than the threat of a rising opposition power. Senghor was threatened by Prime Minister Dia's political maneuvering. In response, Senghor created the one-party and one-union state. Diouf was threatened by the growing strength of the PDS; he removed term limits and created the senate. Wade was threatened by the return of the PS; he dissolved the legislature, called for early elections, and re-introduced the senate. The future of Senegalese democracy stands on the tip of a blade. While a return to autocracy is not inevitable, the threat is very real.

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VII. CONCLUSION: AN INTEGRATION OF STRUCTURE AND ACTORS

This dissertation is an exploration of the determinants of the level of democracy. Using existing theories in democracy studies, this study deduced a model of polity change. The model proposed that changes in polity are the result of the strategic interaction of the military, NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime. The study hypothesized that the preferences of these key actors is influenced by changes in structural factors including economic income, economic development, violence, and the diffusion of democratic norms.

The study tested the effect of the structural factors upon democracy using a combination of econometric and computational analysis. It explored the impact of the structural factors upon actor preferences and the subsequent strategic interaction through three qualitative case studies on Mexico, the Philippines, and Senegal. The combination of econometric, computational, and qualitative analysis was far more compelling than any method individually. No one approach is superior or more empirically valid than the others. The econometric analysis provided statistically significant causal explanations; computational analysis provided trend and distribution data that was easily comprehensible; and qualitative analysis put the data into context. The combination of methods produced a comprehensive answer to the research question. For instance, qualitative analysis highlighted that structural factors often had cascading effects that could not be detected by regression analysis. The 1982 economic crisis in Mexico did not produce a significant GDP loss until the following year; the effect on political change was not evident until the next presidential election five years later.

The combined analysis determined that violence, industrialization, income, and the diffusion of norms are all important factors in the determination of the level of democracy. However, no one factor or combination of factors could definitively predict a change in the level of democracy. Each of these factors affected the motivations and capabilities of key actors: the military, NGOs, political parties, and the ruling regime. While the actions of the ruling regime can be singled out as the actual implementing

factor of democracy, the preferences of the military and political parties influenced the regime's decision-making process. While NGOs had little influence over the other actors, they were successful in improving democratic processes independent of the ruling regime's decisions. In each case, changes in the level of democracy occurred as the result of complex interactions between the four key actors. In all three cases, the ruling regime was the final arbiter of political reform. Of course, the ruling regimes did not adopt political reforms for philanthropic reasons but were highly influenced by other actors. In each case, the collapse of the patron-client system ended NGO support for the autocratic system, mobilizing civil society to demand political change through peaceful protests, riots, and increased political activism towards the achievement of free elections. Citizens' demand for political change resulted in the growth of a viable opposition party, a core element to a competitive election. In the final stages, the military's refusal to repress the opposition and acquiescence towards democracy left the ruling regimes little choice but to allow political reform and political change.

This chapter includes three sections. First, the effect of structural factors upon the level of democracy is reviewed. Section B presents the conclusions of the qualitative analysis on the preferences and interactions of key actors. The final section recognizes the policy implications for democracy and democracy promotion of the findings in the first two sections.

A. STRUCTURAL FACTORS

Structural factors do not have a consistent, linear effect upon the level of democracy. Instead, they exert either centripetal or centrifugal forces upon the level of democracy. Violence and poverty, and to a much lesser extent under-development, provide a strong centripetal effect towards the center of the polity spectrum. Catalysts such as economic crisis and the loss of an interstate war have a weak centrifugal effect that pushes polities towards the extremes of the polity spectrum, full autocracy and full democracy. Although economic income and development contributed to the potential for democracy, neither factor affected the timing of changes in democracy.

1. Violence

How does violence affect democracy? Intrastate violence can act as a catalyst for a change in the level of democracy. Although a change in violence is not determinative in itself, generally an increase in violence is strongly associated with a decrease in democracy while a decrease in violence has a small effect on increases in democracy. For example, rising intrastate violence in the Philippines from 1969 to 1971 led to an increasing acceptance among citizens of a reduction in the level of democracy in the form of martial law as a tradeoff for increased security.

Violence is a catalyst for regime change. While violence is typically an obstacle to democracy, there are a few cases in which a country adopted a higher level of democracy despite a high level of violence or even an increase in violence. In the case of Mexico and Senegal, outbursts of violence actually motivated the ruling regime to adopt small increases in democracy in a conciliatory move to defuse the violence. The incidents did not result in increased calls for democracy but in increased calls for political change. An increase in democracy was a means to achieve political change. In the case of Mexico, rising crime, the 1994 Zapatista uprising, and political assassinations fueled the perception that social upheaval was imminent. As it did in 1977, the PRI allowed political reform in order to avert the spread of uprisings. In Senegal, urban post-electoral protests motivated some minor political reforms. On the other hand, the Casamance insurgency had virtually no impact on the preference for democracy due to its low death toll and geographic remoteness. In 1987, the Philippines returned to democracy despite a high level of insurgency violence. In all three cases, because the violence targeted few civilians and was geographically remote, it presented little threat to the large metropolitan centers. Since the centers of political and economic power were not seriously threatened, civil society's preference for democracy was not adversely affected.

2. Industrialization

Does industrialization lead to democracy? While countries with high levels of industrialization tend to be democratic, the cause-effect relationship is weak. Changes in Mexico's industrialization provide little explanation for changes in the level of

democracy. Senegal increased substantially in democracy despite continued levels of under-development. Only the Philippines showed a significant relationship between industrialization and increased demand for democracy.

Mexico during the 1960s and 1970s was highly industrialized with a well-educated and highly literate work force. Yet, the Mexican Revolution tempered civil society's demand for democracy because it provided a patronage system with incentives for workers and farmers to sustain the autocratic system. Yet, it is impossible to prove that industrialization was not a contributory factor in the growing preference for democracy in Mexico during the 1980s.

The advancement of industrialization in the Philippines during the 1960, 70s, and 80s corresponded well with the rise in democracy in 1986. In the Philippines, a regional proliferation of manufacturing, the adoption of modern agriculture techniques, and Marcos' economic policies degraded the effectiveness of the agricultural-based patronage system. The proliferation of manufacturing enabled the development of democratic ideals in urban areas. Industrialization of the Philippines began in earnest in the 1960s. By the early 1980s, the Philippines had a large concentration of manufacturing in three major cities. The adoption of manufacturing led to an increase in the size of the middle-income tier, high levels of literacy, and an alternative source of income for the wealthy. The political power of landlords diminished as the cost of election campaigns grew, the independence of the workers increased, and the number of tenants declined.

While countries with low levels of industrialization have had difficulty maintaining a high level of democracy, the relevance of industrialization as a determinant of democracy appears to have waned over time as a rash of under-industrialized countries progressed towards democracy since the end of the Cold War. Senegal had a very low level of industry during its large increase in democracy in 2000. Modernization of agriculture is far less prevalent in Senegal than in the Philippines. Although numerous farmers' associations developed in the late 1980s, change in the level of industry appears to have little explanatory effect for democracy in Senegal. The adoption of democracy by a variety of other low industry countries suggests that the importance of industrialization was displaced by some other factor. Since the literature explains the

industry-democracy relationship as the method of spreading democratic ideals through education and literacy, it seems clear that other methods of spreading democratic ideals, such as diffusion from international social interaction and increased information access, have become more significant contributors.

The relevance of economic development and industrialization as a determinant of democracy appears to wane over time. While the case research limits the explanatory power of industrialization, it is difficult to entirely discount the variable as ineffective. For future research, it is important to consider that industrialization may be an over-aggregated variable. Variables such as literacy, education, and relative position of economic groups may have more explanatory power over the long term. Of course, it is also critical to consider regional variations within countries.

3. Income

Does income affect democracy? Income, by itself, appears to be a poor explanatory cause for democracy. No level of economic income can force a country to increase its level of democracy. For the three cases, democracy did not come at the height of economic income, but only after a severe economic crisis.

The effect of the economy on level of democracy was not consistent over time or across polity types. The 1980s was a pivotal turning point in the economic determinants of democracy as the explanatory power of income and economic crisis increased while the relevance of oil decreased. Income had a linear effect on changes in democracy during the 1980s and 1990s. During this time, moderately wealthy countries across Latin America and Eastern Europe dramatically increased their level of democracy. Beyond these two decades, income had a polarizing effect upon polity type. Instead of pushing countries towards democracy, income pushed countries towards the polity extremes of full autocracy or full democracy, creating a U-curve relationship between income and democracy.

Economic crisis also appeared to have a polarizing effect upon democracy though the statistical results were not definitive. Surprisingly, the 1980s economic crisis had a profound, positive effect upon all three cases studies though the timing delay of the

subsequent increase in democracy varied greatly across countries. The 1980s economic crises in Mexico, the Philippines, and Senegal degraded the traditional patron-client relationships, reducing the benefits for maintaining the autocratic regime. In all three cases, growing economic unrest contributed to a significant increase in democracy only when it was combined with other structural factors

The U-curve relationship between income and democracy indicates that few poor countries are likely to sustain democracy. For instance, countries with less than \$2,000 GDP per capita rarely achieve or maintain a high level of democracy. Only India, Mongolia, and the Solomon Islands managed the feat for any significant period of time. More recently, Ghana, Senegal, and Liberia are working to achieve the same. But, their success remains to be proven. The success of these countries at democracy is not limited because they are poor but because the distribution of rare resources in the country is often corrupted by a patronage system, which is not conducive to democracy.

Similarly, it is the patronage system in oil states that inhibits democratic processes. Oil's effect upon democracy is not universal, but can be used to perpetuate the capacity for a patronage system. In fact, Mexico's collapse in oil rents led to the demise of its patronage system and the rise of democracy. In general, achievement of high levels of democracy in an oil state is unlikely unless the patronage system is dismantled.

This analysis was unable to prove or disprove the neo-Marxist focus on class structure as the key to political change. While the middle class represents potential adopters of democratic ideals, the case study analysis found the operationalization of middle class a significant obstacle. Variations in national and sub-national costs of living, standards of living, and currency fluctuations made detailed calculations of a middle class problematic.

4. Norms

Democratic changes in one country have a direct relationship on the level of democracy in peer countries. This effect is most influential post-1980, likely due to improved technology and transportation capabilities that enhance the diffusion of ideas. Interestingly, this same time period saw an increase in low-income and under-developed

countries attaining high levels of democracy. Although not definitive, it is highly likely that increased diffusion capabilities negated the need for income and development as means to develop democratic ideals. In other words, increased economic, social, and technological interaction brought democratic ideals to new frontiers that lacked education, literacy, televisions, and civic associations.

High degrees of economic and social interaction with France and the United States brought democratic ideals to Dakar, northern Mexico, and Manila. However, tight control of the media enabled the government to constrain the spread of democratic ideals nationwide. All three cases had a history of limited democratic processes with a long tradition of voting and a written constitution. It was not until the rise of an independent media that the cracks in the autocratic system began to show. The free media highlighted the imperfections of the political system. It questioned the legitimacy of political assassinations. It highlighted the critiques of the autocratic system from the religious community, major trade partners, and allies. For Mexico and Senegal, the media highlighted the bankruptcy of the one-party system after the end of the Cold War; reform was necessary in order to maintain the country's image as a modern state as many of their neighbors adopted increased levels of democracy.

Level of:	Mexico	Philippines	Senegal
Income	High	Medium	Low
Industrialization	High	Low-Medium	Low
Violence	Low-Medium	High	Low
Diffusion	High	Low-Medium	Medium

Table 12. Summary of Structural Factors by Case Study

The results in Table 12 suggest that no single structural factor is a consistent determinant of democracy. While the diffusion of norms has explanatory power for both Mexico and Senegal, it holds little explanation for the timing of democracy in the Philippines. Section B looks at how these structural factors shaped actor preferences.

B. ACTORS

The effect of structural factors was inconsistent over time because actors responded differently depending upon the specific context and the behavior of other actors. Structural factors did influence actor preferences. However, it was the interactive decisions by actors that determined the resulting change in the level of democracy. The most important actors in determining polity change were the military and the ruling regime. NGOs and political parties were factors but had considerably less ability in controlling the timing of lasting political change.

The military's preference for political change was largely driven by the diffusion of norms. However, the norms adopted did not embrace democratic processes. In none of the three cases did the military take action designed to bring about democracy. In each case, the military adopted professional norms regarding human rights, restraint against peaceful demonstrators, and respect for the constitution. In the case of the Philippines, the partial adoption of these norms led to a split in the military in 1986, which marked the beginning of the People Power Revolution. However, the defectors were not motivated by democratic ideals as evidenced by the seven subsequent coups attempts against President Corazon Aquino. However, the military's internal split limited Marcos' ability to use force to crush the opposition.

In the case of Mexico and Senegal, it was the military's inaction that is of interest. Neither military took decided steps to bring about democracy, but neither did they attempt to oppose an increase in democracy. Both militaries received generous benefits from the incumbent party and faced an insurgency threat. But neither military showed a significant interest in maintaining the incumbent party in order to preserve their resources or move towards autocracy as a counterinsurgency strategy. The military permitted democracy to occur for several reasons. First, the insurgencies in Mexico and Senegal

were low-casualty, geographically remote affairs. The insurgent groups were not a serious threat to the existence of the state. Second, the military was professionalized and independent. The fate of the military was not tied to the fate of the regime. Third, all three countries were already democracies according to their constitutions. It is possible that the military leaders did not recognize the increases in democracy as a change in the domestic balance of power and therefore had little effect on the military's interests. Finally, all three militaries had developed a normative aversion to repressing demonstrators, limiting the executive's ability to remain in power through the use of force.

Although NGOs could be important harbingers of democracy, in Mexico and Senegal, NGOs were co-opted into being clients of the state. It was only when economic crisis radically reduced the distribution of patronage that NGOs began to assert their independence from the state and demand political change. In Mexico and Senegal, NGOs formed formal and informal alliances, respectively, to conduct election monitoring. In the Philippines, business groups and the Catholic Church joined forces in anti-regime protests and boycotts, culminating in the formation of a successful political opposition. In the post-democracy environment, NGOs served as a source for social mobilization and increased accountability of the military, political parties, and the ruling regime.

In all three cases, a viable, organized opposition party was a requirement to increased democracy. Without it, the ruling executive would have remained in power. The opposition's victory was made possible, in part, by a split in the ruling party. Disagreements over power-sharing, ideology, and patronage resulted in defections from the ruling party. The splits in all three cases were partly motivated by economic crisis. The party patronage system was strong during periods of economic stability but could not be maintained during crises.

In all three case studies, the ruling executive was the final arbiter of change in democracy. President Zedillo of Mexico, President Marcos of Philippines, and President Diouf of Senegal all approved election reforms that would enable the rise of the opposition. Of the three, only Marcos refused to acknowledge defeat. His refusal

resulted in widespread unrest that the military was unwilling to repress. The U.S. notification that it would no longer support his rule indicated that Marcos would lose foreign aid critical to the upkeep of his regime; Marcos had little choice but to abdicate. It is possible that Zedillo and Diouf learned from the Philippines and other similar situations. Their decision to abide by the election results was partly driven by the potential for unrest, the ambiguity of the military's willingness to repress unrest, and the possibility of losing foreign aid and investments. Additionally, Zedillo and Diouf also valued democracy, or at least the value in being perceived as a democracy.

The explanatory power of changes in structural factors on actor preferences was mixed (see Table 13). Rising income appeared to have little consistent, explanatory power. Only severe economic crises motivated an increased preference from democracy. Economic crises motivated civil societies to demand change, decreased NGO's stake in maintaining autocracy, consolidated the political opposition, and reduced the regime's ability to provide patronage. Change in industrialization does not explain timing of changes in democracy. This is largely because economic development primarily affects demand for democracy among civil society with little effect upon the preferences of actors that supply democracy. For instance, the growth of independent media was critical in increasing civil society's preference for democracy but appeared to have little influence on other actors. Surprisingly, changes in violence did not consistently affect the preference of the military but was often a significant factor in motivating regimes to implement political reforms. Diffusion surprisingly had a very high impact on the military's preference for democracy. Further, it had a varied impact on civil society. Diffusion explains very little about democratic change in the Philippines, but is far more prominent in Senegal.

Change in:	Civil Society	Military	NGOs	Political Parties	Ruling Regime
Income	Medium	Low	Medium	Medium	Medium
Industrialization	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Low
Violence	Medium	Medium	Low	Low	High
Diffusion	Low to High	High	Medium	Medium	Medium

Table 13. Explanatory Power of Structural Change upon Key Actors

C. PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN CONFLICT-RIDDEN STATES

Over the past decade, the success of democracy in conflict-ridden countries has become a major policy concern. For future research, this study's model could be extended to conflict-ridden states such as contemporary Iraq or Afghanistan. Although the cases in Iraq and Afghanistan are certainly not generalizable to the majority of changes in democracy, the amount of resources and manpower used to create a change in regime and build democracy in those two countries make these cases interesting.

The model from this study predicts that Iraq has a moderate chance of maintaining democracy. Iraq is well industrialized but is plagued by economic turmoil with GDP per capita less than \$2,000. However, Iraq had a long history of autocratic traditions and tightly controlled information channels, which likely hampered the spread of democratic ideals despite high levels of education, literacy, and technology. Furthermore, Iraq is surrounded by non-democratic neighbors, limiting the potential for norm diffusion. Regional democracies such as Israel and Lebanon are hardly peers that Iraq would like to emulate. Therefore, civil society in Iraq is unlikely to demand a high level of democracy. However, high voter turnout and large, organized protests are a positive indication that civil society is actively engaged.

Violence is the primary obstacle to sustaining democracy in Iraq. Iraq's prospects for maintaining democracy will improve if the insurgency can be marginalized to peripheral areas away from the centers of economic and political power. Without a solid base of democratic ideals, the citizenry is likely to prioritize security at the expense of democracy. With a high level of violence and a low level of demand for democracy, Iraq appears poised to be a hybrid regime with only limited democratic processes.

A brief examination of the key actors in Iraq suggests that none will undertake action to cause a significant change in the level of democracy. The military is growing in strength, but power is highly decentralized. A coup attempt would likely split the military. A coup seems an unlikely possibility in the near term unless the military budget is drastically cut. Although there are few significant local NGOs, international NGOs have made significant efforts to monitor Iraqi elections. Based upon the current political situation, one-party rule seems unlikely; any attempts to do so would likely spark civil war. Iraqis have a substantial capacity to mobilize and protest, increasing the potential risks for autocratization. Finally, it is unlikely that the ruling regime would adopt a sudden decrease in democracy even after the U.S. military departs. Any move towards autocracy would ostracize one of the major political parties, again potentially motivating civil war. Additionally, autocratization risks the loss of foreign aid, critical to Iraq's survival and reconstruction.

Afghanistan appears to be a far more difficult problem. Afghanistan has never been industrialized or received significant levels of income. Education and literacy are poor and the country is surrounded by non-democracies. The exception is unstable Pakistan, which seems to encapsulate all of the potential dangers that democratization can hold. Civil society is far more rural and less organized than in Iraq, but small levels of mobilization do occur. As an anecdotal indicator of the low demand for democracy in Afghanistan, the 2009 presidential election was widely criticized as fraudulent, yet there were no major election protests. The presence of NATO creates an artificial supply of democracy in Afghanistan. The cost-benefit analysis of maintaining the current regime type will change for the military and the ruling regime when NATO withdraws. Yet, Afghanistan seems unlikely to autocratize as actors in Afghanistan have similar

constraints to those in Iraq; a move towards autocracy risks civil war. It is ironic that the sub-national power structures that complicate the effectiveness of democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan also ensure its continuation.

The likelihood of either Iraq or Afghanistan achieving a high level of democracy in the near term seems low. However, prospects of achieving high democracy in these two countries or any other target of democracy promotion can be improved. Demand for democracy, though a complex and indirect process, can be encouraged through increased literacy, education, independent media, and information distribution channels that have broad reach in local languages. In many developing countries, religious organizations are an important conduit of democratic norms. At a minimum, it is important for these organizations not to actively oppose democracy. In order to foster demand, the urban areas of economic and political power require security and a stable economy; otherwise there is increased risk that elites will support a move towards autocracy. Further, without the potential for jobs and security, the masses will have little motivation to undertake activities that require a long time horizon such as learning to read or getting a degree, both important factors in building democratic ideals.

Spreading democracy also requires the development of an endurable supply. First, the military should be professionalized; its obligation should be to the democratic constitution, not an individual or office. Second, a viable, organized opposition party must exist. Without it, there are few constraints upon the executive. Finally, the ability to use political pressure to encourage another country to democratize only appears to work during a period of economic crisis within a country that lacks the capability or will to repress its citizens.

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APPENDIX 1: DATA MODIFICATIONS

Polity2 modifications following Plumper and Neumayer:

Afghanistan 78-88 changed to -7
 Angola 91-96 changed to -6, -6, -5, -4, -4, -3
 Bosnia 92-94 changed to missing
 Burundi 92-95 changed to -7, -7, -7, -5
 Cambodia 75 changed to -6
 Chad 78-84 changed to -7
 Comoros 95 changed to 4
 Congo Kinshasa 92-02 changed to -8
 Cuba 59-60 changed to -7
 Cyprus 63-67 changed to 8, 8, 8, 7, 7
 Czech 68 changed to -7
 Ethiopia 74 changed to -9; 91-92 changed to -8, -4
 Hungary 56 changed to -7
 Laos 61-72 changed to -1
 Liberia 90-95 changed to -6
 Nicaragua 79-80 changed to -8, -5
 Somalia 91-2007 changed to missing

Country	Region Designated	Alternative Region
Mauritania Mali Niger Chad	West Africa	North Africa
Congo, Republic of Zaire	South Africa	West Africa
Ethiopia Eritrea Somalia	East Africa	North
Egypt	North Africa	Mid East
Turkey	Mid East	Europe
Sudan	East Africa	Mid East
Iran	Mid East	South Asia
China	East Asia	South
Myanmar	South Asia	East
Panama	Central America	South
Columbia	South America	Central
Mexico	Central America	North America and Europe

Table A.1 Region Conversions

A Note on Colonial Legacy: The identification of a state's colonial ruler is not as straightforward as it might appear. Many colonies traded hands. The British took Guyana and Sri Lanka from the Dutch. The Americans took the Philippines and Cuba from Spain. After World War I, the German colonies were distributed among the British, French, and Belgians. Does one legacy overwrite the other? Ottoman and Portuguese imperialism muddies the water. The Ottoman Empire was not colonial in the traditional sense. Most states were tribute-paying territories with significant amounts of autonomy. The Portuguese were early seafarers and established outposts throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. While the Portuguese established a few colonies in Brazil, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, the majority of their explorations were trading posts. While the natives may have been introduced to European customs and goods in places like Angola, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, these areas were not governed by the Portuguese. In the case of the Ottoman Empire and most Portuguese territories, the state bureaucracy was not created by the colonial ruler.

Arguably, the nationality of the colonizer is irrelevant; it is the type of bureaucratic structure enacted that matters. For instance, the colonial structure that the British imposed upon the American colonies was far different than the one imposed upon Nigeria. The colonial structure imposed is partly influenced by the pre-colonial socio-economic structure and the size of its population. The empirical exploration of cross-sectional colonial structures upon the evolution of democracy has not been adequately explored.

APPENDIX 2: TRANSITION CASES

Transition from Autocracy to Full Democracy

Country	Year
Austria	1946
Italy	1948
Germany	1949
Japan	1952
Uruguay	1952
Korea, S	1960
Dominican Rep	1962
Turkey	1973
Greece	1975
Portugal	1976
Spain	1978
Ecuador	1979
Bolivia	1982
Argentina	1983
Uruguay	1985
Philippines	1987
Pakistan	1988
Chile	1989
Panama	1989
Bulgaria	1990
Czech	1990
Hungary	1990
Madagascar	1992
Niger	1992
Thailand	1992
Lesotho	1993
Croatia	2000
Senegal	2000
Kenya	2002
Liberia	2005

Transition from Partial Democracy to Full Democracy

Pakistan	1956
Turkey	1961
France	1969
Venezuela	1969
Sri Lanka	1970
Pakistan	1973
Columbia	1974
Cyprus	1974
India	1977
Botswana	1987
Brazil	1988
Turkey	1989
Gambia	1990
Peru	1990
Solomon	1990
Poland	1991
Mongolia	1992
Paraguay	1992
South Africa	1994
Nicaragua	1995
Dominican Rep	1996
Guatemala	1996
Romania	1996
Taiwan	1996
Korea, S	1998
Slovak	1998
Argentina	1999
Mexico	2000
Ghana	2001
Moldova	2001
Peru	2001
Macedonia	2002
Indonesia	2004
Albania	2005
Serbia	2006

**Transition from Colony to Full
Democracy**

Myanmar	1948
India	1950
Sudan	1956
Malaysia	1957
Laos	1958
Jamaica	1959
Cyprus	1960
Nigeria	1960
Trinidad	1962
Gambia	1965
Lesotho	1966
Mauritius	1968
Fiji	1970
Bangladesh	1972
Papua New Guinea	1975
Latvia	1991
Lithuania	1991
Slovenia	1991

**Transition from Colony to Partial
Democracy**

Indonesia	1946
Sri Lanka	1948
Singapore	1959
Benin	1960
Congo	1960
Somalia	1960
Sierra Leone	1961
Uganda	1962
Kenya	1963
Zambia	1964
Botswana	1966
Guyana	1966
Equatorial Guinea	1968
Zimbabwe	1970
Comoros	1975
Solomon	1978
Namibia	1990
Belarus	1991
Estonia	1991
Georgia	1991
Macedonia	1991
Moldova	1991
Ukraine	1991
Armenia	1992
Azerbaijan	1992
Slovak	1993
East Timor	2002

Transition from Autocracy to Partial Democracy

Ecuador	1948	Romania	1990
Pakistan	1948	Bangladesh	1991
Syria	1954	Benin	1991
Panama	1955	Zambia	1991
Peru	1956	Congo	1992
Columbia	1957	Guyana	1992
Venezuela	1958	Mali	1992
Pakistan	1962	Russia	1992
Korea, S	1963	Taiwan	1992
Peru	1963	Cambodia	1993
Sudan	1965	CAR	1993
Guatemala	1966	Peru	1993
Ecuador	1968	Guinea-Bissau	1994
Sierra Leone	1968	Haiti	1994
Thailand	1969	Malawi	1994
Ghana	1970	Mexico	1994
Argentina	1973	Mozambique	1994
Thailand	1974	Ethiopia	1995
Burkina Faso	1978	Tanzania	1995
Dominican Rep	1978	Ghana	1996
Thailand	1978	Sierra Leone	1996
Ghana	1979	Albania	1997
Nigeria	1979	Iran	1997
Peru	1980	Armenia	1998
Uganda	1980	Cambodia	1998
Honduras	1982	Djibouti	1999
Turkey	1983	Indonesia	1999
El Salvador	1984	Niger	1999
Brazil	1985	Nigeria	1999
Guatemala	1986	Ivory Coast	2000
Sudan	1986	Serbia Yugo	2000
Korea, S	1988	Comoros	2002
Paraguay	1989	Algeria	2004
Poland	1989	Burundi	2005
Albania	1990	Guinea-Bissau	2005
Comoros	1990	Krygyzstan	2005
Fiji	1990	DR Congo	2006
Haiti	1990	Haiti	2006
Mongolia	1990	Nepal	2006
Nepal	1990		
Nicaragua	1990		

Transition from Full Democracy to Autocracy

Czech	1947
Pakistan	1958
Sudan	1958
Laos	1960
Korea, S	1961
Myanmar	1962
Nigeria	1966
Lesotho	1970
Turkey	1971
Uruguay	1971
Bangladesh	1974
Pakistan	1977
Turkey	1980
Fiji	1987
Peru	1992
Gambia	1994
Niger	1996
Pakistan	1999
Thailand	2006

Transition from Full Democracy to Partial Democracy

Greece	1949
France	1958
Nigeria	1964
Malaysia	1969
India	1975
Sri Lanka	1978
Gambia	1981
Argentina	1989
Columbia	1995
Pakistan	1997
Turkey	1997
Madagascar	1998
Venezuela	1999
Ecuador	2000

Transition from Partial Democracy to Autocracy

Columbia	1948
Syria	1949
Indonesia	1950
Egypt	1952
Guatemala	1954
Cuba	1955
Ecuador	1961
Peru	1962
Benin	1963
Congo	1963
Brazil	1964
Singapore	1965
Kenya	1966
Uganda	1966
Greece	1967
Sierra Leone	1967
Panama	1968
Peru	1968
Zambia	1968
Equatorial Guinea	1969
Somalia	1969
Ecuador	1970
Sierra Leone	1971
Sudan	1971
Ghana	1972
Korea, S	1972
Philippines	1972
Chile	1973
Guatemala	1974
Argentina	1976
Comoros	1976
Thailand	1976
Guyana	1978
Burkina Faso	1980
Ghana	1981
Nigeria	1984
Uganda	1985
Zimbabwe	1987
Sudan	1989
Haiti	1991
Thailand	1991
Azerbaijan	1993
Belarus	1995
Albania	1996

Armenia	1996
Cambodia	1997
Congo	1997
Comoros	1999
Haiti	2000
Nepal	2002
CAR	2003
Guinea-Bissau	2003
Iran	2004
Fiji	2006
Peru	1948
Thailand	1971

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